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ABSTRACT 
This study applies the ethical theories of Emmanuel Levinas to the novels and short 
stories of the major New Woman novelists of the fin de siècle in England. Chapter One 
introduces the study and its theoretical framework. Chapter Two discusses how New Woman 
writers confront their protagonists with ethical dilemmas framed as face-to-face encounters that 
can be read as the moment of ethics formation. They also gesture toward openness and 
indeterminacy through their use of carnivalesque characters. In Chapter Three, Levinas’s 
concepts of the said and the saying illuminate readings of polemical passages that interrogate the 
function of language to oppress or empower women. Chapter Four reads dreams, visions, 
allegories, and proems as mythic references to a golden age past that reframe the idea of 
feminine altruism. Chapter Five employs Levinas’s vision of the tragic artist to read New 
Woman Kunstlerroman. Chapter Six, the conclusion to the study, summarizes the underlying 
framework, the process that initiated the study, and considers implications for further research.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
      In her 2001 study of ethics and narrative in late Victorian fiction, Ethics and Narrative in the 
English Novel, 1880 – 1914, Jil Larson cites as the catalyst for her work a renewed willingness 
among scholars in the 1990s to examine the “embattled concept of ethics and literature” (2). This 
examination, begun a decade earlier by Wayne Booth and Martha Nussbaum, considers the way 
that literature can depict ethical concepts and problems and can, intentionally or not, affect the 
moral development of readers. Larson’s study is made possible, she notes, by the “turn to ethical 
criticism” in the 90s. Larson’s work interrogates the New Woman writers’ engagement with the 
question of female agency at the fin de siècle (3). Considering the novels of these writers in 
comparison with the work of Thomas Hardy and Joseph Conrad, Larson asserts that the New 
Women writers, like Hardy and Conrad, have not yet escaped mid-Victorian ideas about the 
ethical roles of men and women. The value of their work, Larson contends, lies in their re-
casting of emotion as partnering with reason in a way that is defensible for women to make 
better decisions and choices. In contrast to Larson, I argue that the women who comprise the 
major voices among the New Woman writers resist both received social conventions and 
aesthetic forms. Juxtaposing sharp political commentary and narrative innovations, these writers 
invent texts depicting a tragic present that nevertheless takes a utopian turn; by daring to explore 
new narrative forms, they challenge their readers to imagine new ways of living.  
      Foundational to this study is the Victorian hegemony’s demand for womanly altruism. Self-
sacrifice, submerging any extra-domestic ambitions and choosing instead family responsibilities, 
was considered the only moral or ethical choice for women. In other words, the “good” woman, 
the Victorian “angel in the house,” was satisfied to be relegated to the domestic sphere wherein 
she focused her life on serving others. This feminine submission is foundational to the dominant 
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Victorian ethical systems, Utilitarianism and Christianity, which defined for women limited roles 
based on economic good or religious hegemony. However, these systems no longer functioned in 
a period marked by chaos and anarchy when “all the laws that governed sexual identity and 
behavior seemed to be breaking down” (Showalter 2). Writing during this transitional period of 
the fin de siècle, the writers whose work is examined here reject gender-based self-sacrifice as 
unethical. Instead, they seek to imagine a new ethical system for a new woman in a new century; 
thus, in rejecting conventional morality, they must grapple with the central emerging ethical 
dilemma facing both men and women: the obligation to the (perhaps unknowable) other. I argue 
that the texts examined in this study envision a more equitable and gender-neutral system of 
ethics built on mutual responsibility to the other. Their vision of a more open ethical system is 
illuminated by reading their texts through the theories of Emmanuel Levinas. 
1.1 Theoretical Framework 
Donald R. Wehrs and David P. Haney, in their introduction to a collection of essays 
entitled Levinas and Nineteenth Century Literature, link nineteenth century novelists with the 
twentieth century theorist through their mutual contestation of the elevation of the ego and 
personal freedom above the ethical (29), a particularly complex problem for women, who would 
be accused of selfishness and radicalism for asserting autonomous privilege. According to Wehrs 
and Haney, “the authority of Levinas’s philosophical discourse is inseparable from the authority 
that literary discourse of the nineteenth century came to acquire through contesting the 
sufficiency of the period’s forms of placing freedom above ethics.” Instead, Levinas “discloses 
the rational non-violence that the best literature communicates” (29). Novelists and theorists of 
the period, responding to the French Revolution as a defining moment in ethical thought, 
recognized, as does Levinas, the dangers inherent in the autonomous ego and the need to 
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“ground the self in something other, more comprehensive, and more responsible than its own 
rational intentionality” (30).  
      As the New Woman novelists are indeed examining the need for both men and women to 
balance personal freedom and mutual obligation, Wehrs and Haney’s contentions form part of 
the foundation for my use of the work of Emmanuel Levinas as a theoretical framework. 
Defending her own use of Levinas’s work as a lens through which to examine the problematic 
structure of George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda, Rachel Hollander argues that the novel, like other 
late century narratives, “constitutes an ethical response, in both content and structure, to the 
problem of knowing the other” (265). While Hollander mentions only canonical late-century 
writers in her argument, specifically Hardy, I will extend Hollander’s claim to the work of the 
primary New Woman writers: Olive Schreiner, Sarah Grand, Mona Caird, Ella Hepworth Dixon, 
George Egerton, and Mary Cholmondeley. I argue that, given their self-conscious employment 
of experimental narrative forms to articulate their activist stance, these novelists, even more than 
other late nineteenth century writers, are focused on examining the “self’s recognition of and 
responsibility for that which is absolutely other” (Hollander 265).  
      Four principles of Levinas’s work inform this study. First, in their examination of failed 
conventions for marriage and for relationships between men and women, the New Woman 
writers engage Levinas’s concept of the “face,” the pre-conscious and timeless obligation of the 
ethical subject for the other. The face, according to Levinas,  
summons me, calls for me, begs for me, as if the invisible death that must be faced by the 
Other, pure otherness, separated, in some way, from any whole, were my business…the 
other man’s death calls me into question,…The Other becomes my neighbor precisely 
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through the way the face summons me, calls for me, begs for me, and in so doing recalls 
my responsibility, and calls me into question.” (Levinas Reader 82)   
In particular, Sarah Grand, Mary Cholmondeley, and Olive Schreiner layer their discussion of 
gender bias by depicting ethically failed relationships resulting from their characters’ inability to 
respond authentically to this primal obligation. Their indictment of gender roles driving these 
failed relationships only reinforces the need to recognize mutual responsibility that is human and 
therefore gender neutral. Simultaneously, these novelists signal an open future for women 
readers, a political and social indeterminacy, through their use of carnivalesque character types 
who function as a challenge to hegemonical structures.  
      Secondly, for Levinas, the value of language as the vehicle of ethics formation lies in its 
immediacy and its intimacy. In Otherwise than Being, Levinas privileges language as the 
machinery of self-awareness and awareness of the other, the first step in the ethical progress. 
New Woman novelists demonstrate this connection between language and ethical formation in 
texts that both comment on social problems and engage their readers in the use of a new feminist 
language. They are therefore reconceiving language to build both a universal ethics and a new 
common women’s language. New Woman fiction, then, engages the power of what Levinas calls 
“the said”—intelligible and closed communication that is one part of the ethical relationship. On 
one level, they refute ideas about women that have already been codified into written language. 
On another, however, they use written language to invent a sense of community that stands in the 
space of proximity between the self and the other, which Levinas contends is necessary for an 
ethical relationship. 
      Linked with the “said,” according to Levinas, is the third principle I employ in this study—
the concept of the “saying.” In Otherwise than Being, Levinas defines the saying as the ineffable 
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face-to-face moment wherein ethics originates. Before the saying is concretized into language, 
into the said, there must first be a condition between the subject and the other that is not borne in 
words; this is the definition of proximity, or the responsibility to the other. Levinas 
acknowledges the equivocal and enigmatic nature of the saying, acknowledging too its 
connection to transcendence (10). In the texts examined here, the authors combine conventional 
linear narrative with odd interpolations: allegorical digressions, poetical prologues, dreams, and 
mythic visions. An ethical reading of these narrative innovations reveals how they reconceive the 
form of the novel while simultaneously re-framing the self-sacrifice of women in the present as 
fulfilling an obligation to the women of future generations.  
      Finally, I take the fourth principle from two essays: “Reality and Its Shadow,” and “The 
Poet’s Vision.” In “Reality and Its Shadow,” Levinas asserts the potential of literature to 
examine the “entretemps,” the interstices of language within which reside the potential for 
encountering the tragic and engaging the ethical development of the fractured self. The 
entretemps is the eternal “meanwhile” in which characters in literature exist (Levinas Reader 
138). Existing in this suspended state, they are eternally tragic figures, always already fated to 
suffer. In “The Poet’s Vision,” examining the works of Maurice Blanchot, Levinas first describes 
the solitude of the artist, someone who exists outside of the active world in “countless worlds 
conceived by thought, projected by imagination, or divined by instinct” (128) that constitute the 
poet’s/author’s transcendent vision. He agrees with Blanchot that the artist is required to 
sublimate himself or herself to an art that has abandoned heroes and adventure, the old vision of 
“non-world” in favor of a new vision— “the being of beings,” and “the silence following the 
departure of the gods” (128). Writing does not lead us to truth; it leads to the “errancy of being—
to being as a place of going astray, to the uninhabitable” (134). Art leads, not to truth, but to 
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authenticity; it shines a light that “undoes the world, leading it back to its origin, to the over and 
over again, the murmur, ceaseless lapping of waves, a ‘deep past, never long enough ago’” (135). 
The world of literature returns us to the human condition of nomadism, of exile. The New 
Woman Kunstlerroman, depicting the ethical formation of women writers, depict their 
protagonists as feminist artist-heroes who are exiled from others by their attempts to create 
authentic art and whose identities are fractured by the conflict between their personal ethics and 
conventional morality. 
      Both structurally and thematically, then, the New Woman writers investigate narrative 
innovations to express an ethical shift at the century’s end. As Rachel Hollander argues in her 
2013 study Narrative Hospitality in Late Victorian Fiction, “Early and mid-nineteenth-century 
conceptions of morality largely assume the centrality of sympathy, or the ability to understand 
and care for another’s feelings” (2). Part of the shift in thinking that characterizes late-century 
fiction, then, considers the inadequacy of a reliance on sympathy as the basis of the ethical 
relationship as it emphasizes connections and commonality between the self and the other rather 
than an acknowledgement of human complexity and the limits of individual knowledge. While 
depicting late-century dilemmas for women, the New Woman writers join other novelists of the 
period in creating “an ethical response to social and political conditions at the turn of the 
century” (Hollander 264). Their novels, as Ann Ardis asserts, present authoritative explorations 
of women’s identity in a period of transition; during the late-century debate over the need for 
genuine “truth-telling” in realistic fiction, “literary texts were evaluated as…agents of cultural 
formation …” (29). As social critics, the New Women writers are the literary descendants of 
earlier “condition of England” writers like Charles Dickens, Harriet Martineau, and Elizabeth 
Gaskell; their works also resemble the “slum novels” of contemporaries Arthur Morrison and 
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George Gissing. Their polemical spirit sets them in contrast to the Aesthetes; theirs is an activist 
aesthetic. Nevertheless, their novels often employ the experimental, proto-modernist structural 
hybridities that scholars associate with aestheticism in order to accommodate their thematic 
innovations. Additionally, as Linda Dowling notes, because New Woman novelists claim more 
sexual agency for women and write frankly about marital oppression, they were often linked in 
the public mind with the Decadent movement as well (435). 
      In writing about their present, these writers intend to redeem the past failures of the 
patriarchal system by presenting more nuanced alternatives. Sarah Grand, Mona Caird, Olive 
Schreiner, Mary Cholmondeley, and Ella Hepworth Dixon all suggest in their novels that women 
should aspire to more complex roles than the conventional assignments to wife- and motherhood. 
Acknowledging the real change occurring around them, these novelists design lives for their 
protagonists that acknowledge their own current dilemmas and those of other real women while 
attempting to make the transition to less restrictive roles. Perhaps the conventional idealized 
vision of womanhood was never the reality; however, the concept of the “angel in the house” 
certainly had a hold in the popular imagination for much of the Victorian period. By the end of 
the century, even though, as Ann Heilmann asserts, “even the anti-feminists had ceased to 
believe in her” (24), no serious alternatives to this vision of womanhood had been presented by 
leading novelists and writers. 
      In the midst of controversy over the idea of the “new woman” conducted by journalists and 
cartoonists, who were only too eager to lampoon the figure of the New Woman as a mannish 
freak, the New Woman writers attempt to clarify for readers and for themselves how this new 
version of womanhood, this new “self,” will emerge. When they take up their pens to write 
fiction, they intend for their novels to engage social issues and inspire reflection among their 
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readers. However, a chief difference here is that the New Woman writers foreground their 
activist aesthetic; narrative becomes much more overtly the vehicle for reflection and change. 
Each of the novels studied here includes long speeches by troubled protagonists attempting to 
work out their dilemmas. Evadne, for example, in Grand’s The Heavenly Twins, indicts her aunt, 
mother, and other women for their complicity with a corrupt system:  
You think that I should act as women have been always advised to act in such 
cases, that I should sacrifice myself to save that one man’s soul. I take a different 
view of it. I see that the world is not a bit the better for centuries of self-sacrifice 
on the woman’s part and therefore I think it is time we tried a more effectual plan. 
And I propose now to sacrifice the man instead of the woman. (80) 
      In addition, the New Woman novelists replace the earnest, intrusive Victorian narrator with 
equally pointed dialogues between characters, like this one from Mona Caird’s The Daughters of 
Danaus: 
Hadria’s eyes seemed to be looking across miles of sea to the sunny Grecian land. 
“If a slave breaks his chains and runs, I am always glad,” she said. 
“I was talking about Helen.” 
“So was I. If a Spartan wife throws off her bondage and defies the laws that insult 
her, I am still more glad.” 
“Oh, Hadria,” remonstrated Henriette, in despair. 
“I don’t see that it follows that Helen did sin, however; one does not know much 
about her sentiments. She revolted against the tyranny that held her shut in, 
enslaved, body and soul, in that wonderful Greek world of hers. I am charmed to 
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think that she gave her countrymen so much trouble to assert her husband’s right 
of ownership.” (214-215)  
These dialogues replace the authoritative, male voice of the mid-Victorian narrator with more 
authentic multivocal conversations among women, thus elevating the significance of women’s 
real voices. 
1.2 Recent Criticism 
      This study, grounded in the work of Jil Larson, Donald Wehrs and Richard Haney, and 
Rachel Hollander, will not fit within the mainstream criticism on the New Woman writers. New 
Woman scholarship, which began in the late 1970s, has been characterized by a few notable 
trends. The initial group of scholars was interested primarily in introducing this group of non-
canonical and neglected writers to the attention of late Victorian critics and placing them within 
the cultural context of the fin de siècle. Elaine Showalter’s study A Literature of Their Own, 
published in 1977, initiated interest in nineteenth century women writers who had been neglected 
by scholars. Among these largely forgotten writers were the New Woman writers of the fin de 
siècle. While Showalter dismisses this group as less artful than earlier canonical writers because 
they used their texts as “the vehicle for a dramatization of wronged womanhood” (16), she does 
concede that they influenced other women writers to continue to explore female identity (18). 
Gail Cunningham, in The New Woman and the Victorian Novel (1978), connects prominent New 
Woman writers with their more celebrated male counterparts (George Gissing, Thomas Hardy) 
in their resistance to traditional female stereotypes, attack on conventional marriage, and 
discomfort with the notion of increased freedom for women; like Showalter, however, she 
dismisses them as minor writers.   
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      By 1979, the dominant trend in New Woman scholarship was initiated with the publication 
of Patricia Stubbs’ Women and Fiction: Feminism and the Novel, 1880-1920. While Stubbs too 
is initially dismissive of the New Woman novelists in favor of more canonical male writers, 
other feminist critics examined the ways that New Woman novelists reflected the contemporary 
debates about the Woman Question and the Suffragist movement. These examinations, led by 
Ann Ardis, Lyn Pykett, Sally Ledger, Rita Kranidis, Nicola Diane Thompson, and Ann 
Heilmann, dominated the critical landscape through 2001. Talia Schaffer, in 2001, began a trend 
that continues among critics today, of considering the role of the New Women writers in their 
connections to the Aesthetic movement.  
      Other critics during this period examined the New Woman writers’ interest in or rejection of 
eugenics—Olive Schreiner and Sarah Grand both considering the development of the New 
Woman alongside a New Man who would be a fit mate while Mona Caird explicitly rejects the 
eugenic “predestination” in favor of personal freedom. We also see the beginning of a third 
trend—postcolonial examinations—in the work of Iveta Jusova, who examines images of 
imperialism in Sarah Grand’s The Heavenly Twins and The Beth Book. 
      In her 2005 article “The New Woman in the New Millennium: Recent Trends in Criticism of 
New Woman Fiction,” Ann Heilmann identifies three trends in New Woman criticism 2000-
2005: “the quest for a new aesthetic...firmly centered on explorations of feminine alterity” (33-
34); a second focus on New Woman writers’ “heavy investment” in “socially divisive and 
oppressive ideologies like eugenics, racial hygiene and imperialism” (35); and a third focus on 
“the international, multi-ethnic and multi-racial dimensions of the New Woman” (36). Heilmann 
cites her own work (New Woman Fiction, 2000 and New Woman Strategies, 2004) as well as that 
of Patricia Murphy in her 2001 study Time is of the Essence. The second trend is led by 
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Angelique Richardson in Love and Eugenics in the Late Nineteenth Century (2003) and in the 
collection of essays she edited with Chris Willis, The New Woman in Fiction and in Fact (2001). 
Heilmann also mentions the work of Iveta Jusova, whose study The New Woman and Empire 
examines the racial politics of leading New Woman writers (35) and moves other critics to begin 
the third trend, a move away from focus on British and American writers of the fin de siècle into 
a more multinational examination.  
1.3 Chapter Summaries 
      Chapter One investigates the connection between the face-to-face encounter and narrative 
experimentation in three New Woman novels. The Heavenly Twins, by Sarah Grand; The Story 
of an African Farm, by Olive Schreiner; and Red Pottage, by Mary Cholmondeley, all confront 
their protagonists with apparently intransigent ethical dilemmas involving confrontations 
between men and women. Narratively, these encounters take place in open spaces symbolized by 
carnivalesque character types that anticipate not only the social transformation that these writers 
were promoting, but also the inadequacy of the conventional novel form to contain the 
transitional, open, and questioning nature of fin de siècle discussions.  
      In Otherwise than Being, Levinas continues his thesis from Totality and Infinity that our 
response to the other, our pre-cognitive obligation and unconditional responsibility for the other, 
constitutes the true ethical position. This obligation is not a choice; it simply exists. Totality and 
Infinity establishes the transcendence of “the face,” and in the course of this discussion, asserts 
the importance of language in the subject’s response to the other. Otherwise than Being, then, 
takes up the question of ethical subjectivity in relation to language. Here, Levinas investigates 
the subject’s response to the other; the subject’s being held hostage for the other and substituting 
for the other.  In Otherwise than Being, Levinas describes the role of language in the subject’s 
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openness to the other, the “inexhaustible response of the self as saying” (Lingis xiii) that is 
expressed in a universal system of symbols that becomes the said.   
      Following a similar trajectory in my argument, while Chapter One discusses New Woman 
protagonists’ experience of the obligation to the other through their confrontation with the face, 
Chapter Two argues that New Woman novelists illustrate Levinas’s assertion that ethical 
subjectivity is the outcome of discourse. These novelists examine the power of language and its 
elasticity; they interrogate the function of the dominant cultural narrative, the “larger said,” as it 
has been used to silence women’s voices. Ultimately, they reach for a new language, sometimes 
objective, at other times impassioned, to disrupt and unsettle the dominant narrative. To connect 
with their readers, they craft a common, personal, and subversive language based on shared 
experiences. This focus on a new and shared language, however, is still in service to vision of the 
future that, though open-ended and indeterminate, suggests the possibility of a new social reality. 
Thus, if the larger said—the dominant discourse--describes a dystopian experience for women, 
the smaller said—a new feminist language-- articulates a hopeful, progressive, and utopian 
future. 
      I argue that these novelists establish this new, smaller and more personal said in three ways: 
first, they take their message to a new audience of middle-class woman readers in extended 
polemical sections in their novels. Second, they deploy debates among women characters to 
interrogate the role that language has played in establishing the larger said. Rejecting the typical 
earnest male Victorian narrator, they tell stories through women’s voices, lending authority to 
their individual points of view and their critique of this dominant narrative—the smaller said. 
And finally, these novelists depict New Woman protagonists as shaped by the books they read as 
children. For this investigation, I focus primarily on two texts: the “Evadne” narrative in Sarah 
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Grand’s 1893 novel The Heavenly Twins and Mona Caird’s The Daughters of Danaus, published 
the following year in 1894.  
      Chapter Three investigates Levinas’s concept of “the saying,” the ethical responsibility for 
the other that transcends perceived conventions, as New Woman writers use dreams, visions, and 
allegories to establish an ethical proximity with their readers. In this shared narrative space, then, 
writers assert an obligation to future generations of women, which will require intentional self-
sacrifice in the present. If the saying constitutes a tentative approach to the other without 
attempting to define or delimit the other, the New Woman writers dedicate themselves to the 
welfare of future generations of women. However, New Woman writers are not recruiting young 
suffragists; they think more speculatively and broadly, beyond current struggles toward specific 
ends. In mythic terms, they dedicate themselves to a principled forfeit of ease and comfort to 
secure an ethical future for later generations of women. This is ultimately the feminist project 
they describe in their writings.  
      In Otherwise than Being, Levinas discusses the tension between the said and the saying, 
which he defines in a number of ways, but which finally comes to embody the ineffable face-to-
face moment wherein ethics originates. Before the saying is concretized into language, into the 
said, there must first be a condition between the subject and the other that is not borne in words; 
this is the responsibility to the other. Levinas acknowledges the equivocal and enigmatic nature 
of the saying, acknowledging too its connection to transcendence (10): “Being and entities weigh 
heavily by virtue of the saying that gives them light. Nothing is more grave, more august, than 
responsibility for the other, and saying, in which there is no play, has a gravity more grave than 
its own being or not being” (46, my italics). For Levinas, the two distinct but simultaneous 
meanings of language are the essential said and the transcendent saying. He argues that the face-
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to-face ethical encounter is manifested through language, and the said and saying are then 
integrated in the expression of the ethical identity (Eaglestone 140). This integration of the said 
and the saying is critical to my re-framing of the often-criticized melding of experimental 
narrative with polemical sections in New Woman writing. I read their structural hybridities as 
reiterating the characteristics of the said and the saying. The narratives within which political and 
social discussions are embedded provide a frame for these writers’ interrogation of language and 
its power, their examination of the said. The experimental and more elusive passages in their 
texts, then, I argue, illustrate their engagement with Levinas’ concept of the saying, an ethical 
responsibility for the other that has priority over Victorian social and political conventions.  
     The texts examined in Chapter Three emphasize use visions, dreams, and allegories that open 
a space for the saying; they interrogate the expectation that women would willingly sacrifice 
their autonomy and aspirations for their parents, husbands, and children. Such passages 
implicitly challenge both the narratives’ characters and their readers to free themselves from 
conventional expectations and reinterpret their own experiences through an unconventional lens. 
Instead, New Woman writers redirect women’s self-sacrifice away from a duty to husband and 
children and replace the traditional responsibility with the need to secure the welfare of future 
generations of women. These writers depict a necessary and willing self-sacrificial stance that 
women in the present must embrace to envision and promote a more equitable and ethical future 
for later generations. While womanly self-sacrifice and its destructive effects are a prevalent 
theme in the New Woman canon, these novelists replace it with a feminist altruism defined in 
more utopian and Levinasian terms. And the genres here associated with myth, fairytales, and 
allegory are open-ended, challenging readers to speculate about a more open-ended future for 
women, what Eaglestone names “a purposeful inconclusiveness” (136). 
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      In Chapter Four, my final chapter, I argue that the novels featuring the New Woman as writer 
depict their concept of the feminist artist-hero. Many New Woman writers depict protagonists 
who waiver unsuccessfully between the public demand that they marry and produce children and 
their private compulsion to produce instead aesthetic objects over which they exercise creative 
control. In part, their struggle is characterized by doubt surrounding the value of the work they 
might produce versus the cultural imperative to produce the next generation. However, this 
vision of the New Woman writer is often at variance with the actual experiences of the 
characters’ authors, who were quite successful. I argue here that, in writing Kunstlerroman, these 
novelists distinguish between their own experiences and those of their protagonists, first, to 
address issues raised by the Aesthetes about the role and purpose of art. Their vision of the role 
of art, particularly literature, is to “demonstrate a utopian, emancipatory potential in revealing the 
fissures and hidden pathways that run through the hegemonic structures and totalizing 
frameworks” (McDonald 16) in which they live and write. They also intend to elevate the 
woman writer to a tragic figure who is living in the entretemps, the eternal “meanwhile” in 
which characters in literature exist (Levinas Reader 138). Their fractured identities are the result 
of the struggle to maintain their ethical posture, one that diverges from conventional morality. 
Tragedy, another term employed by Levinas to discuss aesthetics, consists in characters’ fated 
passivity, but he also characterizes ethical protagonists undergoing a necessary fracturing of 
identity from a confrontation with a disruptive force (McDonald 36).  In the novels examined 
here, tragic circumstances are multilevel: the writers in these novels are exiled from their homes, 
struggling both financially and for acceptance. Orphaned or rejected by their families, they strive 
to find their voices and to find readers. And—another circumstance aligned with tragic art—they 
fail. In addition, these novelists are ensnared by their contemporary debate surrounding the 
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Aesthetic movement. This ground has been convincingly explored by critics Lyn Pykett and Ann 
Ardis, who focus particularly on how Olive Schreiner, Mona Caird, Sarah Grand, Mary 
Cholmondeley, and Ella Hepworth Dixon document the struggles and defeats of women who 
attempt to negotiate their assigned roles as women with the call to write, particularly to write 
fiction. These texts end in defeat. In all cases, women either die or retreat to maternity, madness, 
or failure.  
      In “The Poet’s Vision,” paying tribute to Maurice Blanchot, Levinas first describes the 
solitude of the artist, someone who exists outside of the active world in “countless worlds 
conceived by thought, projected by imagination, or divined by instinct” that constitute the 
poet’s/author’s transcendent vision. He agrees with Blanchot that the artist is required to 
sublimate himself or herself to an art that has abandoned heroes and adventure, the old vision of 
“non-world” in favor of a new vision— “the being of beings,” and “the silence following the 
departure of the gods” (128). Writing does not lead us to truth; it leads to the “errancy of being—
to being as a place of going astray, to the uninhabitable” (134). Art leads, not to truth, but to 
authenticity; it shines a light that “undoes the world, leading it back to its origin, to the over and 
over again, the murmur, ceaseless lapping of waves, a ‘deep past, never long enough ago’” (135). 
The world of literature returns to the human condition of nomadism, of exile. 
      The New Women writers whose work is examined here depict homeless or exiled tragic 
protagonists who desperately seek to create art from trauma. Like classical tragic protagonists, 
they are flawed, rebellious, aspiring to be more than their society wishes them to be. Like other 
tragic protagonists, they are punished for their desires, but they also experience transformation. 
      McDonald refutes what he considers to be a superficial understanding of Levinas as rejecting 
art because of its immobility and sterility, its fixed form that disconnects it from immediacy and 
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humanity. Instead, McDonald suggests, Levinas is interested in the potential of literature to 
become  
an ethical critique of traditional philosophy, or philosophy as modernist 
rationality. What enables such critique, what serves as its tragic locus, is the 
musicality of the artwork, and the characteristic mode of time, the entretemps 
[interstices of time] to which it is intimately related. Crucial to the notion of the 
musicality of the artwork is the ethical sensibility which animates it, which is 
contrasted with traditional morality … (19) 
McDonald goes on to discuss the concept of the tragic in its presentation of the individual’s 
identity as “diasporic,” irremediably split (21). The individual must choose between the system 
of morality he or she has been taught that provides the rules for living a good life and the ethical 
choice that occurs in the immediate present. This fracturing of the self, which puts the very 
identity into question, can result in the subversion of moral and political authority and “an 
incitement to ethical transcendence without recourse to any settled sense of self” (26). This 
“nomadic” self, an indeterminate state, resides in a region that is “nonconceptual … 
antiepistemological … and nonmoral,” which is “trespassed, most often, in literature, by the 
genre of tragedy” (27). While the New Woman writers do not present classical tragic heroines in 
Lyndall, Mary, Hadria, or Hester, these women all experience tragic loss of identity in facing the 
intersection Levinas describes. These texts then illuminate not only the potential of literature to 
examine the formation of the ethical identity but the heroic quest of the woman artist specifically 
to produce work that engages the reader in the recognition of tragedy along with its attendant 
hope for the future. 
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Chapter Five, the conclusion to my study, discusses the process by which I arrived at my 
theoretical framework and summarizes my argument. In concert with most critical analyses of 
the New Woman writers, this study seeks to frame their works as texts that should be examined 
more seriously for scholarly study. While their works were successful and influential during the 
1890s, these authors are seldom read today, and only Olive Schreiner appears occasionally in 
anthologies of late-Victorian literature. Reading them more closely as utopian political ethicists 
and skillful proto-modernists positions these writers as important transitional voices whose 
works should be studied as embodying significant philosophical impulses between mid-Victorian 
certainties and post-World War I fragmentation. 
Additionally, this study presents a new feminist reading of the theories of Levinas. Levinas 
has been accused of sexism by Simone de Beauvoir for his treatment of women as other, and 
more generally by feminist critics for his use of gendered language. However, this study asserts 
that the theories of Levinas offer a framework for reconsidering altruism without gendering; his 
theories open an expansive space for reading the works of early feminists grappling with the 
need to consider their obligations to the other without the attendant constrictions of conventional 
morality. 
2 THE NEW WOMAN WRITERS AND THE FACE OF THE OTHER 
      Emmanuel Levinas’s theories concerning ethical identity are generally grouped 
under the heading “the ethics of alterity,” an ethics based on the acknowledgment that the other 
represents “the infinite, the transcendent (Totality 49). According to Levinas, our inability to 
categorize the other leads to a system of openness and indeterminacy, rather than a closed system 
that is “totalized” (50). Levinas writes that the ethical subject’s encounter with the other is 
primordial; subjectivity is called into being by the other as the subject recognizes the call, the 
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summons to the other. The subject’s presence before the face of the other is an epiphany that 
creates “an asymmetrical indebtedness” (215) on the subject’s part toward the other’s moral 
summons. This summons is based on the primacy of the other’s right to exist. To be fully 
oneself, then, is to be for the other, who is simultaneously unknowable and cannot be made into 
an object of the self.  
     The New Woman writers, self-consciously responding to a historical moment of transition, 
create protagonists who grapple with the relationship between the self and the other, particularly 
within the parameters of the traditional marriage plot. New Woman writers question the 
implications of the self-sacrifice that Victorian women were expected to exercise in marriage and 
motherhood as they gesture toward a more equable interchange between men and women based 
on an acceptance of the limits of personal freedom with a corresponding acknowledgment of the 
essential unknowability of the other. 
     Thematically, these novelists investigate an ethical shift at the century’s end. As Rachel 
Hollander argues in her 2013 study Narrative Hospitality in Late Victorian Fiction, “Early and 
mid-nineteenth-century conceptions of morality largely assume the centrality of sympathy, or the 
ability to understand and care for another’s feelings” (2). Part of the shift in thinking that 
characterizes late-century fiction, then, considers the inadequacy of a reliance on sympathy as 
the basis of the ethical relationship as it emphasizes connections and commonality between the 
self and the other rather than an acknowledgement of human complexity and the limits of 
individual knowledge.  Concurrent with these novelists’ move toward ethical openness is their 
experiment with aesthetic openness through their use of Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of the 
carnivalesque and “folk laughter,” particularly through the figures of the rogue, the fool, and the 
clown (Forms of Time 158). The medieval folk carnival, which Bakhtin considers so significant 
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in the development of the novel, belongs at an intersection between art and life, where real life is 
presented through play. It is public spectacle, but inclusive--all are invited to participate. 
Carnival “celebrated temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established 
order; it marked the suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms and prohibitions. 
Carnival was the true feast of … becoming, change, and renewal” (Rabelais 10).  Bakhtin calls 
the carnival world a “second life” and “a world inside out” characterized by folk laughter that 
“denies, but … revives and renews at the same time” (Rabelais 11). He identifies three folkloric 
figures whose use as carnivalesque elements in the European novel will be significant: the rogue, 
the clown, and the fool (“Forms” 158). These folkloric figures exist to be read; Bakhtin calls 
them “life’s maskers” (“Forms” 159). They are theatrical and metaphorical figures whose 
otherness challenges traditional categories. They exist as objects of folk laughter, laughter that 
parodies convention and seeks transformation. Bakhtin describes the functions of these three 
figures thus: 
Opposed to convention, and functioning as a force for exposing it, we 
have the level-headed, cheery and clever wit of the rogue (in the form of a 
villain, a petty townsman-apprentice, a young itinerant cleric, a tramp 
belonging to no class), the parodied taunts of the clown and the simple-
minded incomprehension of the fool. Opposed to ponderous and gloomy 
deception, we have the rogue’s cheerful deceit; opposed to greedy 
falsehood and hypocrisy we have the fool’s unselfish simplicity and his 
healthy failure to understand; opposed to everything that is conventional 
and false, we have the clown—a synthetic form for the (parodied) 
exposure of others. (“Forms” 162) 
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      This chapter argues that the New Woman novelists embed the ethical encounter, the face-to-
face confrontation, within narrative innovations that anticipate an open and indeterminate future 
for both women and for the genre. The Heavenly Twins, by Sarah Grand; The Story of an African 
Farm, by Olive Schreiner; and Red Pottage, by Mary Cholmondeley, all confront their 
protagonists with apparently intransigent ethical dilemmas involving confrontations between 
men and women. Narratively, these encounters take place in open spaces that seem to anticipate 
not only the social transformation that these writers were promoting, but also the inadequacy of 
the conventional novel form to contain the transitional, open, and questioning nature of fin de 
siècle discussions. Each employs as well a figure from folklore and carnival juxtaposed with 
more conventional and predictable characters as a way to gesture toward both thematic and 
narrative transformation.  
      All three authors present a new way of thinking about ethical relationships between men and 
women that anticipate the theories of Emmanuel Levinas published in his 1961 work, Totality 
and Infinity. According to Levinas, ethics originates from the presence of “infinity” in opposition 
to “totality” within the human situation (80). While totality implies that the other can be 
assimilated into the subject’s experience of sameness, infinity suggests instead openness to the 
infinite potential of the other. Levinas rejects the synthesizing of phenomena in favor of a 
thought that is open to “the face,” the total vulnerability of the other without the masks that 
humans typically wear to protect themselves from revealing too much.  
      The novelists whose texts I examine in this chapter also grapple with the limitations of the 
realist novel by depicting their protagonists’ ethical crises within narrative structures 
characterized by uncertainty and openness. As characters seek to work out the tension between 
personal freedom and obligation to the other in an open space, these novelists depict encounters 
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that introduce cultural openness through characters who personify the carnivalesque rogue, fool, 
and clown, prefiguring and reflecting the kind of reversal of convention and initiation of an 
“upside down” world that these writers and others anticipated during the fin de siecle.  
      Alistair Renfrew, in his 2015 study of Mikhail Bakhtin’s theories, notes that “carnival is 
deeply reflective of Bakhtin’s thought as a whole, developing the key ideas of embodiment and 
unfinalizability to an almost poetic extreme” (129). He notes that Bakhtin’s study of Rabelais, in 
which he originates his ideas about the carnivalesque in literature, emphasizes his concepts on 
“becoming, the insistence that nothing is more significant than the resistance to closure, the 
unfinalizability of the human subject, the question and process of ‘how a person becomes other’” 
(129). If, as Bakhtin asserts, carnival spirit survives the demise of actual carnival during the 
medieval period and makes its way instead into literature, it is an appropriate form for a 
transitional cultural period like the fin de siècle and a group of writers seeking to articulate 
change in both content and narrative structure. As Renfrew suggests: 
Carnival and carnivalization are driven by the central conviction that the culture 
of the Middle Ages—“folk”—collective and ambivalent—has been 
surreptitiously transmitted (through literature)  to the culture of Modernity –which 
Bakhtin identifies as (predominately) “official,” individualistic and rational. (131) 
Bakhtin argues that, by acting out destabilization, the carnivalesque resists all that is hegemonic 
and reified in culture and language (Rabelais 34), especially the “official version” that truths and 
conventions are established and uniform (Rabelais 9). Thus, it embodies the subversive principle 
that nothing is finite—everything is in a constant state of change (Renfrew 134). As long as the 
carnival spirit is expressed, it reminds officialdom (and readers) that official culture, political 
authority, and social conventions are not immune to change (Renfrew135). Because the New 
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Woman writers challenge hegemony and produce experimental narratives in the context of the 
fin de siècle cultural shift, their activist project is specifically suited to the use of carnivalesque 
elements.  
      I argue that Grand, Schreiner, and Cholmondeley link their interrogation of the face-to-face 
confrontation with  characters who function as the rogue (Grand), the fool (Schreiner), and the 
clown (Cholmondeley), to introduce what Bakhtin calls “double-voiced laughter,” an ambivalent 
laughter that does not equate with the comic, but is identified wherever the “one-sided 
seriousness of any discourse is exposed to the light of another, questioning consciousness; 
through literary laughter, outsidedness is brought inside” (Renfrew 136-7). This use of carnival 
emphasizes the spirit of questioning and inquiry that is characteristic of the fin de siècle. 
2.1 Angelica the Rogue 
      According to Lauren Simek, The Heavenly Twins (1893), part of Sarah Grand’s New Woman 
Morningquest trilogy, characterizes late-Victorian examinations of ethics by contrasting two 
approaches for women: “one that values active self-consciousness and the public expression and 
debate of moral belief, and another that values a more intuitive, private and often unvoiced 
conception of virtue” (337-38). For Simek, as well as for New Woman critics Sally Ledger and 
Ann Heilmann, Angelica, in The Heavenly Twins, represents the actively seeking model for a 
New Woman whose fate in the novel is nevertheless unpromising (Ledger 116). In tracing 
Angelica’s growth from childhood to adulthood and marriage, the narrative depicts her as the 
more forceful, intelligent, and skeptical of the titular twins. However, Angelica’s story becomes 
what Ann Ardis describes as a “boomerang plot” (140) as the result of her actions and their 
consequences in the section of the novel called “The Tenor and the Boy.” In the 100-page 
“aside” of sorts that interrupts the overarching narrative action of The Heavenly Twins, Grand 
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depicts a rebellious young woman whose experiments with gender performance depict a 
questionable ethical stance that has serious repercussions for another. I argue that Angelica’s 
masquerade as her brother, set in a “romance-time” interlude, shifts her temporarily from young 
woman protagonist to a dramatic performance as Bakhtin’s carnivalesque rogue—a character 
whose mischievous behavior is intended to parody the actions of Grand’s real villains in the 
novel—Colonel Colquhon and Mensley Monteith. Angelica’s actions, in appropriating careless 
male privilege in order to manipulate the hapless Tenor, reflect the sanctioned male promiscuity 
that destroys the lives of Evadne and Edith. Depicting Angelica in this role allows Grand to 
suggest that simply endowing women with masculine privilege without an accompanying ethical 
framework is not the answer to the dilemma of the New Woman. Her face-to-face encounter with 
the Tenor also introduces Levinas’ ethics of alterity: Angelica causes the Tenor’s death through 
her unwillingness to acknowledge her responsibility for the other; the Tenor engages in suicidal 
behavior because of his totalized and stereotypical view of Angelica as a young woman whose 
honor must be protected. Simultaneously, the carnivalesque nature of the Interlude introduces the 
roguish laughter that interrogates the cultural authority that dictates inherently false identities for 
men and women, forcing them into artificial and mannered interactions.  
      Grand places “The Tenor and the Boy” interlude in the arc of Angelica’s plot to confront her 
protagonist with the limited options available to her as a young woman now that she has emerged 
from a privileged childhood. The narrative shifts from accounts of Angelica’s clever pranks and 
outspokenness to her outrage as a young woman facing the differences between her opportunities 
and those offered her male twin. Angelica’s nascent feminism is first articulated in a dream, 
which Grand employs to underscore more rigorously the direction she advocated for feminists. In 
fact, the dream, which appears in Book III, chapter VIII of The Heavenly Twins, is identical in 
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substance to Grand’s argument in her essay “The New Aspect of the Woman Question.” In both 
the essay and the dream sequence, Grand asserts the need for women to take over leadership and 
power from men to set the world to rights. In her dream, Angelica banishes clerical leaders, in 
particular, from her sphere, asserting that women exclusively now contain the spirit and will of 
God (289). Men have served as “the muscle—the hard working material of the nation” while 
women are “the soul and spirit, the directing intelligence” (289). Women are now assuming 
leadership to deal with “man the iniquitous” and “to revise moral laws” (289). Angelica’s dream 
forecasts a time when men and women will come to marriage as equals, when “the other sphere 
tamed of its own accord” will come to the woman’s sphere because change “comes 
easily…when the right time comes” (288).  
     Manifestly, however, Grand does not consider that the right time arrived, and she illustrates 
the tragic implications of abandoning gender and mimicking masculine opportunistic behavior in 
“The Tenor and The Boy.” If women are responsible for acting as virtuous agents of change, 
then abandoning their gender identity in the name of personal freedom and power is not only 
inappropriate but destructive, as these women risk becoming equally oppressive and 
manipulative as the men they imitate. Thus, while Angelica’s adventure as a roguish young man 
allows her to experience the freedoms accorded to men while engaged in a theatrical role, her 
identity as a young woman when unmasked will complicate the implications of her act. 
      Angelica’s roguish behavior, though it initially seems an extension of her childhood pranks, 
becomes more tragic than comic. The conditions of the protracted masquerade and her 
exploitation of the vulnerable Tenor rob the interlude of its comic potential even as Angelica 
romps through the performance gleefully. In her masquerade with the Tenor, Angelica for the 
first time creates a male identity that is effectively her own but clothed as a male. Reimagining 
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herself as male does not transform Angelica in any meaningful way. Asserting the privilege 
accorded her male persona, Angelica wields her power only to manipulate the hapless Tenor in 
the same ways she has often manipulated her father and grandfather.  Her roguish behavior, 
enmeshing the Tenor in an invented romantic triangle, making unreasonable demands, and 
appearing and disappearing at will, is a conscious imitation of mischievous male privilege.  
      Thus, in “The Tenor and the Boy,” Grand employs the disguised character of Angelica, as 
she has used Colonel Colquhon and Sir Moseley Mentieth earlier in the novel, to indict the 
unethical exercise of personal freedom. Colquhon and Mentieth are typical wealthy men who 
have exercised their right to live irresponsibly and who have taken advantage of the cultural 
sanction allowing them to victimize young women while demanding sexual purity in prospective 
wives. Angelica, performing her role as The Boy, subjects the Tenor to a parody of this behavior. 
Like Mentieth and Colquohon, Angelica keeps secret both her identity and her marital status; 
these secrets ultimately prove destructive to The Tenor, someone who is more vulnerable than 
she is. Angelica in disguise laughs at and comments on the exercise of male freedom and enjoys 
its privilege. However, Grand finally uses Angelica as The Boy as just another oppressive male 
in the novel. To assuage her boredom, she has treated the Tenor exactly like a bored young man 
would treat a vulnerable young woman. This layer of inversion first underscores themes 
presented more overtly in Evadne’s and Edith’s narratives: the dangerous outcomes for women 
who become the victims of men allowed to interact dishonestly and irresponsibly with women. 
Like a number of vulnerable young women who have been victimized by predatory men, the 
Tenor dies. On another level, however, Grand also implicates a system that refuses access for 
women to real education, echoing Mary Wollstonecraft.  Angelica is ethically stunted, because, 
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though intellectually curious and restless, she has no real access to a challenging and rigorous 
education that might result in a vocation or an avocation to direct her energy. 
      The night world in which the Interlude is set makes possible Angelica’s transgressive and 
subversive behavior. As Lyn Pykett notes, “For the reader the hallucinatory writing of the 
Interlude conjures up a dream-world where gender boundaries dissolve and reform in 
disconcerting ways” (159-160). In fact, Grand styles the narrative as a series of encounters set in 
Bakhtin’s surreal romance-time chronotope (“Forms” 91) outside the main plot of the novel, 
which allows her to interrogate the proposition that chaos is the inevitable outcome of too much 
gender fluidity for women. Presenting Angelica with all of the control in the series of nocturnal 
meetings that frame the narrative upsets the traditional gender-based power balance. Angelica 
seizes both initiative and control in the guise of the Boy; she controls the narrative; she manages 
the times of the meetings, writes the script, and performs two roles, triangulating the Tenor’s 
emotional connections to herself in both the guise of the Boy and the Boy’s version of the real 
Angelica. The Tenor, though older and ostensibly playing the role of mentor, is easily 
manipulated into a passive and weak, more traditionally feminine, position, but acts consistently 
according to the dictates of chivalry and courtly love. 
      Most New Woman critics here focus their attention on the interlude’s exploration of gender 
norms as a patriarchal critique or as Grand’s experiment with the Decadent movement, with 
which the New Women writers were so often linked in the press (Dowling 12). The encounter 
between the Boy and the ethereal and effete Tenor has generally been read as Grand’s 
exploration of power linked to gender norms; “a coded challenge to heterosexual gender roles” 
(Ledger 116).  As these readers assert, Grand is interrogating the roles assigned to men and 
women in a seriocomic interlude that ends tragically, but I read this interlude as framed by the 
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ethical questions underlying the actions of the two characters. Throughout the interlude, while 
Grand occasionally provides moments of same-sex attraction, the gender inversion here is 
plainly used in the service of her overarching point: approaching the end of the century, a more 
open interaction between men and women is needed, one that is not predicated on the easy 
assumptions of convention. However, open ethical spaces and interactions that acknowledge the 
unknowability, the limits of knowledge, present a threat to established social structures that 
cannot yet be dispensed with. Thus, once the players are unmasked, the carnival spirit is once 
more contained; Angelica is punished for her transgression as she becomes a more submissive 
and acceptable wife, and the Tenor dies.  
      The ethical implications of the interlude resonate with Levinas’s assertion of the primordial 
ethical encounter, the acknowledgment of the subject’s responsibility for the other. In contrast 
with the definition of the integrated identity based on a struggle for freedom and self-assertion, 
Levinas describes an ethical identity that acknowledges the unknowability of the other while 
simultaneously responding to the obligation to respond to the other’s being. As the narrative 
progresses, Grand establishes a relationship dominated by Angelica, in the guise of the Boy, 
whose capricious behavior increasingly compromises her ethical identity by victimizing a 
vulnerable other. The narrator says,  “Sometimes he was like a wild creature…not knowing what 
he would do next; and …[t]hen again he would saunter in about midnight, and sit down in a 
dejected attitude, looking unutterably miserable” (401). The Boy is aware of his power over the 
Tenor, and the narrator tells us that “no matter what he had done, by hook or by crook he always 
managed to bring about a reconciliation before they parted” (389). Grand here underscores the 
primary nature of gender identity that interests her: the degree of power and freedom granted 
men and women. 
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      If Evadne’s plot is a cautionary tale about the failed activist, and Edith’s plot an illustration 
of the perils for sheltered young women, Angelica’s plot in this interlude depicts the pitfalls of 
adopting a traditional masculine identity for women. For all of her criticisms of men, Grand was 
no radical, and her vision for women focused on enlightened marriages. When the Boy says 
presciently to the Tenor, “"I mean to be life or death to you” (380), this assertion underscores 
Angelica’s sense of freedom and power in the guise of the boy, the freedom and power typically 
granted to a young male to behave unethically. In her “play,” she treats the Tenor as the subject 
of an experiment. Perhaps her most transgressive behavior is her determination to heighten the 
effects of her masquerade by triangulating the Tenor’s emotional investment in promoting his 
romantic attachment to Angelica. Angelica’s behavior here, in the guise of the Boy, demonstrates 
Grand’s determination to illustrate the last vestiges of Angelica’s womanly virtue disappearing.  
      Grand presents Angelica’s unethical behavior as the consequence of exercising complete 
freedom at the expense of another; like Colquhon and Mentieth, the result of her behavior is 
tragic for someone else. However, her roguish behavior is couched as a response to the 
limitations placed on a woman who desires and needs a vocation and is not allowed one. Under 
these circumstances, Angelica is not attracted to feminine altruism, which she sees as the only 
vocation allowed her. When the Tenor asks her why she did not interest herself in those around 
her and try to help them, she replies that “it is impossible for a woman to devote herself to people 
for whom there is nothing to be done, who don’t want her devotion; and, besides, devotion 
wasn’t my vocation” (442). Womanly self-sacrifice would not be a role that Angelica would 
willingly accept. However, while the reader may accept Angelica’s claim that the masquerade 
was justified given her feelings of frustration and loneliness, Grand, in bringing the interlude to a 
tragic conclusion, places her on the same footing as Colquhon and Menteith. Her drive has been 
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to understand what it is like to be a man and to experience the freedom granted by the 
masquerade. In treating the Tenor as solely a representative of his gender, she has totalized him 
instead of granting him the complexity of his autonomous self. He has made himself vulnerable 
to her, has revealed his “face” by confiding his love for Angelica and revealing the details of his 
past. However, the Boy/Angelica has rejected her obligation to respond ethically by acting 
openly and revealing her masquerade. As Teresa Mangum notes, “Grand maintains the 
distinctions between ‘manhood’ and ‘womanhood’ even as she argues that both concepts require 
revision” (45). As Ann Heilmann adds, Grand suggests that “subversive gestures may afford 
temporary gratification to the individual concerned but are always ultimately ineffective as a 
means of women’s self-liberation” (46). 
      However, Grand does not only interrogate Angelica’s role in the tragedy; ultimately, the 
Tenor’s insistence on the primacy of gender-based rituals kills him. Once Angelica has been 
unmasked and her true gender revealed, the Tenor is himself surprised at how quickly he reverts 
to tradition; although Angelica has not changed in any fundamental way, he is no longer able to 
view her through an objective lens. He can now only think of her in terms of respectable 
womanhood. This inability to accord Angelica true “otherness” kills the Tenor when he refuses 
to take medicine that will treat his pneumonia because it causes him to speak delusionally. Afraid 
that in his delusional ramblings, he might involuntarily reveal Angelica’s masquerade, he acts 
nobly on outdated chivalric notions in order to keep her secret. The tragedy of the interlude is 
ultimately that neither character—despite Angelica’s masquerade—is able to resist objectifying 
and totalizing the other based on gender in order to acknowledge the mystery and complexity of 
the other. 
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      Grand’s employment, then, of this interlude is the closest in spirit to Bakhtinian carnival of 
the three authors precisely because it is an interlude and therefore transitory. Adopting the mask 
of the rogue allows Angelica to safely thwart the conventions that so frustrate her as a young 
woman. Her speech after being unmasked makes clear her intent:  
I have enjoyed the benefit of free intercourse with your masculine mind undiluted 
by your masculine prejudices and proclivities with regard to my sex. Had you 
known that I was a woman—even you—the pleasure of your companionship 
would have been spoilt for me, so unwholesomely is the imagination of a man 
affected by ideas of sex. The fault is in your training; you are all of you educated 
deliberately to think of women chiefly as the opposite sex. Your manner to me 
has been quite different from that of any other man I ever knew…Now, with you 
alone of all men, not excepting Diavolo, I almost think I have been on an equal 
footing; and it has been to me like the free use of his limbs to a prisoner after long 
confinement with chains. (457) 
However, Angelica also acknowledges that she has learned to regret her actions: her “loving-
consciousness was initially dormant…the love in us for our fellow creatures which makes it pain 
to ourselves to injure them” (452-53). Angelica’s acknowledgement of her responsibility to the 
Tenor may appear in conflict with Bakhtin’s description of the cheerful rogue, but the rogue 
figure is now unmasked. As Grand depicts the rogue throughout her novel, he/she becomes a 
figure whose thwarting of convention can sometimes come at a high cost for his victims. 
Angelica is not the roguish villain—that role is filled by Colquhon and Menteith. Instead, she is a 
subversive figure whose secret laughter suggests both resistance to authority and Grand’s 
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ambivalence about the freedom and choices that cultural and ethical changes will offer young 
women.                                                                                                                                                                 
2.2 Gregory Rose the Fool 
      Olive Schreiner’s use of the cross-dressing interlude in The Story of an African Farm 
generates   the fascinating Gregory Rose—sensitive, gender queer, and an example of Bakhtin’s 
“wise fool” character, who, even as an object of scorn, makes the conventional world seem false 
and strange. The activist novelist, according to Bakhtin, needs the character of the fool in order 
to force the reader to see through the fool’s eyes the vision of the world as confused by 
“conventions of pathos and falsity” (“Discourse” 404). The author employs the fool not only to 
subvert social convention, but also to advance an alternate vision that grows out of the fool’s 
uncomprehending wisdom (“Discourse” 404).  Schreiner’s employment of the wise fool 
character coheres with her use of the “mythic mode” in the novel, incorporating allegory, 
folktale, and dream visions, a narrative pastiche that Gerald Monsman suggests “harmonizes 
comic and tragic delineations of character” (262). Like “The Tenor and the Boy,” this interlude 
foregrounds a gender masquerade; however, in this case the carnivalesque overturning of 
expectations and roles pivots to an outcome that is unexpectedly tender and poignant. I argue that 
Schreiner’s use of Gregory as the wise fool in “Gregory’s Womanhood” links Levinas’s 
contention that face-to-face ethical encounters occur on a vulnerable, unguarded, unconscious 
level with Schreiner’s anticipation of a transitional cultural period in which Victorian gender and 
social conventions will no longer seem rational. Writing to Havelock Ellis, she stated, “I object 
to anything that divides the two sexes…human development has now reached a point at which 
sexual difference has become a thing of altogether minor importance. We make too much of it. 
We are men and women in the second place, human beings in the first” (qtd. in Cronwright-
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Schreiner 51). In later writings, particularly Woman and Labour, she argued even more 
extensively for a move toward androgyny as economically beneficial. Schreiner employs this 
subplot to illustrate the necessary gender upheaval in the transition to a more open ethical system 
that privileges an acknowledgment of the limits of knowledge and the drive for sympathetic 
intimacy (Hollander 1). 
      Gregory Rose is at once the most conventional and the most disruptive male in the novel. We 
know very little about Lyndall’s stranger, and Waldo remains a strangely obscure figure 
throughout. Gregory’s arrival at the farm as the new overseer, dressed in an elaborately romantic 
and masculine costume “with shining spurs, an ostrich feather in his hat, and a silver-headed 
whip” (Schreiner 103), introduces him as a comic character, a parody of the stereotypically 
masculine figure. When Lyndall first sees Gregory, she tells Waldo, “There…goes a true 
woman—one born for the sphere that some women have to fill without being born for it” (103). 
The reader is invited to laugh at Gregory’s fussy housekeeping, his obsession with his looks, and 
his girlish letters to his mother and sister. In addition, those letters make clear that he has always 
been ineffectual: the school masters held him back and called him “a blockhead,” and his father 
dubbed him “a noodle and a milksop” (89). Gregory’s comic value is only exaggerated and 
extended in his interactions with Lyndall, who unhesitatingly puts him in his place when he 
abandons Em and abases himself for her "[l]ike a little tin duck floating on a dish of water, that 
comes after a piece of bread stuck on a needle, and the more the needle pricks it the more it 
comes on” (124).  
      Even as the comic fool, Gregory Rose begins to expose the false binaries of male and female. 
The figure of the fool, Bakhtin notes, is an observer; he is “life’s perpetual spy” (FT 161). The 
fool is inherently linked to metamorphosis, and one of his typical functions, as Bakhtin points 
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out, is in the sexual sphere “the making-public of specifically nonpublic spheres of life” (161). In 
addition, the fool’s inherent stupidity and incomprehension are presented in novels polemically; 
[incomprehension] interacts dialogically with an intelligence (a lofty pseudo intelligence) with 
which it polemicizes and whose mask it tears away” (“Discourse” 403). Schreiner’s use of 
Gregory as the uncomprehending fool places him in direct contrast to Lyndall’s pseudo 
intellectualism and bitter rejection of generous and ethical behavior to others. 
      However, Gregory Rose’s status as a comic fool shifts once he dons a woman’s clothing. 
When Gregory initially discovers the women’s clothing in the attic, he begins immediately to 
claim an alternative self. Once Lyndall has gone away with her stranger, Gregory Rose no longer 
has a clear identity on the farm. No longer Em’s suitor, and abandoned by Lyndall, he inhabits an 
uncertain space. He has even given up the lease on his cottage on the farm. Without a clear 
identity, he discovers the women’s clothing in the attic, clothing that had belonged to Em’s 
mother, and he seems immediately to respond to the opportunity to embrace the maternal 
identity. Examining the clothes, his eyes are “imploring” (132) as though he requests permission 
to embrace this new persona. Significantly, as he examines the dress, he remembers having seen 
a similar one worn by “a sister of mercy” (132), a role he will later adopt along with the clothing. 
As he tries on the hat and looks into a fragment of mirror, he notes first the incongruous 
combination of the woman’s hat and his beard. This moment of incongruity continues to 
underscore Gregory’s carnivalesque and comic role, but Schreiner does not linger on the comic 
possibilities here. Instead, she notes his almost instant recognition of a transformed self: “[t]he 
blue eyes looked out with the mild gentleness that became eyes looking out from under a kapje” 
(132). Already he seems to put on, with the women’s clothes, what Ann Heilmann calls the “the 
transfigured m/other” (139).  When he leaves the attic to go downstairs, the narrator tells us, he 
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has “an awful and mysterious look in his eyes” (132). The term “awful” here, I assume, 
Schreiner intends to be interpreted in the sense that Gregory is literally in awe of the transformed 
self he has just witnessed.  
      Schreiner’s use of the wise fool character problematizes the folk tradition wherein the fool 
mocks the king as he is crowned the carnival king. In dressing as a woman, Gregory Rose 
appears to lose rank instead of gaining it, abdicating male privilege and abjecting himself. I 
suggest that this transitional novel includes here a transitional interpretation of the character of 
the fool by connecting the character of the fool with gender evolution. Gregory Rose is already a 
gender non-conformist. Dressing as a woman allows him to both mock the false pretense of his 
own and others’ masculine facades. Additionally, dressing as a woman makes Gregory Rose 
more like Lyndall, whose dominance makes her both the object of his devotion and his model for 
womanhood.  
      As he later cares for the dying Lyndall, Gregory willingly abjects himself, sleeping on the 
floor outside her door and performing all of the duties of a nurse, particularly one who is 
extending mercy to an indifferent subject. Throughout this interlude, he remains silent and 
passive, never revealing his true identity. Claire Kahane invests this incident with significantly 
transferring the “woman’s voice” from Lyndall to Gregory and extinguishing the “voice of 
protest” as Gregory represents a move away from Lyndall’s anger and activism to Gregory’s 
“self-abnegating subject” and “Transsexual mother” (89). However, Monsman’s reading of the 
episode seems truer to Schreiner’s remarks in her foreword, as he notes, “Gregory seems to 
move toward a total mode of being, uniting contraries to rediscover a unity in which one cannot 
have any single identity without possessing many other modes of being also” (262). I suggest 
that, as well, Gregory’s transformation and willing abnegation illustrates Schreiner’s 
36 
commitment to the principle that gender is fluid and that a universal ethics for the future will 
require men and women to move toward androgyny.  
      In Levinasian terms, Gregory is also sacrificing his own freedom and masculine privilege in 
service to the other, in this case, Lyndall. In an earlier conversation in the novel, they had already 
made this bargain: 
[Lyndall says] I remember your words: You will give everything, and expect 
nothing. The knowledge that you are serving me is to be your reward; and you 
will have that. You will serve me, and greatly. The reasons I have for marrying 
you I need not inform you of now; you will probably discover some of them 
before long. 
I only want to be of some use to you, he [Gregory] said. (125) 
 
At the time of this conversation, Lyndall’s intent seems to be providing herself with a husband to 
legalize the birth of her child, a bargain she ultimately rejects. However, Gregory, who appears 
to be willing to make this bargain out of his pathetic devotion to Lyndall, has indeed committed 
himself to sacrifice his freedom and privilege as a man in return to serve an indifferent other. 
      Schreiner’s use of the fool here dramatizes not only gender inversion but Levinas’s principle 
of responding to the unknowable other. Lyndall has proven herself unwilling to offer her own 
life for another or to limit her freedom in any way; she has acknowledged that she is too bitter 
about the condition of women to work toward a better future. She is “asleep, swathed, shut up in 
self” and will “deliver no one” until she herself has been freed (102). At this stage in her life, 
disillusioned by her experience as a genteel young woman, Lyndall has decided that her only 
duty is to herself. She rejects motherhood as an intolerable lifelong burden and only wants to be 
“a thing that thinks” (111). Like Angelica, Lyndall is angry because she has not been given the 
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opportunity to work toward something that moves her; she counsels Waldo to “live for one 
thing” because “anything is possible to a man who knows his end and moves straight for it, and 
for it alone” (114-115). Lyndall intends to be an actor, a profession she believes will allow her to 
“absorb and then reflect other human lives” (115). This choice seems especially ironic for 
Lyndall, because she has deliberately locked herself into an autonomic stance that rejects 
openness to the unknowability of others that would seem a necessary insight for an actor. In 
order to be successful, she is ready to manipulate men in order to succeed, as she argues that 
“[m]en and things are plastic; they part to the right and left when one comes among them moving 
in a straight line to one end” (115). By the time she is dying, Lyndall has had a revelation, seeing 
her life as that of “a poor weak soul striving after good” who “learnt, through tears and much 
pain, that holiness is an infinite compassion for others; that greatness is to take the common 
things of life and walk truly among them” and “that happiness is a great love and much serving” 
(154). However, this deathbed revelation feels too much like bargaining with God. Lyndall has 
always been a leader among the three children, and she has always struggled with adults for 
control. Her stated goal, even as a child, has been to run away and to gain control of her own life. 
Service to others has never been an important factor for her, an indication of her lack of 
understanding and acknowledgment of any obligation to the other. 
      In contrast to Lyndall, Gregory gains integrity as the transgendered figure of the fool. After 
first playing the fool for an indifferent princess, he now appears wise and loving. As Carolyn 
Burdett argues in Olive Schreiner and the Progress of Feminism: Evolution, Gender, Empire 
(2001), “[I]n place of the sacrificial woman protagonist, the character who narratively enacts 
love-as-sacrifice in African Farm is a man, dressed in women’s clothes” (36). Burdett also points 
out that, in naming her cross-dressing character after Saint Gregory, who helped create the 
38 
Nicene Creed and restore church unity, Schreiner suggests an interpretation of Gregory Rose as 
symbolic of reconciliation and unity (37). For Gregory, a selfless love and “absolute sensitivity 
to the other” transform Gregory into a fully realized human being (38).  
      Schreiner’s use of Gregory Rose as the fool, then, suggests two considerations. First, in 
aligning the comic figure of the fool with compassion and respect for the other, she underscores 
Levinas’s definition of the ethical confrontation between the subject and the other that calls the 
subject into an ethical posture that abnegates personal freedom and subjectivity. Gregory Rose 
becomes an ethical subject only by putting off the unethical identity that he has assumed in a 
conventional male role. When he neutralizes his conventional masculinity by adopting a female 
appearance and posture, he literally clothes himself as the other, putting on the traditionally 
subordinate role as he abdicates privilege in much the same way that the fool is crowned king 
during carnival; he now originates the “double-voiced laughter” that subverts traditional ideas of 
femininity and masculinity. Joyce Avrech Berkman, in The Healing Imagination of Olive 
Schreiner: Beyond South African Colonialism (1989) describes what she interprets from 
Schreiner’s writings to be her “tripartite transformative process: the overcoming of female self-
hatred and dependency,…the reformulation of individual identity freed from the socially 
constructed bifurcation of feminine and masculine personality; the resolution of sex antagonism 
through the comradeship of ‘new men’ and ‘new women’” (126). Ultimately, Schreiner suggests 
that the age of transition that she and the readers are inhabiting is one that will require men and 
women to recognize Bakhtin’s “second life,” an openness to the medieval sense of festival that 
acknowledges deeper human truths and spiritual knowledge through their openness to change 
and questioning of hegemonic institutions, and a “world inside out” (Rabelais 11).  
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      If Grand interrogates the inherent unethical and unhealthy nature of false gender binaries 
through her use of the rogue, Schreiner extends the argument a step further in advocating for a 
move toward androgyny. Lyndall’s bitterness leads, not to the laughter of the rogue, but to self-
destruction. Lyndall distances herself from others, insisting on a subjectivity that is enclosed and 
autonomous. Neither has her intelligence led her to a meaningful kind of resistance--her anger 
has merely paralyzed her. In contrast, Schreiner depicts Gregory Rose as a mythic figure with 
roots in folklore, one whose consciousness links him with an understanding of the fundamental 
obligation to the other. In Gregory Rose, in fact, we see the intersection of Levinasian ethics and 
Bakhtinian folkloric laughter. 
2.3 Dick the Clown 
      As Carolyn de la L. Oulton and other critics have noted, Mary Cholmondeley appears to 
employ none of the experimentation that characterizes the work of Schreiner and Grand in her 
novel Red Pottage (1899). Much of her style mimics George Eliot’s, whose work she greatly 
admired (Oulton, de la L. 205). Her chapters are headed by didactic epigraphs, mostly in the 
form of proverbs or literary quotations from her contemporaries, particularly Emerson, Eliot, and 
Kipling. Cholmondeley’s narrator is the familiar Victorian moralizing and intrusive character; 
and the “Postscript” to Red Pottage is a cozy aside to the reader wherein the narrator reveals the 
as yet unwritten pages in the “Book of Life” that he sees for Rachel Ward, Dick Vernon, and 
Hester Gresley (283). I argue, however, that Cholmondeley’s innovative use of the hysteria trope 
for both men and women as an illustration of ethical renovation merits attention. The 
breakdowns that she details for her three protagonists illustrate the need for the literal breakdown 
and destruction of current mores in order for real transition and change to occur. As SueAnn 
Schatz comments, the novel is illustrative of the author’s “practical idealism” (28) and a 
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feminism “grounded in reality and practicality” (26). Structurally, Cholmondeley’s three 
narrative threads confront each of the three protagonists with an ethical challenge; however, the 
two dominant narratives, centered on Hugh Scarlett and Rachel Ward, specifically investigate the 
Levinasian challenge based on the willingness of the individual to resign the desire to dominate 
and master others, instead responding to the calling of “the face,” the complete vulnerability of 
the other. According to Levinas, in “Ethics as First Philosophy,” our dominant self, with our 
unjustifiable exercise of complete freedom, is confronted by a sense of obligation to and 
responsibility for the other. We respond to the stripped-down vulnerability of the other with 
vigilance and an obligation to justify our own right to exist. Acknowledging this obligation, we 
forfeit the desire to exercise complete freedom (Hand 82-83). As an unwilling participant in Lord 
Newhaven’s duel/death pact, Hugh Scarlett must literally kill himself or try to justify his right to 
exist to redeem an obligation to Newhaven. He is nominally free to make either choice. And later 
in the novel, Rachel Ward is exhorted by the Bishop, the authoritative representative of Christian 
dogma, to take responsibility for Hugh’s life or death as a result of her acceptance or rejection of 
his love. Through these ethical challenges, Cholmondeley depicts her two main protagonists 
disintegrating into physical and psychological chaos, their identities fragmented, when faced 
with their own ethical failures. Through the Rachel narrative, she also indicates the need to move 
toward a more universal ethics beyond limited gender definitions. 
      Additionally, like Grand and Schreiner, Cholmondeley employs folkloric laughter within her 
novel of ordeals through the use of the third of Bakhtin’s carnivalesque figures, the clown, 
embodied in the character of Dick Vernon. Vernon, whose birth places him within the ranks of 
the wealthy middle class, nevertheless functions as an outsider whose years of living in 
Australia, lack of aristocratic polish, and working class opinions make him uncomfortable in 
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high society. Dick’s friendships allow him entrance to society, but his blunt and honest 
observations serve not only to make him a foil for the melodramatic behavior of both Lord 
Newhaven and Hugh Scarlett, but to serve as the commentator on the absurdities of society’s 
conventions. Dick’s outsider status makes him an appropriate representative of the “world inside 
out,” and Cholmondeley uses Dick as the spokesman for change and for the transition to a social 
system that promotes ethical behavior by rejecting conventional positions based on class and 
gender. 
      In the plot centered on Hugh Scarlett, Cholmondeley uses the mechanism of a death pact 
initiated by Lord Newhaven in order to problematize several ethical underpinnings of late 
Victorian society. When Lord Newhaven forces Hugh into the bargain as a way of exacting 
compensation for his loss of honor in losing his wife’s love to Hugh, he does so on the basis of 
an archaic system wherein his wife is treated as his exclusive property, a system that has just 
been reformed through a series of laws under the various Married Woman Property Acts of 1870 
and 1894. These laws changed the conceptions of women’s relationships with material property 
and thus cast doubt on their position as material property themselves. Thus, the conventions 
demanding that a man defend his honor or that of his wife seem outdated. In addition, Lord 
Newhaven himself calls into question the validity of the mechanism when he notes ironically that 
he found this idea in a magazine serial. Lord Newhaven’s manner, even as he demands that Hugh 
participate in the death pact in order to avert scandal, is described by the narrator as “languid” 
(12), and he refers to “the somewhat hackneyed circumstances” in which he and Hugh find 
themselves (13). Thus, Cholmondeley uses the death pact and Hugh’s eventual breakdown and 
death as a symbolic end to an archaic marital system.  
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      It is from Hugh Scarlett’s plot that the novel’s title emerges; Hugh believes that he has sold 
his birthright—his position as an honorable man with an unsullied reputation to offer a virtuous 
woman in marriage—for an adulterous affair with a silly and trivial woman. This affair has now 
landed him in a duel for his life. He is forced then to fight in a defense of the honor he has 
forfeited already. The life or death situation in which he finds himself forces him to defend his 
right to exist at the expense of Lord Newhaven’s life. Thus, his plot becomes a sustained study 
on the right of a man to exist dishonorably at the expense of another’s life. I suggest that 
Cholmondeley employs this plot for two purposes.  First, she interrogates the remnants of a 
tradition that positions women as possessions of their husbands and symbols of their honor so 
that a wife’s appropriation by another man is an affront to the husband. Second, in depicting 
Hugh’s breakdown and death, she symbolizes the necessary disintegration of an obsolete system 
that requires strong women to marry and prop up weak, dissolute men. His refusal to accept the 
responsibility for his own moral failings and his dependency on a good woman to save him are 
destructive and outworn patterns of behavior at the turn of the twentieth century. Cholmondeley 
dramatizes, through Hugh’s novel-length breakdown, her vision of an open future for men and 
women, one based on Levinas’ description of mutual vulnerability and refusal to objectify the 
other. 
      The reader observes Hugh’s systematic rejection of responsibility. First, he feels trapped and 
resentfully bound by his tacit acceptance of the pact (15). He blames Lady Newhaven, the silly 
and vain woman with whom he has conducted an affair. After falling in love with Rachel, he 
seeks justification for rejecting his responsibility. Eventually, he feels caught in an ethical 
labyrinth, with no possible escape: “There was no help for him. There was no way out. He was in 
a trap. He must die, and soon, by his own hand. Incredible, preposterous fate!” (74). When he 
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nearly dies from drowning, he has resigned himself to dying, but his attachment to Rachel 
convinces him that Newhaven has behaved unethically in requiring his death, and he begins to 
convince himself that he is not obligated to sacrifice his own life at the demand of the other. Two 
points are salient here: on one level, Cholmondeley interrogates a ritual that has certainly 
become ridiculous by the end of the century; on another level, however, the reader understands 
that Hugh’s arguments for his own right to live are nevertheless fundamentally dishonorable 
because he is unwilling to confront his challenger or tell the complete truth to Rachel. 
      However, Hugh’s psychological breakdown creates openness in the narrative, the potential 
for transformation. His suicide after Rachel angrily rejects him seems like the only possible end 
for a man whose ethics are based on fear. Unable to acknowledge his failure as an ethical subject 
to both Lord Newhaven and Rachel, Hugh spirals into a trance state and then further into 
delusions and madness. Hugh’s breakdown takes the form of identity fragmentation. He sees a 
shadow beside him that embodies the “old Hugh,” the unethical man. In his delusional state, 
Hugh believes he must kill the unethical, dishonest and unworthy man in order to be with 
Rachel. He sets out to kill himself in order to find Rachel and be with her. Using Christian 
symbolism, Cholmondeley depicts Hugh as driven to the lake in a determination to immerse 
himself in a kind of baptism. He will, he thinks, kill the “old self” in the lake so that Rachel will 
see the new self he has become, and she will return to him: 
She would never have forsaken him. But she had mistaken this evil creeping 
shadow for him, and he had not been able to explain. But she would understand 
presently. He would make it all very clear and plain, and she would love him 
again, when he had got rid of this other Hugh. He would take him down and 
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drown him in Beaumere. It was the only way to get rid of him. And he, the real 
Hugh, would get safely through.  (273) 
While Hugh’s breakdown and death symbolize the necessary disintegration of an obsolete 
system, his final recognition of an unethical self that must be destroyed does suggest the 
possibility of transformation.  
      Both Rachel’s and Hugh’s responses to the death pact, in fact, deepen the satirical plot 
mechanism into a sustained meditation on the obligation of the self to the other in the ethical 
relationship. For Rachel as an ethical subject, the pact clearly is repugnant. As she has 
experienced poverty and observed economic injustice, Rachel has acknowledged the obligation 
of one to the other as well as the demand that she relinquish the freedom that money has 
provided her to help others. In addition, while she likes Lord Newhaven and resists Lady 
Newhaven’s foolish and dangerous self-absorption, she nevertheless responds to Lady 
Newhaven’s need of her; Rachel sees through Lady Newhaven’s illusions and her insincerity but 
is drawn to her because Lady Newhaven reveals her “face” when she shows Rachel the genuine 
terror she feels on behalf of Hugh. The sincerely vulnerable face that Lady Newhaven presents to 
Rachel is enough to call out Rachel’s response. Because she knows of the affair between Hugh 
and Lady Newhaven, Rachel struggles to love a man who has behaved dishonorably and wants to 
help him make a fresh start (107).  
      Cholmondeley, in the Rachel plot, undermines and disrupts conventional ideas of the need 
for womanly self-sacrifice by dramatizing the difference between genuine philanthropy and the 
idealized but shallow demands on women to marry flawed and dishonest men. Cholmondeley 
presents in Rachel a portrait of the New Woman who defies the bold, mannish portrait so popular 
in the media of the time. While she possesses wealth and independence, she has also been poor, 
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and her recognition of socioeconomic injustice and the way she is forced into competition with 
others who are also poor and struggling to survive shapes her ethics. Although she receives a 
fortune left to her by the man who cheated her father and is able to return to society, she finds 
herself regretting the loss of a life that is stripped down to its essentials. As she later tells Hugh 
after her return to society, she has difficulty transitioning back to the polite artifice of society and 
playing effectively the appropriate “games” required by social occasions (27). 
      In Rachel’s relationship with Hugh, Cholmondeley employs the familiar motif of the 
traditional “good woman” who sets out to recuperate a profligate man, exactly the marriage 
tradition that Sarah Grand and other women involved in the Social Purity Movement sought to 
prevent. However, early in her friendship with Hugh, before knowing anything about him, she 
responds to a sense of responsibility for him: “A long look passed between them. Hugh’s 
tortured soul, full of passionate entreaty, leaped to his eyes. Hers, sad and steadfast, met the 
appeal in his, and recognized it as a claim” (28).  Rachel’s sense of the call of the other here will 
be repeated later in her interactions with Lady Newhaven. Her interactions with both men and 
women in the novel replicate almost exactly the Levinasian sense of the claim of the other: “the 
being that expresses itself imposes itself, but does so precisely by appealing to me with its 
destitution and nudity—its hunger—without my being able to be deaf to that appeal…the face 
opens the primordial discourse whose first word is obligation…” (“Ethics and the Face” 191, 
202). Hugh, desperate to find a savior from his own moral degeneracy, sees her as a Madonna 
figure: “…in faces, calm and pure as Rachel’s, on which the sun and rain have never beaten, 
there is an expression betokening strong resistance from within of the brunt of a whirlwind from 
without” (11). Her status in representing the Ruskinian ideal of purity is confirmed early in the 
46 
novel when Hugh desperately determines to fasten on to her strength and purity so that her “pure, 
strong soul” can redeem him from “the ugly by-paths of these last years” (11).  
      While even Rachel recognizes that Dick is a better man than Hugh, Rachel’s missionary-style 
fervor causes her to prefer Hugh to Dick because Hugh needs her more. Cholmondeley here 
depicts the way that even privileged women are made to feel responsible for saving weaker men 
through appeals to their altruistic instincts—society’s familiar demand for womanly self-
sacrifice. Ultimately, the Bishop uses this sense of responsibility to indict Rachel for her failure 
to forgive and therefore to save Hugh. The Bishop has, up to this point in the novel, seemed to 
represent an enlightened and sensible authoritative voice. He respects and attempts to protect 
Hester for her talent; he recognizes Dick as a good and honest man; and he sees through James 
Gresley’s foolish inadequacies as a brother and a clergyman. However, his speech to Rachel 
reveals his adherence to the conventional view of women as responsible for providing a 
sanctuary for men, particularly weak men. While he grants Hugh’s inadequacies as a man, one 
who is “shallow and hard,…without moral backbone, the kind of man who never faces a 
difficulty, who always flinches when it comes to the point, the stuff out of which liars and 
cowards are made” (268), he nevertheless blames Rachel for not fulfilling her responsibility to 
Hugh.   
      For the reader, Rachel’s instinctive repudiation of a man who has lied to her and caused the 
death of another through his cowardice seems just. However, Hugh’s breakdown strips his 
identity to utter vulnerability. Beyond the Bishop’s exhortations, it is Hugh’s defenselessness and 
the fact that he is stripped of all conventions that summon Rachel to more ethical behavior. As 
Levinas describes this calling in “Ethics as First Philosophy,” Rachel’s own existence is justified 
when she is able to lay down her ego and acknowledge her responsibility to the other (Hand 83) 
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by responding to Hugh’s need. While Hugh’s demand of her to sacrifice herself in the name of 
convention was not ethical because it was based on his totalization of her as a pure woman 
obliged to save him, his breakdown reveals his “face.” Cholmondeley makes an important 
distinction here: an ethical relationship between men and women does not negate the need for 
self-sacrifice or obligation to the other. However, both men and women respond to the other as 
ethical subjects only when they reject comfortable and familiar assumptions. 
      When Cholmondeley introduces Dick as the novel’s humorous commentator, she redeems 
the text from simply functioning as a dark depiction of late-Victorian society. As Bakhtin asserts, 
parodic writing that includes folk laughter is “far distant from the negative and formal parody of 
modern times. Folk humour denies, but it revives and renews at the same time” (Rabelais 11). 
Dick’s presence in the novel, therefore, as the clown, who often upends characters’ pretensions, 
makes possible at the end of the novel a sense of possibility and transformation. As Renfrew 
notes, Bakhtin’s notion of folk laughter is communal; the satirical novelist fails when her 
mockery of her subjects is shallow and one-dimensional. Instead, laughter can be a corrective 
only when “the one-sided seriousness of any discourse is exposed to the light of another, 
questioning consciousness” (136). Dick’s presence in the novel, then, introduces “discourse 
shaped by laughter” (137), which maintains the novel’s sense of liberating both the characters 
from their narrow-minded society and the novel from its defined limits. Like the fool, the clown 
exists to interrogate false stereotypes and to expose artificial convention. 
      Like the typical figure of the clown, Dick is presented as an outsider. He does not belong to 
the society world that he will uncomfortably inhabit out of friendship with Lord Newhaven and 
in pursuit of Rachel.  He is described as an awkward but goodhearted figure in Chapter One, 
described as “strongly built, ill-dressed…with his keen, brown, deeply scarred face and crooked 
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mouth” (9).  Although he is an old friend of Lord Newhaven’s, he has just returned from 
Australia, and his presence at the party is revealed to be through a four-year-old invitation that he 
has mistakenly used. His dress clothes don’t fit him; Lord Newhaven has already observed that 
his pants are too short and his waistcoat is out of date. Dick’s lack of polish is immediately 
revealed when he asks Newhaven to “trot out a few heiresses” (10). He is consistently presented 
as a foil to Hugh Scarlett: when Hugh first notices Rachel, he determines to marry her so that she 
can save him from his profligate way of life (11). After also deciding to pursue Rachel, Dick, in 
contrast, has a hard time remembering her name (42). As Hester’s cousin, Dick figures in her 
memories as the son of a prosperous squire whose childhood behavior was so mischievous and 
disruptive that his family sent him to Australia to make his way. Now that he has returned, Dick 
continues to disrupt expected outcomes. He clarifies his attitude toward others’ expectations of 
him when he removes a padlocked gate from its hinges, and Rachel asks him if he always does 
what he wants to do. “It saves trouble,” is his answer (87). In addition, the figure of the clown is 
often used in novels to resist and reveal false religion. Cholmondeley’s use of Dick to laugh at 
Mr. Gresley’s lack of common sense and hypocrisy offer some of the funniest scenes in the 
novel, particularly in the temperance meeting, when he overrules James’ call for complete 
abstinence from liquor with a more sensible exhortation to “look out for an honest 
publican…who will buy only the best liquor from the best sources…and [r]emember some men 
have heads and some haven’t” (98). He and James, the hypocritical villain of Hester’s plot, have 
always been at odds because of James’ dishonesty and pretentiousness. Dick ends the novel as 
the only suitor worthy of Rachel’s love, and the narrator looks ahead to note that he seems “to 
see Rachel with children around her, and Dick not far off” (283).  Through his presence, Dick 
lightens the melodrama of the ordeals that Rachel and Hester face, but he also represents the 
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alternative to Hugh for Rachel. As an outsider who is not tethered to convention, he represents 
the “New Man” to her emerging New Woman. He is the least materially eligible of Rachel’s 
admirers, but he is also the most adventurous and open to transformation. Cholmondeley’s 
choice of Dick as the eventual partner for Rachel reaffirms her rejection of the traditional 
marriage plot as well as her commitment to a vision of uncertainty for the future. Her selection of 
the figure in the novel who has functioned as the clown scaffolds this novel’s acknowledgment 
of carnival’s reminder that the present and the future are in a constant state of becoming. 
      All three authors examine the coming transition, with more or less confidence in positive 
transformation, and all clearly examine the ravages of a system in which one partner is allowed 
to exercise freedom at the expense of compassion, and the other partner is expected to sacrifice 
her freedom and her identity to maintain the status quo. However, none of these writers favors a 
corresponding lack of responsibility and obligation for women. The themes in these novels 
clearly suggest that the authors do not advocate a radical rejection of motherhood or marriage; 
instead, they gesture toward openness and transformation in these institutions. As Levinas 
suggests, the traditions surrounding marriage and motherhood emerge from political and 
religious systems that are modes of synthesis, that are thus mythic, thematizations of origins and 
ends. While Grand gestures toward the need for a new ethical framework by interrogating 
destructive gendered behaviors, both Cholmondeley and Schreiner suggest more positive 
alternatives through a vision of transformation and change based on movement from gender 
binaries toward androgyny. In the coming transitional period they are anticipating, clearly, a 
system of ethics that requires mutual obligation to the other as well as a recognition of the 
other’s autonomy. Simultaneously, however, these novelists seek a corresponding formal 
transformation indicated by their use of carnivalesque elements. Unsatisfied with the foreclosure 
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of the marriage plot or the form of the conventional novel, they introduce characters whose 
presence is rooted in folklore but look forward with carnival logic to change and renewal. 
3 THE NEW WOMAN WRITERS AND THE SAID 
As discussed in Chapter One, New Woman novelists in wrote toward ethical openness and 
indeterminacy by embed carnivalesque characters in their novels. The next two chapters examine 
how these writers engage with Emmanuel Levinas’s concepts of the “saying” and the “said,” 
described in his 1974 study of the role of language in ethical development Otherwise than Being 
or Beyond Essence.  Describing our precognitive recognition and call to responsibility for the 
other, Levinas identifies the saying as “the proximity of one to the other, the commitment of an 
approach, the one for the other, the very signifyingness of signification” (5). However, this 
phenomenon cannot be made manifest without a correlative linguistic system, the said, which, 
while it limits the saying and “betrays” it into definition, is a necessary step (5).  
Otherwise than Being continues the argument from Totality and Infinity that our response to 
the other, our pre-cognitive obligation and unconditional responsibility for the other, is the 
ethical position. This obligation is not a choice; it simply exists. Totality and Infinity establishes 
the transcendence of “the face,” and in the course of this discussion, asserts the importance of 
language in the subject’s response to the other. Otherwise than Being, then, takes up the question 
of ethical subjectivity in relation to language. Levinas describes the role of language in the 
subject’s openness to the other, the “inexhaustible response of the self as saying” (Lingis xiii) 
that is expressed in a universal system of symbols that becomes the said.  Following a similar 
trajectory in my argument, while Chapter 1 discusses New Woman protagonists’ experience of 
the obligation to the other through their confrontation with the face, this chapter argues that New 
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Woman novelists illustrate Levinas’s assertion that ethical subjectivity is the outcome of 
discourse. 
These novelists examine the power of language and its elasticity; they interrogate the 
function of the dominant cultural narrative, the “larger said,” as it has been used to silence 
women’s voices. Ultimately, they reach for a new language, sometimes analytical and restrained, 
at other times angry and passionate, to disrupt and unsettle the dominant narrative. To connect 
with their readers, they craft a common, personal, and subversive language based on shared 
experiences. Ultimately, this focus on a new and shared language, however, still serves a vision 
of the future that, though open-ended and indeterminate, suggests the possibility of a new social 
reality. Thus, if the larger said describes a dystopian experience for women, the smaller said 
articulates a hopeful, progressive, and utopian future. 
The novelists examined here establish this new, smaller and more personal said in three 
ways: first, they employ extended polemical sections in their novels to take their message to a 
new audience of middle-class woman readers by literally going on record with their side of 
public controversies. Second, they deploy conversations and debates among women characters to 
interrogate the role of language in establishing the larger said. Rejecting the typical earnest male 
Victorian narrator, these texts tell stories through women’s voices, lending authority to their 
individual points of view and their critique of the dominant narrative—the smaller said. And 
finally, these novelists depict New Woman protagonists as ethically influenced by the power of 
language in the books they read as children. This investigation focuses primarily on two texts: 
the “Evadne” narrative in Sarah Grand’s 1893 novel The Heavenly Twins and Mona Caird’s The 
Daughters of Danaus, published the following year in 1894.  
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3.1 Articulating a New Said 
     When they shifted their arguments from essays to novels, the New Woman writers did not 
abandon polemical language. As they engaged with commentators and critics who continued to 
promulgate conventional ideas about women’s opportunities, these novelists confronted a body 
of work that existed in print and which both defined and limited ways of thinking about ethical 
womanhood—the overarching narrative that I am naming the larger said. Because the debate was 
being conducted around them in essays and Punch cartoons, the New Woman novelists wrote in 
part to express and defend their point of view. They documented a side of the debate 
overwhelmed by primarily male voices in journals and newspapers—the authentic, average 
woman’s voice. In their drive to record their argument, they employ the function of the said that 
Levinas sees as advantageous but also dangerous: the said concretizes ideas and reifies them by 
permanently locking an expression or a moment. However, for the New Woman writers, that is 
exactly the function of language they are exploiting—they can begin, by telling stories in 
women’s voices, to create a body of work in print that offers an alternative language and vision, 
both a corrective vision of the present and a progressive vision for the future.  
     Levinas notes that any book is “pure said” (171); it illustrates the commitment into language 
of the saying, the “interruption” of the saying as it is frozen into time on the page. However, he 
also explains that every book becomes part of a conversation characterized by moments of 
disruption and intervention. In publishing their novels, the New Woman writers inject 
themselves, their protagonists, and their utopian vision into the conversation. 
     Indeed, as Talia Schaffer discusses in her 2001 essay “’Nothing But Foolscap and Ink:’ 
Inventing the New Woman,” the real turning point in the New Woman debate occurred when the 
conversation shifted from discussing real women to discussing characters in novels (40). In 
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Sarah Grand’s essay “The New Aspect of the Woman Question,” Grand unwittingly coins the 
term that would gain momentum from Ouida’s response in an essay entitled “The New Woman.” 
Thus, as Schaffer notes, Grand is already moving the figure she is describing into the realm of 
fiction by idealizing and mythologizing her (42). As Schaffer discusses and Ann Heilmann 
argues more extensively in New Woman Fiction: Women Writing First-Wave Feminism (2000), 
the term “New Woman” itself was unstable from its first use because of the many ideological 
stakeholders employing the term to capture an abstract cultural conception (2). Rita Kranidis, in 
Subversive Discourse: The Cultural Production of Late Victorian Feminist Novels (1995), argues 
that the New Woman in reality “has not yet materialized socially;” once moved into novels, 
however, as a character, she “serves as a theoretical concept and a dynamic social projection” 
used by novelists to critique the social order (xiv).  
     Protagonists in New Woman novels are depicted as heroines who decline traditional roles, 
resist accepted conventions of marriage and motherhood, aspire to or do work for a living, and 
argue feminist ideals (3). Gail Cunningham interprets the emerging picture of the New Woman 
as culturally defined by her advocates in journalistic discourse: she is middle-class, principled, 
idealistic, intelligent, and individualistic (11). These were attributes attached to the figure who 
appears in public discussions. However, the New Woman protagonists who appear in the heyday 
of New Woman novels, the 1880s and 1890s, possess attributes that make them more difficult to 
sum up: they often embody the lived experiences of their creators, but they are also clearly 
conceived as part of the social and political project of the New Woman authors, to function as 
persuasive models for real young women.  
     However, moving from the straightforward argument of an essay to more layered and 
complex narratives, these novelists also engage with the aspect of the said that illustrates the 
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ways in which language moves the encounter between individuals from an intangible connection 
into one defined by a common language. The said, fixing and designating the meaning of an 
encounter, comprises a necessary step in the ethical relationship because it becomes, over time, 
the vehicle for identity and relationship: “a being, designated by a substantive, is distended, in 
the time of lived experience, into life, into essence, into a verb, but across the opening that the 
diastasis of identity works, across time…such is consciousness” (Levinas 36). In other words, 
these novelists shifted their concerns into narrative fiction, specifically in the form of the 
feminist bildungsroman, to establish closer relationships with their intended middle-class 
readers. As Kate Flint discusses in The Woman Reader 1837-1914 (1995), in her chapter on New 
Woman writers, these writers’ employment of the bildungsroman “encourages sympathetic 
identification on the reader’s part” as the “reader’s growth in knowledge is made to parallel that 
of the protagonist” (296). Indeed, the New Woman writers perceived the relationship between 
their novels and a “society of readers” who would be invited to adopt language and concepts 
reflecting what they had read (Flint 315). Thus, readers become vicarious participants in debates 
conducted in a new, feminist language that they are encouraged to internalize. This particular 
type of novel, then, invites an intimate relationship between writer and reader, which imitates the 
proximity that Levinas asserts is necessary for ethical relationships. 
     Choosing the novel form as the vehicle for a transformative link with readers makes sense for 
these writers on two levels. First, as Mikhail Bakhtin suggests, the novel in the late nineteenth 
century was still a young genre, one without strict generic definition. The form was and is still 
developing, so it lends itself to a movement of women writers so enmeshed in their own time. As 
noted in Chapter 1, these novels are often permeated with the folkloric laughter that subverts 
hegemonies and closed systems. The form of the novel is flexible and characterized by “an 
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indeterminacy, a certain semantic open-endedness, a living contact with unfinished, still-evolving 
contemporary reality (the open-ended present)” (italics mine) (Bakhtin 323). The novel reflects 
reality as it develops and shifts because the form itself is so capable of shifting; it reflects “the 
tendencies of a new world still in the making” (324). For a group of writers intent on dramatizing 
the current reality for women, the openness and flexibility of the novel as a form permits them to 
include many voices and forms—interludes, fantasies, allegories, “proems,” folktales, dreams, 
etc. If, then, as I argue, these writers are exploring through their protagonists an open-ended 
ethical system, one that foregrounds alterity and indeterminacy, the form here matches its 
content. As Bakhtin notes, the novel is “younger than writing and the book; it alone is 
organically receptive to new forms of mute reception, that is, to reading” (321). Thus, the New 
Woman writers employ the novel to engage in a conversation with their readers, while also 
modeling a polyphonic community of women, one whose voices are permitted to speak 
provocatively or subversively without the author intervening between character and reader. 
Essentially, then, they are taking advantage both of the permanent nature of language to fix their 
ideas within a genre that is flexible and adaptable to contemporary needs. Within the novel form, 
these authors model the proximity between subjects necessary for ethical transformation with 
and for their readers by depicting characters in conversation and debate with one another, within 
communities of women. 
3.2 Dialogues with Readers through Character Monologues   
     Within the novels, passionate debates or monologues illustrate Levinas’s assertion that 
philosophical writing, or communication, must grapple with the limitations of language in its 
tendency to foreclose the openness, the uncertainty, the disruption of the same that is the saying. 
Thus, while these passages remain questioning, open, tentative sallies—often mournful, or bitter, 
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or enraged--they are not prescriptive. They stop short of defining or describing a desirable 
outcome, except in the most general terms. Some characters perform this function by speaking 
directly to readers through extended monologues that effectively function as dialogues with 
readers.  
     Perhaps the best known of these passages is included in Olive Schreiner’s The Story of an 
African Farm, published in 1883, a decade before the peak of the New Woman debates. Lyndall, 
the proto-feminist protagonist of the novel, bitterly evokes Mary Wollstonecraft in an extended 
monologue with a silent Waldo, arguing about “the position of women” (178), which she says is 
her passion. The monologue is long, angry, and resentful, and much of it interrogates the way the 
world speaks to women, as this excerpt demonstrates: 
“It is not what is done to us, but what is made of us,” she said at last, “that wrongs 
us. No man can be really injured but by what modifies himself. We all enter the 
world little plastic beings, with so much natural force, perhaps, but for the rest—
blank; and the world tells us what we are to be, and shapes us by the ends it sets 
before us. To you it says—“Work;” and to us it says—“Seem!” To you it says—
As you approximate to man’s highest ideal of God, as your arm is strong and your 
knowledge great, and the power to labour is with you, so you shall gain all that 
human heart desires. To us it says—Strength shall not help you, nor knowledge, 
nor labour. You shall gain what men gain, but by other means. And so the world 
makes men and women.” (179) 
Lyndall’s argument here is an indictment of the reified ideas that shape the development of 
women—the inflexible and overarching mandates communicated to them from the earliest years 
of their lives. Throughout this extended monologue, Lyndall uses the phrases “it says” and “they 
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say,” over and over. Lyndall’s anger and frustration are directed at an imaginary “they” who 
control the messages and the naming used to keep women in their place. For Lyndall, the 
patriarchal admonitions are masterminded by an amorphous power structure that uses the power 
of language to exclude women: 
“They say women have one great and noble work left them, and they do it ill. 
That is true; they do it execrably. It is the work that demands the broadest culture, 
and they have not even the narrowest. The lawyer may see no deeper than his law-
books, and the chemist see no further than the windows of his laboratory, and they 
may do their work well. But the woman who does woman’s work needs a many-
sided, multiform culture; the heights and depths of human life must not be beyond 
the reach of her vision; she must have knowledge of men and things in many 
states, a wide catholicity of sympathy, the strength that springs from knowledge, 
and the magnanimity which springs from strength. We bear the world, and we 
make it.” (180). 
For Lyndall, even the role that women are biologically determined to appropriate is one for 
which they criticized, but she considers, like Mary Wollstonecraft before her, that women are set 
up to fail even in this role. Schreiner, in the earliest of the New Woman novels, employs 
Lyndall’s monologues as implicit dialogues with her readers, articulating an angry and extended 
indictment of the culture and its larger said. She models here a sense of urgency and restlessness 
that was beginning to gather energy in activist movements even in the mid-1980s. Later in the 
same monologue, however, Lyndall offers her vision of a more hopeful future: 
“A great soul draws and is drawn with a more fierce intensity than any small one. 
By every inch we grow in intellectual height our love strikes down its roots deeper, 
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and spreads out its arms wider. It is for love’s sake yet more than for any other that 
we look for that new time…Then when that time comes…when love is no more 
bought or sold, when it is not a means of making bread, when each woman’s life is 
filled with earnest, independent labour, then love will come to her, a strange, sudden 
sweetness breaking in upon her earnest work; not sought for, but found. Then, but 
not now—” (102) 
        Another extended monologue is employed by Sarah Grand at the end of the Interlude, “The 
Tenor and the Boy,” in Sarah Grand’s The Heavenly Twins. The Boy, now unmasked as Angelica, 
explains her reasoning for masquerading as a boy and hiding her true identity from the Tenor: 
“I wanted to do as well as to be, and I knew I wanted to do, but when the time 
came for me to begin, my friends armed themselves with the whole social system 
as it obtains in our state of life, and came out to oppose me. They used to lecture 
me and give me good advice, as if they were able to judge, and it made me rage.” 
(438) 
Angelica’s anger toward the well-meaning women who have abetted the cultural imprisonment 
of other women will resonate with young women readers. Angelica is especially interested in the 
way men speak to each other, which is distinctly different from the way they speak to women:  
“I wanted to hear how men talk to each other…I have enjoyed the benefit of free 
intercourse with your masculine mind undiluted by your masculine prejudices 
with regard to my sex…I almost think I have been on an equal footing; and it has 
been to me like the free use of his limbs to a prisoner after long confinement with 
chains.” (443-444) 
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Grand here singles out the power of male language. Angelica understands how language has 
been used to trivialize women; her attempts at independence have been stunted. She believes that 
if only she can somehow gain access to the ways that men speak to each other, this secret 
language will unlock knowledge that she can use to gain more personal freedom and power.  
        Both Schreiner and Grand, in these monologues, employ the angry, bitter female voice to 
articulate their consciousness of the dominant culture’s language and their need to interrupt its 
narrative and challenge its power. Both Lyndall and Angelica voice readers’ inchoate ideas 
awakening to their own need to subvert expectations attached to the identity already established 
for them by their culture; these protagonists’ words, now in print, fixed and permanent, literally 
put words in their readers’ mouths. Thus, through these monologue/dialogues with readers, New 
Woman writers employ novelistic language to encrypt a new, feminist said for a new generation 
of readers. 
3.3 Modeling Conversation among Characters to Give Women a New Language 
       To move a step further, however, Sarah Grand and Mona Caird depart from the use of the 
angry monologue to a more nuanced approach-- a series of conversations between characters, 
which traces their characters’ evolving awareness of the invisible guiding hand of the larger 
culture, particularly as this guidance is deployed in declarations about women and their identity. 
As Robert Eaglestone comments about Levinas in his analysis of Otherwise Than Being, Grand 
and Caird’s texts are “both discursive and performative” (139 ); that is, according to Eaglestone, 
Levinas uses two techniques to question or subvert traditional ideas about philosophy in 
Otherwise than Being. First, he changes terms and definitions frequently, illustrating the slippery 
nature of language and its constant “interruption of itself” (139). Second, he frequently employs 
questions rather than statements because questions convey openness and indeterminacy; they 
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open a dialogue with the reader (139). Grand and Caird use similar techniques. Their 
protagonists’ conversations with other women often feel repetitive, as if they are seeking 
definition and not finding it. Additionally, they raise many questions about the limits of language 
in their need to understand their own ideas. Thus, like Levinas, Grand and Caird demonstrate the 
limits of language even as they also foreground the use of a new feminist and personal language 
to disrupt the larger said. Their protagonists are speaking their way into their new ideas, 
discovering not only the ways that language has betrayed them, but also discovering the power of 
language to reframe an open-ended, utopian vision for women. 
     Two novels that trace these conversations between women are Sarah Grand’s The Heavenly 
Twins and Mona Caird’s The Daughters of Danaus. In Evadne, Sarah Grand’s protagonist, 
readers are presented with a young woman who is just beginning to articulate feminist 
convictions, and whose ethical development emerges through dialogues with her mother, an 
aunt, and ultimately, supportive feminist mentors. The Evadne plot is one of three in the novel 
that Grand uses to “emphasize the necessity for women to learn to critique their culture if they 
want to resist or transform it” (Kranidis 90). 
     Caird, on the other hand, documents a different experience—the young woman with firm 
convictions about the need for change whose statements and the language in which she frames 
her ideas are challenged and discouraged by her sister, a reluctant mentor, and finally, by the 
conventional middle-class women who surround her. In this case, Caird illustrates the use of 
language as a kind of weapon—questioning, passionate, often unregulated and unfiltered speech 
that is employed as the protagonist’s only access to power.  
     In both novels, because these novelists are modeling interactions for their readers, they begin 
with the power of maternal language and its implications. Maternal language is represented by 
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both Grand and Caird as a complicit force that continues to enclose young women within 
conventional and often destructive boundaries by linking rebellion against convention with 
public shame and disgrace. In The Heavenly Twins, for example, after weeks of increasingly 
acrimonious exchanges in letters, Evadne, confronted by a tearful mother, is told that she is 
“selfish and unnatural,” and her actions will make it impossible for her sisters to marry (107). 
Her mother attributes Evadne’s obstinacy to her “over-education” and the reading that Evadne 
has managed to do in spite of her parents (107). When her arguments do not persuade Evadne to 
return, Mrs. Frayling employs emotional blackmail, declaring that Evadne’s intransigence is 
destroying her health. This argument, of course, succeeds, and Evadne agrees to an unhappy 
compromise. Language has failed Evadne and her parents; Evadne has carefully articulated her 
position in her letters, and her parents have rejected her position, insisting instead on obedience 
based on the proper role of a daughter. The gulf between them seems unbridgeable because the 
force of logic cannot overcome the power of maternal self-sacrifice.  
     Similarly, as Ann Heilmann argues, the most prominent theme in The Daughters of Danaus is 
Caird’s “critique of motherhood as an oppressive patriarchal institution” (158). Hadria articulates 
her reasons for abandoning a fraudulent marriage to her sister-in-law; however, she too sacrifices 
her autonomy and returns home at the news that her father has lost his income and her mother is 
dangerously ill. Like Evadne, all of Hadria’s logical arguments fail to overcome the force of 
parental need. Though neither of her parents confronts her directly, their role at this point in the 
novel represents the force of convention and the expectations directed at young women. If 
Hadria does not return home to care for her mother, she will be even further ostracized. No 
matter how talented she may be, the force of her musical ambitions simply cannot withstand the 
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demands of the community that she sacrifice her dreams to do her duty. Nursing her mother, 
Hadria has a prophetic vision: 
She realized now, with agonising vividness, the sadness of her mother’s life, the 
long stagnation, the slow decay of disused faculties, and the ache that accompanies 
all processes of decay, physical or moral…the appeal of womanhood itself:—the 
grey sad story of a woman’s life, bare and dumb and pathetic in its irony and pain: 
the injury from without, and then the self-injury…the unconscious thirst for the 
sacrifice of others, the hungry claims of a nature unfulfilled, the groping instinct to 
bring the balance of renunciation to the level, and indemnify oneself for the loss 
suffered and the spirit offered up. (263) 
For their readers, both Grand and Caird write prophetically here; these passages warn readers 
about the force of tradition and the larger said. The dominant discourse is powerful. However, as 
subsequent passages in these novels will illustrate, there is also power in language that emerges 
among and between women—the conversations are personal and the language is idiosyncratic, 
but its very newness and difference is its appeal to readers.  
     As both novels progress, Grand and Caird depict each protagonist next in relationship with a 
woman who serves as mentor of sorts and with whom her conversations provide opportunities to 
articulate her own growing convictions about the way to understand womanhood. These 
conversations foreground the characters’ search for their own language through which to 
articulate a position on marriage and motherhood. Evadne finds a sympathetic listener in her 
aunt, Mrs. Orton Beg. Less conventional than her sister, Evadne’s mother, Mrs. Orton Beg is 
physically similar to Evadne, but living in a cathedral town has deeply affected her character. 
She is described by the narrator as a woman whose “spiritual nature predominated,” who 
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inspired others to “desire to go forth and do great deeds of love” (72-73). More significantly for 
Evadne, she is a more flexible thinker than her sister, and she privileges moral behavior above 
conventional appearances. Thus, when Evadne makes her case for not living with her husband, 
Mrs. Orton Beg’s initial response is involuntarily conventional and she is horrified. However, 
she later comes to acknowledge the moral force of Evadne’s arguments: Grand shows her 
responding to Evadne’s argument and admitting its justification, when she thinks “reason and 
right were on Evadne’s side” (81). Simultaneously, her aunt knows the opposition Evadne will 
face as well: “she felt in her heart the full force of the custom and prejudice that would be against 
her, and shrank appalled by the thought of what the cruel struggle to come must be if Evadne 
persisted in her determination” (81). Grand here uses Mrs. Orton Beg as the model of a woman 
whose natural inclination is to behave as expected, but who is won over by the force of a valid 
argument, even to admitting the duplicity that good women practice by choosing not to know the 
truth:  
“If I ever let myself dwell on the horrible depravity that goes on unchecked, the 
depravity which you say we women license by ignoring it when we should face 
and unmask it, I should go out of my mind. I do know—we all know; how can we 
live and not know? But we don’t think about it—we can’t—we daren’t…” (82) 
Grand articulates the differences between Mrs. Orton Beg and Evadne in a telling passage about 
the power of words and their implications: 
“There is one word more I would say, although I do not wish to influence you,” 
Mrs. Orton Beg began hesitantly. 
“You mean submit” Evadne answered, and shook her head. “No, that word is of 
no use to me. Mine is rebel. It seems to me that those who dare to rebel in every 
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age are they who make life possible for those whom temperament compels to 
submit. It is the rebels who extend the boundary of right little by little, narrowing 
the confines of wrong, and crowding it out of existence.” (95) 
Mrs. Orton Beg’s conversation with Dr. Galbraith also embeds Evadne’s dilemma within the 
larger context of the struggle for women’s rights when she describes Evadne as the new version 
of Faust’s Marguerite—one who, like other young women, would sacrifice romance for the 
pleasures of learning and knowledge, who rejects a momentary passion in favor of a “sense of 
proportion” and looking forward to 
the gradual growth of knowledge through all the ages, the clouds of ignorance and 
superstition slowly parting, breaking up, and rolling away, to let the light of 
science shine—science being truth, and there is all art, and all natural beauty from 
the”  beginning—everything that lasts and is life (98).  
This step in Evadne’s education demonstrates a critical function of language that Levinas 
discusses: the ethical subject becomes aware of the power of the said and “all the possibilities of 
vocabulary” (37). For the first time, Evadne demonstrates her understanding of the power of 
language and its function in establishing order. She has set terms for the future; however, as I 
will discuss later, up to this point, her ideas about ethical behavior have been private, shaped by 
her readings in biology and social theory. She has now taken an important step in beginning to 
articulate her convictions publicly and acting on them. 
     Similarly, Caird depicts Hadria, trying to reconcile her own ambitions with the demands of 
motherhood and domesticity, working out the conflict first with a sympathetic mentor. Unlike 
Evadne, however, whose language reveals the scientific and philosophical texts that have shaped 
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her thinking, Hadria expresses herself passionately, using vivid language that often verges on the 
poetic: 
“Renunciation is always preached to girls, you know…preached to them when as 
yet they have nothing more than a rattle and a rag-doll to renounce. And later, 
when they set about the business of their life, and resign their liberty, their talents, 
their health, their opportunity, their beauty…then people gradually fall away from 
the despoiled and obedient being…”(45) 
And later: 
“I have seen this sort of traditional existence and nothing else, all my life, and I 
have been brought up to it, with the rest—prepared and decked out like some 
animal for the market—all in the most refined and graceful manner possible; but 
how can one help seeing through the disguise; how can one be blind to the real 
nature of the transaction, and to the fate that awaits one…” (50) 
This is visceral language that is unregulated and unleashed, but also revealing in its lyricism of 
Hadria’s talent as a composer of music. Ironically, Hadria’s mentor Valeria Du Prel, a successful 
novelist, often chastens Hadria about this extravagant use of language. What appeals to Hadria 
about Valeria Du Prel is that she is an independent, unmarried woman who supports herself as a 
novelist. Hadria idealizes Du Prel and envies what she views as the artistic life that will be 
unavailable to her, hemmed in by family duties and expectations. Du Prel functions partly as a 
surrogate mother whom Hadria can use as a sounding board for ideas she is unable to share with 
her own mother, a woman who refuses to entertain the possibility of the nontraditional woman. 
However, Du Prel also seems to be a character whom Caird employs to illustrate a fissure 
between fiction and real life. The female protagonists in Du Prel’s novels may be bold and 
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rebellious, but she is not. While she writes narratives about women who transgress convention, 
Du Prel idealizes marriage and womanly self-sacrifice. Not a New Woman, Du Prel is instead an 
example of “The Independent Woman,” a type defined by Martha Vicinus and discussed by Ann 
Ardis as a woman who participates in the public sphere but maintains her class position and her 
standing as a “lady” because she continues to endorse traditional gender and class conventions 
(Ardis 16). In a novel that investigates the implications of self-sacrifice, Du Prel functions as an 
object lesson for both Hadria and readers—if Caird is indicting marriage as a hollow contract for 
women, she is also carefully distinguishing between women who seek real change and those 
satisfied and well-served by the status quo. Du Prel values her independence and solitude, but 
she is not ready to shun convention. When Hadria confides to Du Prel that she feels suffocated 
by the demands that she cater to her parents and find a suitable husband, Du Prel only 
acknowledges some reservations about the “tyrannical tradition” that allows “no latitude for 
variety of type;” she even cites the hopelessness of “beating one’s wings against the bars” (49). 
For Du Prel, Hadria is an impractical and intemperate young woman whose ideas will, she is 
certain, change as she grows older, falls in love, and marries.  
     In Du Prel, Caird employs a woman who makes her living through narrative to call attention 
to Hadria’s radical ideas through the style of her language; Du Prel often accuses Hadria of using 
exaggerated language: “Ah! Hadria, you exaggerate, you distort; you forget so many things—the 
sentiments, the affections, the thousand details that hallow that crude foundation which you see 
only bare and unsoftened” (51).  Hadria constantly expresses her growing conviction that she has 
been raised as a sacrifice to the demands of a self-perpetuating system. She uses a variety of 
images that are strong and vivid to illustrate for readers both her anger and frustration and the 
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understanding that language, while it can be used powerfully, is ultimately inadequate to 
accomplish the radical change that will free her.  
     Both Grand and Caird go on to develop themes about the efficacy of language either to free 
women or further constrict them through a series of conversations between men and women that 
make up much of the action of each novel. In the characters of Mrs. Malcomson and the 
American clergyman, Mr. Price, who appear in the “Malta” section of The Heavenly Twins, 
Grand provides Evadne with her first real advocates, who will offer Evadne the opportunity to 
articulate her emerging feminist ideas. When Evadne first encounters Mrs. Malcolmson, she is 
engaged in berating a handsome but conventional clergyman, Mr. St. John, on the platitudes 
about women she so often hears from the pulpit. He has defended the “old exquisite ideal of 
womanhood” and her “beautiful submission to the hardships of her lot” when Mrs. Malcolmson 
retorts that the “’poetry of the pulpit’” has “pleased our senses” and “flattered us into inaction by 
it, and used it as a means to stimulate our vanity and indolence by extolling a helpless condition 
under the pompous title of ‘beautiful patient submission:’  
“You have administered soothing sedatives of ‘spiritual consolation’ as you call 
it, under the baleful influence of which we have existed with all our highest 
faculties dulled and drugged. You have curtailed our grand power to resist evil by 
narrowing us down into what you call the ‘women’s sphere,’ wherein you insist 
that we shall be unconditional slaves of man, doing always and only such things 
as shall suit his pleasure and convenience.” (176-177) 
Another advocate who appears less often is Mrs. Sillenger, who interjects: 
“I wonder men like yourself, Mr. St. John…continue so prejudiced on this 
subject. How you could help on the moral progress of the world, if only you 
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would forget the sweet soporific ‘poetry of the pulpit’…and learn to think of us 
women, not as angels or beasts of burden—the two extremes between which you 
wander—but as human beings…” (178) 
Throughout the “Malta section” of the novel, Mrs. Malcolmson continues to debate Mr. St. John 
and more conventional women in the military community. Outspoken but reasonable, she uses 
the authority of her husband’s position to raise questions about the ways in which false analogies 
and characterizations of women have been used to constrict them. Mrs. Malcolmson normalizes 
feminism; Grand depicts her as a middle-class woman whose husband makes no attempt to 
curtail her outspokenness and who is respected in the small community of English people in 
Malta. Her arguments are presented as logical and good-natured throughout. In counterpoint to 
Mrs. Frayling and Mrs. Orton Beg, Grand positions Mrs. Malcolmson as an illustration of a 
mature and reasonable feminist who is able to articulate her ideas within a very traditional 
(military, in this case) culture and cause the other reasonable members of the community to 
reconsider their own positions.  
     Grand employs Mr. Price, the radical American, to make the case for the evolution of women 
in the most direct terms. Defending Evadne’s emerging outspokenness, he tells Mr. St. John that 
women may once have “meekly acquiesced” and even believed what men told them, that they 
were “illogical, unreasoning, and incapable of thought” but now women have arrived at more 
logical conclusions; he believes that “unrest and rebellion against the old abuses” will be a great 
improvement, an “onward impulse” that men should not resist (217). As Mr. Price is an 
American and an older man, he is both progressive and authoritative.  
     The “Malta” section of the novel foregrounds language in distinct contrast to earlier sections. 
Because Evadne is now in conversation with older and disinterested men and women, the 
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language here is divested of familial obligation. Mrs. Malcolmson and Mr. Price are outsiders, 
and their language is generally confident and matter-of-fact. This section of the novel is short, 
but it reflects two possibilities for Evadne and the novel’s readers: in the small world of the 
military post in Malta, well-educated and thoughtful people both assume and speak logically of 
the coming transition for women. These men and women are authoritative, and so their 
progressive ideas seem to be replacing the older and more destructive conventions. Second, the 
small community in Malta is a model for readers in its openness to debate. Grand uses this 
episode to illustrate how language allows the ethical subject to literally speak her way into 
ethical subjectivity.   
     By contrast, if Grand employs conversations between Evadne and her friends in Malta to 
depict Evadne’s moral growth through self-expression, Caird writes many angry diatribes for 
Hadria that function performatively as multiple efforts to open exchanges, to interrupt more 
conventional ideas. As Levinas employs multiple definitions for the saying and the said to open 
and interrogate the nature of philosophical language (Eaglestone 139), Caird is similarly 
employing forceful and emphatic statements to interrupt, over and over, stagnant notions about 
womanhood. Throughout the novel, Caird uses Hadria to speak eloquently against conventional 
ideas; through Hadria, she is forcefully negating destructive ideas and replacing them with the 
language of powerful and righteous anger at the prospect of serving as one of “society’s 
scapegoats” (Ardis 18). These dramatic passages ring eloquently for the reader as Caird has 
composed them to reflect the pain of an artist who is painfully constricted by duty. As Ann 
Heilmann comments, Caird “exposed the patriarchal roots of all authoritative discourses, urging 
on her readers the recognition of the dangers inherent in imbuing the old mythologies of male-
governed society with the new female-directed demands of the age” (158). 
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     Caird depicts Hadria’s ongoing conversations with the most influential women in her life, her 
sister-in-law, Henriette, and her neighbor, Lady Engleton. Henriette is particularly influential in 
Hadria’s life as she has played matchmaker in promoting the marriage between her brother 
Hubert and Hadria. As Henriette mendaciously convinced Hubert to pretend to accede to a less 
conventional marriage that would theoretically cede more independence to Hadria than was 
usual, Hadria considers Henriette to have conspired in a fraud, and she considers her an enemy. 
Henriette consistently presents the conventional view of marriage and feminine self-sacrifice. 
She feels no remorse for her part in tricking Hadria into marriage with her brother, and Hadria 
directs her angriest and most radical speeches to Henriette, as in this exchange: 
“It would take too long to go into this subject,” said Henriette. “I can only repeat 
that I fail to understand your extraordinary views of the holiest of human instincts.” 
“That catch-word! And you use it rashly, Henriette, for do you not know that the 
deepest of all degradation comes of misusing that which is most holy?” 
“A woman who does her duty is not to be accused of misusing anything,” cried 
Miss Temperley hotly. 
“Is there then no sin, no misuse of power in sending into the world swarms of 
fortuitous, poverty-stricken human souls, as those souls must be who are born in 
bondage, with the blended instincts of the slave and the master for a proud 
inheritance? It sounds awful I know, but truth is apt to sound awful. Motherhood, 
as our wisdom has appointed it, among civilized people, represents a prostitution 
of the reproductive powers, which precisely corresponds to that other abuse, which 
seems to most of us so infinitely more shocking.” (249-250) 
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This conversation is one of many in the novel wherein Hadria passionately attacks convention, and 
Henriette defends the need for womanly submission. Hadria’s assertion that motherhood has been 
forced on unwilling women like her is enraged; the sheer force of her language leaps from the 
page, conveying the righteous anger Caird is communicating to her readers as their right.  
     Hadria’s other sparring partner, Lady Engleton, is described as a woman unwilling to 
entertain uncertainty or openness. Like Valeria Du Prel, she is another example of the 
“independent woman” who only dabbles in new ideas. The narrator describes her someone who 
“enjoyed playing with unorthodox speculations, but…objected to have her customary feelings 
interfered with…She liked to leave a question delicately balanced, enjoying all the fun of 
‘advanced’ thought without endangering her favorite sentiments” (187). Caird effectively 
presents Lady Engleton as the figure Hadria could have been. Her husband Hubert, in fact, sees 
Lady Engleton as the woman he thought he was marrying in Hadria: she is an artist, and 
therefore has “originality and brilliance,” (127) but never trespasses the bounds of 
conventionality. He thinks of Lady Engleton that she “always knew when to stop; she had the 
genius of moderation. She stood to Hadria as a correct rendering of a cherished idea stands to a 
faulty one” (127). Lady Engleton, who is thoughtful and intelligent enough to debate with 
Hadria, nevertheless is unwilling to consider the potential for change in a society that satisfies 
her in its current form. For Caird, the Henriettes and Lady Engletons of the world represent the 
contemporary forces that are marshalled most effectively against emerging feminists; thus, 
Hadria’s anger and eloquence are deployed in contrast to their statements throughout the novel. 
The force of her language, used to name and designate, illustrates the power of the said to create 
a teleological narrative of oppression and pain (Levinas 36). 
3.4 Critiquing the Larger Said through Scenes of Reading 
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     The final consideration that Grand investigates about the power of language is in the potential 
for shaping young women’s convictions through their reading, part of the late-century debate on 
women’s rights. As Ann Heilmann suggests, the popular Punch cartoon “Donna Quixote” 
captures much of the force of the controversy. The illustration depicts the New Woman character 
dressed as a traditional “bluestocking” with her feet on a pile of books, and surrounded by 
symbols suggesting her militant feminist ideas. She is reading/has read Ibsen, Tolstoy, Sarah 
Grand, Iota, and Mona Caird—these books have left her with, as the caption declares “A world 
of disorderly notions, picked out of books, crowded into his (her) imagination” (3). The books at 
her feet, from the perspective of the Punch cartoonist, represent the subversive influences on the 
young bluestocking produced by literary rabble rousers—authors who are notably either women 
or foreigners. Unwittingly, the cartoonist depicts exactly what New Woman writers hope for: 
their novels and those of like-minded writers will effectively model the beginnings of a new 
“larger said” that is both contrarian and feminist. As Heilmann notes, not only does the cartoon 
depict the significant role of reading and writing for the New Woman, but it captures the 
intersection of “literary (self-) representation,…popular culture, and first-wave feminism” (4). 
Notably, the cartoon illustrates the unease in the late nineteenth century with women reading 
novels; the general suspicion of the effect on women of reading novels at this point mirrored the 
earlier targeting of sensation novels, but “the issue of women’s reading in the 1890s becomes 
most active around the question of access to knowledge” ( 301). 
     Although Caird does not address this issue, in The Heavenly Twins, Evadne Frayling’s bid for 
more agency in determining her future is linked by Grand to the books she has read and their 
power in shaping Evadne’s convictions about her worth and identity. As Flint points out, 
“Evadne’s reading is her source of knowledge about herself and her world. When her concerns 
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and her reading shift from personal reading to social/political works, she “’realizes her own 
limitations’” (25). Grand links Evadne’s identity so closely to her reading because in order for 
the New Woman to survive, she “must learn first and foremost to be a critic of her culture. Her 
failure or success depends upon how well she learns to read—men’s books, men’s reasoning, 
men’s means of control, and the masculine privilege that organizes the marriage plot” (Mangum 
90).  
     The first chapter of the novel begins “At nineteen Evadne looked out of narrow eyes at an 
untried world inquiringly. She wanted to know” (5). The narrator goes on to describe Evadne as 
a child who “demand[ed] instruction as a right” Her relationship with her father, who 
underestimates her intelligence, focuses Evadne’s energies on acquiring facts and accurate 
information, for this is the advice her father gives Evadne’s brothers. Seeking facts leads her first 
to study mathematics, and later, to read opportunistically. When a book or novel is left out by her 
father or a visitor, Evadne takes the opportunity for unsanctioned reading, documenting her 
impressions in a commonplace book (16). Reading in this way, Evadne is exposed to the ideas of 
John Stuart Mill on “The Subjection of Women,” Lewes “Life of Goethe,” and Goldsmith’s The 
Vicar of Wakefield. She later finds a box of science books in the attic and studies anatomy and 
physiology. Acquiring this type of knowledge is taboo for a young woman of her class, but the 
narrator points out that Evadne reads both fiction and nonfiction “with the utmost deliberation 
and with intellect clear and senses unaffected by anything” (24). While she goes on to study 
“pathology…prophylactics and therapeutics,” she is nevertheless “quite unharmed because she 
made no personal application of her knowledge as the coarser masculine mind of the ordinary 
medical student is apt to do” (24). Her reading and writing produces in Evadne a logical, 
disinterested worldview. As the narrator describes her character, on the brink of womanhood, 
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when she is made to become more self-conscious, Evadne’s chief interest is the acquisition of 
knowledge; she is not primarily interested in literature, as “mind as creator appealed to her less 
than mind as recorder, reasoner, and ruler; and for one gem or poetry or other beauty of purely 
literary value which she quotes, there are fifty records of principles of action” (25).   
     Given Evadne’s dedication to facts and knowledge, and her understanding of anatomy, it is 
inevitable that she will resist living with a husband who has been unmasked as profligate. Her 
bid for release from marriage to a husband she no longer trusts is, however, foiled by her 
mother’s tearful plea that she has embarrassed her family by adopting such an unorthodox stand 
against marriage. To all of Evadne’s concerns about Major Colquhon, Mrs. Frayling simply 
responds that Evadne must read her Bible, say her prayers, and do the right thing (106). Mrs. 
Frayling blames Evadne’s obstinacy on her reading:  
“Once you over-educate a girl, you can do nothing with her, she gives herself 
such airs; and you have managed to over-educate yourself somehow, although 
how remains a mystery. But one thing I am determined upon. Your poor sisters 
shall never have a book I don’t know off by heart myself. I shall lock them all up. 
(107) 
Reading, as Adam Seth Lowenstein notes, is “an emancipatory force” in a young woman’s life 
(436). However, later, Evadne’s undoing and collapse into hysteria is also directly linked to her 
reading, or her lack thereof. Having promised Colonel Colquhon that she will not act on her 
newly formulated feminist convictions, she stops reading any challenging or rigorous texts that 
might motivate her to take action. Instead, she declines into a bitter, frustrated woman who will 
no longer engage with substantive ideas about women. Her comments in the last section of the 
novel reflect how her willingness to read only trivial and “safe” women’s novels both reflects 
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and shapes her decline into depression. After expressing a distaste for discussions of politics or 
business, she declares the uselessness of women attempting to play a role in public life:  
“I hear women say that they are obliged to interfere just now in all that concerns 
themselves because men have cheated and imposed upon them to a quite 
unbearable extent. But they will do no good by it. Their position is perfectly 
hopeless, and the mere trade of governing is a coarse pursuit, and therefore most 
objectionable for us” (533). 
When asked about her reading, Evadne admits that she had sought knowledge as a young 
woman, but now avoids books that are “true to life.” Instead, she prefers safe books, those that 
will “take me out of this world and make me feel something,” books that have “the effect of rest 
upon my mind;” she likes best “to know nothing and believe in ghosts” (534). Later in Dr. 
Galbraith’s narrative, he makes clear that he understands how Evadne’s promise to Colonel 
Colquhon that she will not act on her beliefs has caused her to decline into bitterness and 
depression over the years.  
     The relationship between Evadne’s ideas, her reading, and her ability to act on the knowledge 
that she has acquired, reflects Levinas’s description of the way that the said confers identity on 
human beings: the said, in its fixing of meaning, creates narratives over time—it “imprisons the 
living in a state of consciousness” (38) and makes subjective identity possible. Evadne’s 
worldview, her ethical positions, had been formed through her reading and later, through 
conversations in Malta. Her inability to act on these positions, to contribute to the larger 
conversation, has left her stunted and rigid, indifferent to the possibilities around her. “At the 
crux of the general epistemological concerns of the novel lies this conflict between action and 
passive surrender to a predetermined life-script (Flint 440). 
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3.5 Conclusion   
     Clearly, addressing the need for social change was not a new tactic for Victorian novelists: in 
writing novels of social criticism in an effort to affect their readers’ opinions, New Woman 
novelists followed the most influential novelists of the mid-Victorian period, including Charlotte 
Bronte, George Eliot, Charles Dickens, and Elizabeth Gaskell. However, the New Woman 
writers specifically target middle class women readers with their middlebrow novels in order to 
change readers’ behaviors and enlist them in an activist community1. Additionally, in writing 
serious, polemical fiction, in fact, they reclaim the moral high ground: instead of corrupting the 
minds of young women readers, as sensation and gothic novels were widely considered to do, the 
New Women novelists intend to employ fiction in a serious effort to dramatize the lived 
experience of middle class women coping with a society in transition and to connect women with 
each other. As Ann Ardis argues in the last chapter of New Women, New Novels, these authors 
deserve recognition for their determined use of polemical content: “They flaunt their anger. They 
proclaim their heresies in loud voices. They document the efforts made to silence them. And they 
produce an aesthetic of political engagement that is quite different from the (ostensibly) 
apolitical formalism of high modernism” (170). 
     The New Woman novelists represented a transitional moment at the end of the century that is 
equidistant from the certainties of mid-Victorian novelists and the confident innovations of the 
Modernists. As Elaine Showalter discusses in Sexual Anarchy: Gender and Culture at the Fin de 
Siècle, what she calls “textual anarchy” began with George Eliot’s death in 1880 (59). Some, like 
Olive Schreiner, openly rejected Eliot’s moralistic tone (Showalter 64) and defended a more 
personal aesthetic. Eliot was widely considered to have written from a man’s point of view, 
while the New Woman writers were writing to women readers and with the intent of making 
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political and social statements that reflected a kind of gender solidarity (64). Ella Hepworth 
Dixon articulated the act of writing as promoting “a kind of moral and social trades-unionism 
among women” (qtd. in Showalter 64). Thus, the generic innovations that these writers 
introduced were intended to reflect a myriad of women’s experiences that could not be confined 
to the traditional form of the three-decker mid-Victorian novel.  
     According to Gail Cunningham,  “The important point is that for this brief period at least the 
emancipation of women and the emancipation of the English novel advanced together” (3). As 
Cunningham notes, because New Women were rebelling within a personal context, the novel 
was a more appropriate way of portraying them as the novel could “investigate in detail the clash 
between radical principles and the actualities of contemporary life” (17) through “a fictional 
heroine who took a fresh look at these” and who would provide a model for with whom middle 
class women readers could safely identify (17). 
     Both Caird and Grand end their novels with broken, exhausted protagonists whose failure to 
act on their principles has defeated their early promise as radical reformers. Through her 
misguided promise to Colquhon, Evadne dooms herself to a lifetime of suppressing her 
intellectual interests and stifling her activist impulses. Hadria surrenders to her mother’s needs 
and continues the destructive cycle of feminine self-sacrifice that Caird presents. However, even 
a dystopian ending cannot fully mute the voices of the women in these novels for their readers. 
As Anna Maria Jones argues in her 2007 article “A Track to the Water’s Edge”: Learning to 
Suffer in Sarah Grand’s ‘The Heavenly Twins,’” the radical potential of these novels lies less in 
the imagined success of their protagonists and more in what she defines as a kind of performative 
self-sacrifice that readers must undergo. Activist readers of these novels are called on to suffer 
by intellectually holding both social critique and “utopian idealism” simultaneously (222). As 
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readers come to understand within their own cultural context, their own time is not likely to see 
the fruition of their desire for change; that will occur in a utopian future, a future secured at least 
in part through the writing of the present. As they internalize a new, feminist, utopian said, these 
readers become part of a community newly engaged in critiquing the larger said whose power 
has defined them. These novels are not intended, like the “safe” novels that Evadne reads, to 
transport readers to a hopeful but solely imaginative fantasy world. Imaginative fantasy is 
perhaps beguiling, but it does not provoke its readers to action, and that is the end to which the 
New Woman writers are leading. 
     The nature of the book and of the said, as Levinas concludes, is that books are constituted of 
“pure said,” the presentation of the saying and its context. But books constantly interrupt one 
another’s discourse; they call for other books, and the dialogue continues, already in need of 
further interruption as the book is printed, already “interpreted in a saying distinct from the said”  
(171); just as Caird and Grand shape a new said to influence the larger discourse, they anticipate 
the next wave of women writers who will become a part of the ongoing conversation. 
3.2 Endnote 
1Teresa Mangum, in Married, Middlebrow, and Militant (1998), argues that Sarah Grand, 
as a New Woman novelist, was part of a turn of the century movement in women’s fiction to 
engage middle class women readers in an “intermediate” level of fiction. Mangum quotes Jane 
Tompkins’ study of nineteenth century American fiction, Sensational Designs: The Cultural 
Work of American Fiction, 1790 -1860 (1985), on the role of middlebrow novels. Tompkins 
notes: “I see them as doing a certain kind of cultural work within a specific historical situation 
and value them for that reason. I see their plots and characters as providing society with a means 
of thinking about itself, defining certain aspects of a social reality which the authors and their 
79 
readers shared, dramatizing its conflicts, and recommending solutions” (qtd. in Mangum 20). 
Mangum argues that New Woman novels demonstrate the emergence of a category of fiction that 
critics would be “routinely calling ‘middlebrow’ only a few years later (19). As Mangum goes on 
to note, New Woman novelists, along with other novelists who fall into the middlebrow 
 
 
4 THE NEW WOMAN WRITERS AND THE SAYING 
     Otherwise than Being, Levinas’s study of the limits of philosophy, discusses the tension 
between the said, which he defines as language, and the saying, which he defines in a number of 
ways, but which finally comes to embody the ineffable face-to-face moment wherein ethics 
originates. Before the saying is concretized into language, into the said, there must first be a 
condition between the subject and the other that is not borne in words; this is the definition of 
proximity, or the responsibility to the other. Levinas acknowledges the equivocal and enigmatic 
nature of the saying, acknowledging too its connection to transcendence (10): “Being and entities 
weigh heavily by virtue of the saying that gives them light. Nothing is more grave, more august, 
than responsibility for the other, and saying, in which there is no play, has a gravity more grave 
than its own being or not being” (46). (my italics). Clearly, states Levinas, in the process that 
leads saying to said, justice and self-reflection become possible (46).  
     The texts I examine in this chapter interrogate perhaps the most powerful weapon arrayed 
against Victorian women—the expectation that they would willingly sacrifice their autonomy 
and aspirations for their parents, husbands, and children—through visions, dreams and 
allegorical passages that allow their readers the freedom to experience meanings that are less 
fixed, but that carry that “gravity more grave” to which Levinas refers. Instead, New Woman 
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writers redirect women’s self-sacrifice away from a duty to husband and children and replace the 
traditional responsibility with the need to secure the welfare of future generations of women. 
These writers depict a necessary and willing self-sacrificial stance that women in the present 
must embrace in order to envision and promote a more equitable and ethical future for later 
generations. While womanly self-sacrifice and its destructive effects are a prevalent theme in the 
New Woman canon, these novelists re-conceive the notion in more utopian and Levinasian 
terms. For Levinas, mutual self-sacrifice is a primordial and ethical stance; in the texts I examine 
here, mythical or allegorical framing suggests the unconscious, precognitive nature of the drive. 
     Levinas describes language as an amphibology, a term that the OED defines as “a sentence 
which may be construed in two distinct senses.” For Levinas, the two distinct but simultaneous 
meanings of language are the essential said and the transcendent saying. He argues that the face-
to-face ethical encounter is manifested through language, and the said and saying are then 
integrated in the expression of the ethical identity (Eaglestone 140). This integration of the said 
and the saying is critical to my re-framing of the often-criticized melding of experimental 
narrative with polemical sections in New Woman writing. I read their structural hybridities as 
reiterating the characteristics of the said and the saying. The narratives within which political and 
social discussions are embedded provide a frame for these writers’ interrogation of language and 
its power, their examination of the said. The experimental and more elusive passages in their 
texts, then, I argue, illustrate their engagement with Levinas’ concept of the saying. For example, 
Olive Schreiner’s The Story of an African Farm presents angry monologues by Lyndall, her 
proto-feminist protagonist, which angrily indict the controlling and confining narrative about 
women and their power. Clearly, Schreiner employs Lyndall’s comments to encourage readers to 
consider the power of language as it has been arrayed against them. However, the text also drifts 
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into allegorical passages that appeal to the reader’s inarticulate and unconscious recognition of 
the other.   
In the texts I examine, elusive, symbolic and transcendent moments presented as visions, 
dreams and allegories engage with experiences that cannot be expressed through transactional 
language. These powerful scenes interject the weight of mythology and folklore into texts, along 
with their appeal to the Jungian unconscious. Thus, while asserting common cause with their 
readers and bending the dominant discourse—the said—to their own ends, New Woman writers 
simultaneously establish what Eagleton describes as a “purposeful inconclusiveness” (136).  
In this chapter, then, I argue that the New Woman writers engage with Levinas’s concept of 
the saying through their use of dreams, visions, and allegories to envision an ethical proximity 
with their readers, asserting an obligation and a responsibility to future generations of women, 
which will require intentional self-sacrifice in the present. If the saying constitutes a tentative 
approach to the other without attempting to define or delimit the other, a kind of passivity, we 
see the New Woman writers dedicating themselves to the welfare of future generations of 
women. This approach makes clear why, even in their polemical passages, these novels never 
behave as recruitment tools for some specific call to action. New Woman writers are not 
recruiting young suffragists; they think more speculatively and broadly, beyond current struggles 
toward specific ends. They intend to redeem the past oppressive self-abnegation, which was one-
sided and forced them into confining roles; they now, in mythic terms, dedicate themselves to a 
principled and deliberate forfeit of ease, comfort, and acceptance in order to secure an ethical 
future for later generations of women. This is ultimately the feminist project they describe in 
their writings.  
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I begin my argument by noting intersections between three critical discourses: New Woman 
studies, Bakhtinian chronotopes, and folklore studies. Adam Seth Lowenstein, in his study “’Not 
a Novel, Nor Even a Well-Ordered Story’: Formal Experimentation and Psychological 
Innovation in Sarah Grand’s The Heavenly Twins,” argues that the New Woman writers critique 
cultural norms through allegorical forms that rely on “outdated or anachronistic temporalities, 
often situated in a pre-modern, pre-civilized Golden Age, in order to speak about futurity and 
reform” (Lowenstein 434). Bruce Clarke, discussing allegory as a means of engaging 
technological advances, describes the function of allegory as a means of social critique: 
“Allegorical temporality is discontinuous time. In allegory some temporal dissonance, some 
historical clash of past and present, present and future, generates a layered text often intended to 
neutralize or harmonize that dissonance, to recuperate an obsolescence” (60). This use of an 
ancient setting as a way of envisioning future reform is similar to Bakhtin’s discussion of 
“historical inversion,” or Golden Age thinking, wherein the writer locates ideals of “purpose, 
ideal, justice, perfection, the harmonious condition of man and society” in a heroic or Edenic 
past (147). The Golden Age, in Bakhtinian terms, is not a specific historic period, but instead 
refers to an imagined period celebrated as a mythic time in which humans achieved legendary 
status. The New Woman writers often either set their dreams and visions in an idealized folkloric 
past, or they use forms like fairytales and allegories that recall an idealized past. In doing so, they 
appeal to readers on an unconscious level, accessing the collective memories of the values taught 
by these tales. To access a mythic past, to assert the primacy of an idealized good, makes 
possible a vision of a mythic future for women. 
     This concept of employing a mythic vision is examined by Sasha L. Biro, in her article 
“Levinas’s Reception of the Mythic” Biro argues that, although Levinas initially rejects the 
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mythic as a state of being before reflection and thought and thus, before the ethical, he uses 
mythic language and examples to develop his assertions. Like Eagleton, Biro reads Levinas’s 
language as performative and constantly interrupting itself. She reads Levinas, incorporating 
mythic examples throughout his writing, as open to an alternative reading: “the myth shines 
through, speaking not of a pagan nothingness shorn from the ethical but, instead, of the power 
(primacy) of the imagination, which is in itself ethical” (427). The New Woman writers 
incorporate mythic language and references to access the diachronic nature of the saying—the 
obligation to the other is both infinite and ambiguous.  
     Anticipating magical realism, these texts illustrate how daily, normative events could at any 
moment “unfold into a mythological scene or tableau” (Bakhtin 104); thus, historical time and 
mythological time are interwoven and indistinguishable. Here, I return to Mikhail Bakhtin in his 
discussion of the chronotope. As he traces the development of the novel from ancient Greek 
romances to the works of Rabelais, Bakhtin identifies a number of major and minor chronotopes, 
beginning with the “adventure-time” of ancient Greek romances. In his discussion of the 
adventure-time chronotope, Bakhtin notes that at the core of all chronotopes in ancient literature 
is “folk-mythological time;” the literature of the ancient Greeks is characterized by their sense 
that reality was shot through with traces of mythological time. This aspect of the Greek epic and 
drama characterizes scenes and tableaus in New Woman texts that position dreams and visions as 
momentary intrusions into everyday life, suggesting an intersection between reality and myth 
that speaks to Biro’s interpretation of Levinas’s discussion of the ethical identity.   
     The texts I examine here fall into two categories: visions that evoke the form of fairytales or 
folktales, and narratives that employ prophetic allegory. George Egerton, in the dream sequence 
from her short story “A Cross Line” in Keynotes (1893); Ella Hepworth Dixon, in Mary Erle’s 
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mirror vision from The Story of a Modern Woman (1894); Emma Frances Brooke, in Jessamine’s 
dream from A Superfluous Woman (1894); and Olive Schreiner, in Lyndall’s mirror visions from 
The Story of an African Farm (1883) explore shared and powerfully emotional experiences 
through dreams and visions that carry mythic weight. These writers invite readers to participate 
in transformative scenes that evoke the familiar forms of childhood—fairytales or folktales—but 
set within newly adult contexts. Sarah Grand, in her “Proem” section of The Heavenly Twins, 
and Olive Schreiner, in both The Story of an African Farm and “Three Dreams in the Desert,” 
employ prophetic allegory to say the unsayable through an ancient form, accessing Golden Age 
archetypes to reach their readers on an unconscious level. Schreiner and Grand employ these 
allegories to envision an open-ended but hopeful future. Like biblical prophets, the rich language 
they use is suggestive but not definitive. Thus, building on Biro’s argument, I read all of the texts 
I examine here as employing strange, obscure, or allusive language to capture shared experiences 
that are deeply personal or boldly prophetic. In their very obscurity, the visions, dreams and 
prophecies discussed here resist closure; they begin a dialogue with readers and invite questions 
and other narratives. 
     Less directly, these claims are also undergirded by Rachel Hollander’s argument in her essay 
“Daniel Deronda and the Ethics of Alterity”, wherein she suggests that the more open and less 
traditional ending for Gwendolen Harleth, as opposed to the rather conventional ending for the 
novel’s titular protagonist, preserves the “originary ethical moment of uncertainty” (283); this 
openness at the end of the novel suggests the shortcomings of the linear, conventional realist 
novel to examine an ethics based on openness to the other (284). As I have suggested in previous 
chapters, the innovations introduced by New Woman writers are intended to address these 
shortcomings. However, as Ann Ardis points out, while the work of these novelists displayed 
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some of the same characteristics of accredited proto-modernists, their radical feminism sidelined 
the texts (170). Their structural innovations have been considered tentative, transitional, pre-
modernist forays into radical experimentation. Here I assert instead the intentionality of narrative 
experimentation to invent a narrative structure appropriate to the feminist project; as Bakhtin 
notes, the novel is the most open and appropriate form for those writers engaged in critiquing 
their culture because of its availability to reinvention. 
4.1 Dreams, Visions, and Trances 
     The language of prophetic or numinous vision certainly satisfies Levinas’s description of the 
saying as “grave” and authoritative. For late-Victorian readers, biblical passages from both the 
Old and New Testament would be familiar; in addition, reasonably educated readers would be 
aware of literary references to tales from classical Greek mythology. The use of visions in New 
Woman fiction then offers an opportunity to lend a mythic weight to a woman’s experience. The 
experiences are nearly always prophetic; thus, they function, like visions and dreams in epic 
poems, to be interpreted. Penelope’s dream about her suitors as geese slaughtered by an eagle in 
the Odyssey, for example, is sent to her by Athena to comfort and strengthen her as she staves off 
the aggressive suitors. This dream, though cast in symbols, is more straightforward than many, as 
the eagle is revealed as Odysseus. Less straightforward is Hecuba’s dream, when pregnant with 
Paris, that she will give birth to a burning torch. Along with biblical prophetic dreams that are 
interpreted by such figures as Elisha and Joseph, these dreams are cast in symbolic terms that 
require readers to understand their significance on a nonliteral level. Three examples of similar 
dreams or visions are employed by George Egerton, Emma Frances Brooke, and Ella Hepworth 
Dixon. 
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     One of the most familiar visions in the New Woman canon appears in the short story “A 
Cross Line,” the first in the collection Keynotes (1893) by George Egerton (Mary Chavelita 
Dunne). As the un-named protagonist is lying in the sun, she imagines that she sees in the clouds 
“[o]ld time galleons …with their wealth of snowy sail spread, riding breast to breast up a wide 
blue fjord after victory” (8). Longing to escape domestic drudgery, she imagines Cleopatra and 
Antony, and sees herself “in Arabia on the back of a swift steed” (8), embarking on an intensely 
erotic imaginative adventure: 
Flashing eyes set in dark faces surround her; …her thoughts shape themselves 
into a wild song, a song to her steed of flowing mane and satin skin…a song to 
the untamed spirit that dwells within her. Then she fancies she is on the stage of 
an ancient theatre out in the open air, with hundreds of faces upturned towards 
her. She is gauze-clad in a cobweb garment of wondrous tissue. Her arms are 
clasped by jeweled snakes, and one with quivering diamond fangs coils round her 
hips…She bounds forward and dances, bends her lissome waist, and curves her 
slender arms, and gives to the soul of each man what he craves…(8) 
This vision is an unabashedly erotic fantasy of controlling and enthralling a gathering of men 
subservient to her sexuality. However, even more important than its exploration and celebration 
of a woman’s desire and ambition is the setting for the fantasy. In a Golden Age past, to be sure, 
women certainly were not granted more agency then than during the 19th century, but logic is not 
the point here. The daily, normative event could at any moment “unfold into a mythological 
scene or tableau” (104); thus, historical time and mythological time are interwoven and 
indistinguishable. The moment that the protagonist’s daydream becomes more vivid depicts the 
intrusion of mythological time into historical time. The effect is much like the later use of 
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magical realism—blurring the line between prosaic reality and mythological fantasy imbues the 
vision with narrative gravity. We cross over into adventure-time, wherein time and space are 
suspended and alien. The subsequent vision acquires the strangeness and mystery of the saying 
both because it will prove to have implications for the protagonist’s understanding of her 
obligations to other women, and also because its power derives from symbolic associations and 
suggestions. 
     The ancient setting for the fantasy employs the power of myth. As Ann Ardis notes, it is 
significant that the protagonist’s fantasy takes place in an ancient culture wherein “she would be 
able to take pleasure in both her erotic fantasy and her fantasy of success as an artist in a public 
forum” (100). The protagonist “moves from culture into nature—and exposes the latter as 
culture’s vision of what lies below or behind itself in a primitive or archaic cultural formation” 
(100). The mythic past connects the protagonist to Cleopatra, a powerful figure both for her 
status as a ruler and as an alluring woman. For her readers, the symbol of a powerful woman 
monarch who also leveraged her sexuality as part of her power would provide a compelling 
fantasy. However, even more significant is the protagonist’s view of her imaginary self “on the 
stage of an ancient theatre out in the open air, with hundreds of faces upturned towards her.” 
Greek tragedies and comedies were didactic; they engaged their audiences in debates about 
moments of ethical crisis, and the arc of justice they trace reflects the arc of social justice that 
developed in Greek culture. The relationship between playwright and audience is thus analogous 
to the relationship between Egerton and her readers. Egerton employs this image deliberately to 
comment on her intention to use narrative as a means of engaging her readers in a conversation 
about their own understanding of the transitional time in which they were living and the ethics of 
the future.  
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Because George Egerton depicts women’s sexuality and maternity as part of their nature, 
she is sometimes dismissed by feminist critics as a biological essentialist. However, Sally Ledger 
reads in her short stories “an unresolved tension between an essentialist, biologically driven 
maternal impulse associated with femininity, and a less tangible ‘excess’ of desire that has, in the 
stories, nothing to do with reproductive sexuality” (xix). Desire in the fantasy is certainly erotic, 
but the protagonist is expressing her own desire as well for the agency to express herself 
publically. The eroticism of the fantasy is inescapable, but sexual desire, for Egerton, is a 
metaphor for ambition and influence. 
Lisa Hager argues that Egerton intends even more in her depiction later in the story of the 
relationship between the protagonist and her maid; their cross-class intimacy suggests a view of 
women’s sexuality that depicts a “community of women” who connect with one another 
mutually instead of hierarchically (1). Hager’s reading of the text is supported by the 
protagonist’s own interpretation of her dream as she reflects later on the ways women are 
connected in a kind of unacknowledged “sisterhood.” The immediate aftermath of her intensely 
passionate vision is the protagonist’s meditation on her conviction that men have created an 
image of women that limits their perception of the true and more complex nature of women. Men 
are blind to a restlessness in women and a desire for change and excitement, what she considers 
the fundamental “primeval trait” that is found in women (9). She envisions women as 
participating in an unwritten code to keep “the workings of our hearts…closed to them, that we 
are cunning enough or great enough to seem to be what they would have us, rather than be what 
we are” (9). Few men, she claims, have the insight to understand the contradictory nature of 
women. Women, however, she thinks, are united in an unspoken understanding of this link 
between them: “Women talk to me—why, I can’t say—but always they come, strip their hearts 
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and souls naked, and let me see the hidden folds of their natures. The greatest tragedies I have 
ever read are child’s play to those I have seen acted in the inner life of outwardly commonplace 
women. A woman must beware of speaking the truth to a man; he loves her the less for it. It is 
the elusive spirit in her that he divines but cannot seize that fascinates and keeps him” (11). The 
protagonist’s meditation establishes her as an ethical actor; she asserts her responsibility to other 
women and the bonds of responsibility that link women with one another. Additionally, the 
vision binds women in, significantly, an unspoken code—one that is unsayable, and in fact, does 
not need expression.  
This meditation is the very definition of Levinas’s concept of proximity. Women, according 
to Egerton, do not even need to voice the links between them and their obligation to one another. 
This understanding simply is inherent in their condition. Indeed, for the protagonist, or for 
Egerton, all women share this universal fantasy of empowerment reaching back into a mythic 
past; it is a shared understanding of their identity and accesses as well a sense of continuity and 
connection with pre-Christian, matriarchal societies. However, this shared understanding also 
has important implications for the present and the future in its clear depiction of the intention to 
acquire power in a public and influential setting. 
Like Egerton, Emma Frances Brooke employs a compelling vision for her protagonist that 
interrogates a woman’s obligation to ethical maternity. Through a powerful but horrifying vision 
in A Superfluous Woman, Brooke’s protagonist conjures a vision of a biblical hell wherein she 
suspends herself, determined to prevent the birth of a deformed child. Dissatisfaction with her 
superficial life led the young Jessamine to run away to the Highlands to work on a farm, but this 
solution was not satisfactory. Suffering from restlessness and a desire to thwart the conventions, 
the character can neither accept the place dictated by her class, nor break from the expectations 
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she has been raised to meet. In the last section of the novel, having perversely succumbed to the 
demands of her society status and married the syphilitic Lord Heriot, she has borne him two 
deformed children. Finally, she wills herself into a trancelike state in order to prevent the birth of 
a third monstrous child.  
In her trance, Jessamine sees herself poised on the edge of an abyss from which she has been 
pulled: “a place of torture in the centre of a whirl of fire and noise. There were shapes and cries, 
regiments of creatures, waves of fire, and wide shouting mouths with fangs that darted and 
fastened on her heart.” She imagines the child she is carrying as “a shadow” that is “small, still, 
insignificant, but containing within itself monstrous possibilities” (210). As the “Review of 
Reviews” pointed out, the novel has much the same theme that Grand develops in the “Edith” 
narrative in The Heavenly Twins. However, while Grand depicts Edith’s children as sickly and 
Edith eventually consumed by madness and rage, Brooke instead creates a protagonist who 
imagines the effects of syphilis through a vision of hell that could be pulled straight from the 
pages of The Book of Revelation or Dante’s Inferno.  The effect is certainly a more gothic 
imagining of the theme, but the prophetic weight of the language accomplishes something 
different from Grand’s more straightforward depiction; in Brooke’s depiction, the pregnant 
woman is no longer a victim. She is asserting power over the symbolic importance of her body as 
a reproductive mechanism. Like all women, her significance to her husband and to her culture 
lies in the maintenance of her virginity so that she can, after marriage, bear the next generation of 
property owners. In choosing not to have a child, she does not reject this role so much as she 
employs it to deny both her husband and the surrounding culture its expectation. She asserts the 
power of women to control their bodies.  
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Like Egerton, Brooke accesses here the collective power of women’s memories and their 
connections with a continuous narrative about transgressive women. She recalls the orthodox 
view of suffering in childbirth as punishment meted out to Eve for her disobedience.  
Jessamine’s decision to manipulate the process for her own intentions elevates her to the stature 
of biblical characters who rebel against the demands of a patriarchal society. She thus becomes a 
threat to a culture that accepts the propagation of an increasingly degenerate upper class. Her 
decision has tragic consequences for herself and her child, but she also effectively ends the 
monstrous line of her husband’s family, and she decides for herself, rejecting any effective 
treatment. The gothic vision of hellish maternity effectively functions as both a cautionary tale 
for readers and a mythic vision of a woman’s power and agency rather than as a victim of a 
profligate husband. Brooke here makes a bold gesture to reach out to readers and engage them, 
not only in the debate surrounding The Contagious Diseases Act, but also implying the necessity 
for women to consider their own reproductive rights. These suggestions, though, are couched in 
terms that, like Egerton’s vision, carry the weight of religious ritual and thus elevate the 
woman’s role to heroic and powerful. Jessamine becomes a figure carrying out the necessary 
self-sacrifice of a generation of women in order to bring about a more open and optimistic future. 
As Anna Maria Jones argues in “A Track to the Water’s Edge: Learning to Suffer in Sarah 
Grand’s The Heavenly Twins,” Brooke’s depiction of Jessamine’s suffering traces a motif in 
New Woman texts—readers must suffer for the benefit of future generations (218). The readers 
to whom the New Woman writers direct their texts will be transformed into new women whose 
political struggles will benefit those who come after them. Egerton and Brooke, through their 
readers, expand the call to the other and the ethical obligation to the other outward to successive 
generations. 
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Two final scenes link the power of the prophetic vision with fairytale tropes that integrate 
childhood memories and folkloric time. According to Bruno Bettelheim, fairytales resonate with 
readers’ first memories of learning to distinguish between good and evil, suffering and 
punishment. Young girls read or listen to fairytales as a way of exploring their identities (383). 
They operate in that primordial and unconscious space that Levinas describes. Images of 
fairytale princesses and evil queens, wicked stepmothers and oppressed stepdaughters shape 
young women’s understanding of their identity. One of the most familiar and powerful images 
from fairytales is the image of the wicked queen in Snow White looking into the mirror to 
confirm that she is still “the fairest of them all.” The image of a woman seeking reassurance of 
her power from a mirror is both a commentary on the commodification of women’s beauty and 
the need to confront one’s reflection in order to understand one’s identity. The scene also 
suggests that the Queen is confronting another self—a reflected and threatening other. Similarly, 
the mirror scenes in both Ella Hepworth Dixon’s The Story of a Modern Woman and Olive 
Schreiner’s The Story of an African Farm anticipate Sir James Frazer’s analysis of reflections in 
The Golden Bough. In Chapter 18.3, “The Soul as a Shadow and Reflection,” Frazer documents 
widespread beliefs that link reflections with “the shadow-soul” and death. Frazer notes that this 
belief explains the Victorian tradition of covering mirrors after a death, as “[i]t is feared that the 
soul, projected out of the person in the shape of his reflection in the mirror, may be carried off by 
the ghost of the departed.” Both Dixon and Schreiner employ mirror scenes that involve a 
protagonist confronting an alternate self—a shadow-soul—in the mirror as she faces an ethical 
crisis. In each case, the protagonist reiterates her acceptance of present suffering that will be 
redeemed in a more optimistic future. 
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Ella Hepworth Dixon constructs a dramatic and poetic confrontation in a mirror between her 
protagonist, Mary Erle, and the two halves of Mary’s self: the self she has become through 
dutiful and exhausting work, and the self who is still yearning for a passionate and fulfilling 
connection with a man. In this vision, Dixon describes the dilemma shared by many of her 
readers struggling with the tug of war they experience between making the honorable choice and 
making the easy choice. Offered the opportunity to run away with her former fiancé, who 
abandoned her to marry a wealthy woman, she is momentarily tempted. She sees this moment as 
perhaps her last chance to experience a man’s love. After years of struggle, she is bitter about 
“the impotence, the helplessness of woman's lot… She was the plaything, the sport of destiny, 
and destiny always won the game” (254). However, at this point in the novel, Mary has seen two 
women die painful deaths because they have surrendered to passion and have trusted a man. 
The fair and just self whom Mary has embraced is, of course, the source of her response, 
which she frames as a statement of unity with other women: “I can't, I won't, deliberately injure 
another woman. Think how she would suffer! Oh, the torture of women's lives—the 
helplessness, the impotence, the emptiness!” (255). Dixon then confronts Mary with the 
consequences of her decision through a mirror vision in Chapter XXII, “The Woman in the 
Glass.” Walking through the city in an effort to avoid another confrontation with Hemmings, 
Mary is continually reminded of his wife and children as she notices “endless rows of houses, 
trim, smug dwellings, every one of which represented the Family—that special product of 
civilisation for which she, as an individual, was to be sacrificed.... “(259). After returning to her 
rooms, unable to sleep, Mary looks into the mirror; she has a sense of being haunted by another 
self, as she thinks that she has struggled with “a strange sense of dual individuality” (262). In the 
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mirror she sees “a woman…with reproachful, haunting eyes” who appears “curiously young” 
(263): 
The cheeks were delicately thin, but the lips were those of a girl of 
eighteen; in the fluffy, fair head the few grey hairs were lost among the 
pale gold. There was the line of her throat, her beautiful white shoulders, 
the delicate modeling of her satiny arms. (263) 
In the vision, this woman first appears to be the version of Mary whom she is trying to suppress, 
the Mary who longs to give in to Vincent. The vision in the mirror, like Gypsy’s vision in “A 
Cross Line,” asserts a woman’s power to attract a man. Mary has resisted this self, has not 
acknowledged her physical and sexual powers. But the woman in the mirror confronts her not 
only with her potential, but also with the negligible consequences of the unethical behavior Mary 
is debating: 
‘You may torture me, starve me, but you cannot make me unlovable. He 
loves me!’ smiled the woman. ‘Why, he would ruin himself to-morrow for 
me. I have only to say one word, and his life is mine…We are alive now. 
We love each other. Give him to me! Only a few short years am I here,’ 
pleaded the haunting eyes: ‘I, and such as I, tearing our little hands in the 
search for gold, shaking them at the heavens with impotent 
vengeance…Why, people in the next generation will shrug their shoulders 
and say, “After all, they were only human.” And I,’ pleaded the woman in 
the glass, ‘I shall have lived.’ (264) 
Mary, an idealistic woman who has watched other women suffer after agreeing to offers like 
Vincent’s, has long rejected this aspect of her identity. However, as she grows older and lonelier, 
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she is painfully aware of her lost opportunities. However, the vision in the mirror now shifts 
dramatically:  
When she raised her head again, the eyes were no longer triumphant, they 
were reproachful. ‘Who am I? Why am I here?’ they asked: ‘To live is to 
suffer; why do you let me live? Must I go on looking back at you until my 
eyes are faded, my lashes are grey, until I have run through the gamut of 
mental and physical pain? I am a living, suffering entity,’ said the woman 
in the glass, ‘in a world of artificial laws; of laws made for man's 
convenience and pleasure, not for mine. Have I one thing for which I have 
longed? Have I a human love, have I the hope of immortality, have I even 
tasted the intoxication of achievement? Human life is but a moment in the 
æons of time, and yet one little human lifetime contains an eternity of 
suffering. Why, since you take joy from me, why do you let me live?’(263 
– 65)  
This Snow White confrontation reflects a set of urgent questions for Dixon’s readers. What is the 
place of women? If they reject the domestic life, what will be the alternative? How do they 
respond to the adversarial nature of their relationships with each other that has been imposed on 
them? Dixon, employing the mirror as a vehicle for a woman to confront the sides of her nature, 
embodies this dialectic literally as two women struggling with each other within every woman. 
Dixon never resolves the dilemma satisfactorily: Mary makes the ethical decision and refuses to 
undermine or destroy another woman’s marriage. But she does so at the cost of any happiness for 
herself, condemning herself to a lonely and painful life. This section of the novel is truly the 
heart of Dixon’s argument and is the only truly polemical section in The Story of a Modern 
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Woman. Clearly, Dixon foregrounds her insistence on the responsibility that women have for 
one another as a necessary commitment that will take them into a more fulfilling future. 
Conversely, in The Story of an African Farm, Olive Schreiner depicts Lyndall as a unified 
and integrated self only when she confronts herself in the mirror. As she prepares to leave the 
farm with the stranger, she comforts her shadow-self: 
‘We are all alone, you and I,’ she whispered; ‘no one helps us, no one 
understands us; but we will help ourselves.’ The eyes looked back at her. There 
was a world of assurance in their still depths. So they had looked at her ever 
since she could remember, when it was but a small child’s face above a blue 
pinafore. ‘We shall never be quite alone, you and I,’ she said; ‘we shall always 
be together, as we were when we were little.’ 
The beautiful eyes looked into the depths of her soul. 
‘We are not afraid; we will help ourselves!’ she said. She stretched out her 
hand and pressed it over them on the glass. ‘Dear eyes! We will never be quite 
alone till they part us—till then!’ (131) 
For Lyndall, the vision of the self she sees in the mirror is a kind of Wordsworthian vision of a 
child’s eyes. The eyes she sees, the face she sees, reminds her of the elusive period in her life 
before the struggle of adulthood. Schreiner employs a similar scene at Lyndall’s dying moment, 
wherein she literally watches her soul depart into the mirror: 
Then the white face on the pillow looked at the white face in the glass. They 
had looked at each other often so before. It had been a child’s face once, 
looking out above its blue pinafore; it had been a woman’s face, with a dim 
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shadow in the eyes, and a something which had said, ‘We are not afraid, you 
and I; we are together; we will fight, you and I.’ (156) 
As Lyndall dies, the narrator describes a “wonderful, yearning light in the eyes still” while “the 
soul, clear and unclouded, looked forth” (156). Dixon, writing a decade after Schreiner, depicts 
the fractured self that tradition has imposed on women. For Schreiner, the earliest of New 
Woman novelists, the woman in the mirror signifies the assertion that each woman will struggle 
in the present; however, she will also draw strength from her own recognition that there is a 
struggle to be fought. Lyndall’s death is a defeat in the present, but her image in the mirror 
encourages her to see the future optimistically. The other Lyndall in the mirror is not only 
Lyndall’s self, she is also other women. Thus, in Lyndall’s assertion of unity and completion 
with her other self, she asserts her connection to and need for other women. 
     These images of the woman confronting herself in the mirror are powerful motifs from the 
unconscious, and I suggest that Dixon and Schreiner are reaching their readers here on a 
transcendent level, communicating an ethical struggle that is fundamental to women’s identity. 
The image of a woman confronting herself is one they implant in their readers’ minds; their 
feminist project rests, after all, in the willingness of women readers to confront themselves and 
their assumptions, and, finally, to acknowledge their need for one another and ethical 
responsibility for each other. 
4.2 Proems and Allegories 
The other set of texts to examine here use allegorical language, setting radical ideas within a 
familiar and centuries-old form. Allegory is also familiar to readers in the form of Christian 
teachings in Jesus’ parables and classics like Everyman and John Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress. 
Allegory, by nature, is a Golden Age form that generalizes about virtuous principles and 
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qualities. To write allegory is to write philosophy. In an 1888 letter to Havelock Ellis, Olive 
Schreiner writes that poetry and allegory are the forms she uses to convey her most layered and 
complex ideas. Her writing, she says, “is all poetry from the first to the last…There are allegories 
in it; I’ve tried to keep them out, but I can’t. I’ve come to the conclusion that only poetry is 
truth” (Schreiner and Rive 142). According to Gerald Monsman, “for Schreiner and her 
contemporaries, allegorical thinking supplied the connections, the correspondences between real 
and dream life, allowing the artist (and the reader) to understand his or her private aspirations in 
universal and historical terms” (55). Indeed, Schreiner relies on allegory to evoke emotional 
depth from more abstract ideas; allegorical writing for Schreiner proceeded, she believed, from a 
more unconscious and instinctive mode of working (Burdett 78). For Schreiner, then, allegory as 
a mode of writing proceeds directly from the source of the saying, wherein she connects with her 
readers through an indirect approach to language. 
Among Schreiner’s many allegorical writings, of particular note here are two: “The Hunter,” 
which appeared in the section from The Story of an African Farm entitled “Waldo’s Stranger,” 
and the “Three Dreams in a Desert” selection from Dreams. Both allegories deal with the theme 
of renunciation in the search for truth. While “The Hunter” tells the story of the seeker of truth 
whose lifelong struggle to find truth requires the renunciation of worldly distractions, it is “Three 
Dreams in a Desert” that directly connects this theme to women. “Three Dreams” directly 
articulates Schreiner’s belief that women of her generation were preparing the way for future 
generations by writing toward the future. 
     “The Hunter” is reminiscent of John Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress sans the Christian focus. 
Waldo has refused money for his carving, preferring to offer his art to the stranger. 
Understanding this demonstration of Waldo’s integrity as an artist and seeker of truth, the 
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stranger tells Waldo the story of the man who seeks fulfillment by rejecting a typical life in order 
to seek truth. Like “Everyman,” this allegory is set in an ancient time wherein the Hunter of 
Truth is directed by Wisdom and Knowledge in his quest to find the beautiful silver bird of 
Truth. Dedicating his life to building a stairway to the mountains wherein the bird resides, the 
Hunter gradually sacrifices everything—Excess, Sensuality, Human Nature-- to his single-
minded quest. Along the way, he acquires the virtues that accrue in his noble quest. Ultimately, 
like Mary Erle, the Hunter commits himself to noble Denial and heroic self-sacrifice in the cause 
of illumination for those who will come after him: 
Where I lie down worn out other men will stand, young and fresh. By the 
steps that I have cut they will climb; by the stairs that I have built they will 
mount. They will never know the name of the man who made them…But 
they will mount, and on my work; they will climb, and by my stair! They 
will find her, and through me! And no man liveth to himself and no man 
dieth to himself. (85) 
Gerald Monsman suggests that Schreiner employs allegory as a means to present an “alternative 
configuration for the patriarchal and colonial suppression of the ‘thousand meanings’ of women's 
or natives' lives by an overwhelming cultural and technological power” (55). Through allegorical 
language, she presents a vision that unifies her readers around the “moment in which the self 
transcends its loneliness and identifies the Other as no longer foreign but as that in which its 
dreams are reflected” (56). Indeed, Schreiner appears to embrace the openness of allegory, its 
multivocal nature, as a means to drawing her readers closer. By focusing on women figures in 
her allegories, she elevates womens’ voices to the significance traditionally reserved only for 
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men. Writing about women in a complex and layered form that is directed to women readers, 
Schreiner imaginatively presents a more ethical future for her readers’ descendants. 
Perhaps Schreiner’s most famous allegorical sketch, however, is “Three Dreams in a 
Desert,” which became an almost sacred text for imprisoned suffragettes, some of whom could 
quote it verbatim (Heilmann 125) because of its powerful articulation of their role in preparing 
the way for generations of women to come. The piece depicts allegorically the position of 
women in the past, present, and an idealized future. In the first dream, the past, Woman lies 
unmoving in the sand, covered by the sand of centuries; she is burdened by the “hard-baked clay 
of Ancient Customs;” she was forced by Man into subjection during the Age-of-dominion-of-
muscular-force and imprisoned by Inevitable Necessity. As the narrator watches, the age changes 
to the age-of-nervous-force and cuts the band of Inevitable Necessity. As the woman begins to 
move, she is inextricably bound to man, who cannot move until she does. She begins painfully 
and slowly to move, and by the end of the dream, she has almost risen.  
In the second dream, the woman is now able to move; on the banks of a river that runs 
between the desert and the Land of Freedom, she encounters Reason in the shape of an old man. 
He tells her that the only avenue to Freedom is “down the banks of Labour, through the water of 
Suffering.” Removing the “shoes of dependence” and the “mantle of ancient received opinions,” 
she can wear only the garment of Truth into the water. Before she attempts to cross, Reason also 
tells her that she must relinquish man, who here appears as a mewling and dependent infant. 
According to Reason, man must earn his own freedom; she will be burdened by him and will 
lose her footing by trying to nurture man. The last scene in this dream is the one most treasured 
by suffragettes and coined a cherished phrase. Reason tells woman that she will probably not 
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cross the river into Freedom, but she will join others in creating “a track to the water’s edge” that 
others will follow: 
Lead on! make a track to the water’s edge! Where you stand now, the 
ground will be beaten flat by ten thousand times ten thousand feet.” And 
he said, “Have you seen the locusts how they cross a stream? First one 
comes down to the water-edge, and it is swept away, and then another 
comes and then another, and then another, and at last with their bodies 
piled up a bridge is built and the rest pass over.” 
She said, “And, of those that come first, some are swept away, and are 
heard of no more; their bodies do not even build the bridge?” 
“And are swept away, and are heard of no more—and what of that?” he 
said. 
“And what of that—” she said. 
“They make a track to the water’s edge.” 
“They make a track to the water’s edge—.” And she said, “Over that bridge 
which shall be built with our bodies, who will pass?” 
He said, “The entire human race.” 
And the woman grasped her staff. 
And I saw her turn down that dark path to the river. 
The third and shortest dream simply envisions a “heaven on earth” wherein “brave men” and 
“brave women” walk unafraid and hand in hand. However, it is the second dream that is 
obviously the most compelling vision for Schreiner’s readers. Their footsteps will provide the 
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track wherein others will follow, but the price they will pay is an acceptance of apparent failure 
in the present.  
     Again, the link in both allegories is clearly to an ethical choice in the present that will nurture 
a more optimistic future. As Patricia Murphy argues, allegory, in its interpretive openness, 
imparts a sense of timelessness, of infinity that constitutes what she names as “female 
temporality” (207). The similarity in allegorical writing to biblical style encourages “a 
transgressive form of reading—a feminine form of reading, if juxtaposed against the appropriate 
response to the ultimate patriarchal narrative, the Bible” (208). Thus, Schreiner here is rewriting 
the patriarchal story and opening up narrative and interpretive possibilities (209). Infusing her 
allegories with optimism and idealism, Schreiner employs what Joyce Avrech Berkman calls 
“boundary transcendence,” permeability “between the actual and the ideal”  bridging “mythic 
and spiritual perceptions with material existence” and “pointing to ways to heal divisions of race, 
class, and gender” (213-214). And, even more compelling for her readers, she uses Christ 
imagery that allows her readers to frame their struggle for equality in terms of spiritual 
redemption (Heilmann 125). This re-framing of a political movement in transcendent terms, 
Heilmann suggests, “tapped into the feminist unconscious of the times” (126).  
As Schreiner harnesses the power of allegory to access the primordial force of the saying, 
Sarah Grand employs a similar form in the “Proem” that is a prelude to The Heavenly Twins. Set 
in Morningquest, a cathedral town, the complicated and sometimes unwieldy novel begins with a 
meditation on the influence of the Cathedral chimes on the townspeople. The church bells, which 
chime Mendelsohn’s “He watching over Israel slumbers not nor sleeps, “on one level appears to 
represent the power and influence of God and the Cathedral. Michelle Mouton also reads this 
meditation as Grand’s examination of a feminist aesthetic and readers’ expectations (77). I 
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suggest another reading: the Cathedral bells keep the time of an ancient and powerful institution 
that controls the lives of the townspeople. The bells are inescapable; they chime at regular 
intervals and can be heard throughout and beyond the city. The narrator suggests that the chime 
has literally become inextricably linked with the bodies of the townspeople, “one of their first 
sensations…like a blood relation, a part of themselves,…with them wherever they went, ready to 
respond at any moment, like sensitive chords vibrating to a touch” (vii). The largest part of the 
meditation is dedicated to an examination of the townspeople’s response to the bells. The most 
disconnected and unappreciative listeners simply complain about the noise; others are reminded 
to think about the nature of God and to reinvent God in the image that most closely reflects their 
own priorities (viii). These listeners interpret God as an exaggeratedly masculine and distant 
father, a more human and Jovian character to whom they pray and whom they attempt to 
propitiate through church attendance, or a complex and baffling deity formed in a much more 
recognizable and human image: “a God of peace who patronized war; a gentle lamb who looked 
on at carnage complacently; a just God who condemned the innocent to suffer; an omnipotent 
God who was powerless to make his law supreme…” (ix). This version of God, the narrator 
notes, changes constantly, depending on fickle human concerns and trends. Humanity, clearly, 
has interpreted the meaning and need for existing institutions to suit themselves and shifting 
opinions. Reading the meditation as Grand’s commentary on the omnipresence of patriarchy 
makes sense of the last part of the meditation. Near the end of the Proem, Grand literally “rings a 
change” that forecasts the theme of her novel: change is coming. The narrator of the Proem 
emphatically declares that  
even in Morningquest a new voice of extraordinary sweetness had already 
been heard, not his, the voice of man; but theirs, the collective voice of 
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humanity, which declared that ‘He, watching,’ was the all-pervading good, 
the great moral law, the spirit of pure love, Elohim, mistranslated in the 
book of Genesis as ‘He’ only, but signifying the union to which all nature 
testifies, the male and female principles which together created the 
universe, the infinite father and mother, without whom, in perfect accord 
and exact equality, the best government of nations has always been 
crippled and abortive. (xi) 
As Ann Heilmann notes, the Proem’s long meditation on religion, philosophy, hegemony, or 
aesthetics, depending on how one reads the allegory, ends with a vision straight from Madame 
Blavatsky’s theosophical principles: “the Universal Divine Principle of double-gendered 
sexlessness as the origin of all cosmic development” (94). Grand’s vision of a prosperous 
future is one characterized by both spiritual and practical androgyny. This drastic change, of 
course, will not happen in the present; it is Grand’s vision for a better future for women. As 
the narratives of her three protagonists in The Heavenly Twins demonstrate, this theme is 
underscored by their suffering in the present. The Proem ends with the narrator asserting that 
while change is certainly coming, the townspeople are generally oblivious because the time 
has not yet come.  
     Naomi Lloyd, in “The Universal Divine Principle, the Spiritual Androgyne, and the 
New Age in Sarah Grand's the Heavenly Twins” (2009), reads the Proem as heavily 
influenced by Grand’s interest in theosophy. In Grand’s declaration of a new view of the 
deity as androgynous, she elevates those who understand the necessity for a “dual-sexed 
divine” (79) to the highest level of understanding in the city. Those who have undergone 
this spiritual awakening Morningquest understand "’Elohim’ to be ‘mistranslated in the 
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book of Genesis as 'He’; they believe  the term  to signify instead  ‘the union  to which all 
nature testifies, the male and female principles which together created the universe’” (Lloyd 
80).  
Adam Seth Lowenstein illuminates, however, Grand’s recourse to allegory, noting that the 
Proem’s mix of “mythical” and “prosaic” language results in “a kind of allegorical time” (434). 
Indeed, the folktale language and appeal to a mythical past results in “some temporal dissonance, 
some historical clash of past and present, present and future” that “generates a layered text often 
intended to neutralize or harmonize that dissonance, to recuperate an obsolescence” (Clarke, qtd. 
in Lowenstein 434). Like Schreiner, Grand here accesses the qualities of allegory that underscore 
its mythic implications, and also like Schreiner, she casts her (no pun intended) grand vision of 
the future for women in grave and mythic tones. The Proem is interrogative—it raises the kinds 
of questions that Levinas discusses in his definition of the saying. In its interpretive openness, it 
also offers cautious optimism for a more ethical future. This emphasis on a new conception of 
ethics for women will become the driving theme of her novel. As Lauren Simek ends her essay 
“Feminist ‘Cant’ and Narrative Selflessness in Sarah Grand’s New Woman Trilogy,” “Exploring 
the possibilities offered by novelistic narrative’s ambiguous sense of self and audience, Grand 
encourages women to cultivate a similar perspective, to develop the ability for unself-conscious 
selflessness, as well as the ability for active interpretation of that selflessness in themselves and 
others” (364). 
To write about women’s mythic and biblical past, re-centering the biblical experience on 
woman as Christ figure, is to reassert matriarchy as sacred—not in terms of reproduction—but in 
terms of power and centrality. Schreiner positions women in the present as messianic figures in 
their willingness to sacrifice present happiness and safety for future generations. This type of 
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self-sacrifice redeems the oppressive past of abnegation. To access the unconscious drives 
expressed most compellingly in symbols, folk motifs, and prophetic dreams is to enter into the 
realm of the saying. Uniting the saying and the said in their writing, New Woman writers 
envision the possibility of a just and ethical future for women through their commitment to one 
another in the present. These writers cross boundaries in their texts to re-frame their present 
difficulties in mythic tones; to imagine and to prophesy an indeterminate but transcendent future.  
5 NEW WOMAN AESTHETICS AND ETHICS 
     As Chapters Two and Three discuss, New Woman writers intentionally reach out to a 
community of women readers to build a shared vision of a future for women. Their suggestions 
about this future are not prescriptive; instead, Sarah Grand, Olive Schreiner, Mary 
Cholmondeley and others enhance the baseline arguments of Victorian feminist activists by 
imbuing their protagonists, first, with a shared language; and second, with transcendent dreams 
and experiences gesturing toward a feminist utopian vision of the future. Critics of the period 
generally assumed that New Woman novels were at least semi-autobiographical, and they 
particularly leveled this charge at those novels written as Kunstlerroman—Cholmondeley’s Red 
Pottage, Dixon’s The Story of a Modern Woman, and, especially, Grand’s The Beth Book—and 
those like Schreiner’s The Story of an African Farm that feature a failed woman artist-figure. 
However, these novels’ depictions of their artist-protagonists do not limn the career trajectory of 
their authors. Olive Schreiner, Sarah Grand, Mary Cholmondeley, and Ella Hepworth Dixon 
enjoyed considerable success, both financial and social. While their novels did not enter the 
literary canon, their work was nonetheless widely read and debated during the fin de siècle. Why, 
then, do their novels depict writing and publishing, particularly writing and publishing serious 
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works of fiction, as such a struggle for their protagonists? Are they suggesting a significant value 
in failure as a means of moving forward for women?  
     The last question to consider in this study, then, is this: How do these writers depict a 
generation of women authors and philosophers who will move women forward? Drawing again 
on the work of Emmanuel Levinas, I argue here that, in writing Kunstlerroman, these novelists 
distinguish between their own experiences and those of their protagonists, to depict the figure of 
the feminist artist-hero. The figure of the feminist artist-hero, an outsider working in exile, 
embodies the present struggle of the New Woman to enter the larger conversation of literature 
and art; however, precisely because she is the figure who will continue to document this struggle, 
she will be called to lead the next generation of women. In doing this, New Woman writers are 
building on the legacy of Elizabeth Browning’s Aurora Leigh, and depicting women whose 
desire to create art becomes a hero’s quest, mirroring the journey of traditional epic heroes. 
Reading the texts examined here through a series of characteristics or stages that are suggested 
by Levinas’s reading of Maurice Blanchot illuminates their authors’ depiction of their 
protagonists as heroic figures whose quest is artistic. These artist-heroes are characterized as 
tragic figures whose quest to create authentic art condemns them to exile, isolation, and fractured 
identities. 
     In “The Poet’s Vision,” an analysis of the aesthetic of Maurice Blanchot, Levinas describes 
artists as tragic but heroic exiles whose transcendent vision carries mythic implications. 
According to Levinas, writing like Blanchot’s does not lead us only to truth or a vision of reality; 
it leads to the “errancy of being—to being as a place of going astray, to the uninhabitable” (134). 
Great art leads to authenticity; it shines a light that “undoes the world, leading it back to its 
origin, to the over and over again, the murmur, ceaseless lapping of waves, a ‘deep past, never 
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long enough ago’” (135). This distinction between truth and authenticity is a touchstone for the 
New Woman artist-hero figures. In his early study of ethics and aesthetics, “Reality and Its 
Shadow,” Levinas asserts that the work of art exists outside of time, in what he calls the “hither 
side of time” or time’s “interstices” (131). Art must be more than simply a reflection of reality 
that leads to knowledge if it is to have any value. Thus, in this early study, Levinas reads artists 
as intentional myth-makers, deliberately obscure and enigmatic in their attempt to reach for 
something more than the real, something other and beyond language (142). Later, then, in his 
study of Blanchot, he expands on this distinction between the real and the transcendent, using the 
terms “truth” and “authenticity.” Truth is limited to depictions of the known world, the 
“sovereignty of self,” and the limits of history (130). In contrast, authentic literature, according 
to Levinas, goes beyond the real to the unthinkable, and to what he calls the “errancy” of being. 
The mission of the writer is to continue to engage with what is unknown, insecure, evading our 
grasp. We are called both backwards and forwards; authentic literature reminds us where we 
have been by connecting with a mythic past. It reminds us, especially, of our failures. But it also 
calls us forth into the nomadic existence of change and openness. This is the role of the 
protagonists discussed here. They reflect their creators’ understanding that for all of their current 
success, the future of women writers will be freighted with the responsibility to articulate a 
vision of the future as marked by change, possibility, and transformation. As Levinas notes, the 
artist-hero accepts the role of the “Eternal Wanderer … along the border of non-truth, a realm 
extending farther than the true” (136).  
     While the suffragist movement engaged in political advocacy on behalf of women, the New 
Woman novelists depicted feminist heroes as writers whose tragic lives would yield authentic 
writing. These novels, then, affirm the importance of written language (Levinas’s the Said) in 
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shaping the future for women, especially as the language that records women’s voices and 
narratives. That the feminist heroic figure is a writer is also significant because it reinforces the 
belief that literature, or more broadly, art, must not separate itself from its social and political 
context; that, instead, its power lies in its engagement with the lives of readers. Their vision of 
the role of art, particularly literature, is to “demonstrate a utopian, emancipatory potential in 
revealing the fissures and hidden pathways that run through the hegemonic structures and 
totalizing frameworks” (McDonald 16) in which they live and write. 
     The feminist artist-hero undergoes, in the course of her journey, a series of trials and 
challenges, but she finally experiences a fracturing of her identity that results from the 
confrontation between her ethics and the larger conventional morality (Mcdonald 36). This 
fracture transforms her into the type of hero she will become. Additionally, these novels 
underscore the notion that the New Women writers, their readers, and their protagonists, all 
inhabit what Levinas describes as the entretemps, the “meanwhile” inhabited by characters who 
exist only in the world of a novel. New Woman writers and their readers inhabit their own 
entretemps, the transitional time and space between the fin de siècle and an indeterminate future 
for women.   
5.1 The Solitary Hero 
     In “The Poet’s Vision,” Levinas first describes the solitude of the artist, someone who exists 
outside of the active world in “countless worlds conceived by thought, projected by imagination, 
or divined by instinct” that constitute the poet’s/author’s transcendent vision. He agrees with 
Blanchot that the artist is required to sublimate himself or herself to an art that has abandoned 
heroes and adventure, the old vision of “non-world” in favor of a new vision— “the being of 
beings,” and “the silence following the departure of the gods” (128). The characters depicted in 
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the four novels examined here are all orphans: Lyndall is one of three English children being 
raised on a farm in South Africa by a careless and disinterested guardian. Mary Erle’s 
unstructured childhood is the result of her mother’s death as a result of giving birth to Mary’s 
brother. The subsequent death of her father when she is a young adult forces Mary then to 
become the guardian of her orphaned brother. Beth’s father dies when she is a young child, and 
she is left to the less than tender mercies of an abusive mother. Hester Gresley’s parents died 
early in her childhood, and she is subsequently raised by an aunt.  
     Depictions of orphaned protagonists are certainly typical of Victorian literature; Laura Peters, 
in her study Orphan Texts: Victorian Orphans, Culture, and Empire (2000), reads the orphan 
figure as subverting the Victorian idealization of the domestic sphere. The orphan embodies 
difference, a character whose existence disturbs prevailing notions of rootedness and security 
(27). The female orphan is a particularly subversive character whose vulnerability can be read in 
terms of sexual availability and threat (19). Thus, here, the orphaned status of the protagonists 
signals two things to the reader: first, these young women have always been on a different path 
from their more conventional counterparts. Their orphaned or abandoned status marks them as 
figures who are already other; second, as orphans, these characters underscore the threat of 
sexual promiscuity that New Women were generally considered to pose.    
     In addition to depicting their protagonists as orphans, these authors go on to characterize their 
protagonists as solitary or exceptional—they are distinguished from others by their atypical 
pursuits or behavior. Their solitary pursuits or exceptionality mark them as prospective artists; as 
Levinas asserts, the artist is an outsider, someone who chooses difference even as a child.   
     Schreiner depicts Lyndall, for example, as the leader of the three children on the farm; she is 
skeptical of adult motives and confident in her ability to get what she wants. When she tells Em 
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that she plans to leave the farm and attend school in spite of their guardian’s wishes, she argues 
that “… nothing helps in this world … but to be very wise, and to know everything – to be 
clever” (11). She wants to be rich when she grows up, but she also craves knowledge: “there will 
be nothing that I do not know” (11). Lyndall patterns herself after Napoleon Bonaparte. She 
admires him precisely for his rise from common beginnings to become “master of the world” 
(12). Her assessment of Napoleon’s trajectory describes her own plan: “When he said a thing to 
himself, he never forgot it. He waited and waited and waited until it came at last” (12). Schreiner 
depicts Lyndall consistently as self-possessed and determined to make her own plans, a nascent 
leader despite her gender. Lyndall is an exceptional child, precocious, realistic, and persistent in 
demanding autonomy. Her departure from the farm to go to school is the result of her strong will; 
she has literally bullied her guardian into paying for her education. 
     Likewise, Dixon’s narrator in Chapter Two of The Story of a Modern Woman, “A Child,” 
emphasizes Mary Erle’s difference by locating her firmly in the entretemps of the fin de siècle: 
Born too late for the simple days of the fifties, when all it behooved a young girl 
to do was to mind her account-book, read her Tennyson, show a proper 
enthusiasm for fancy-work stitches, and finally, with many blushes, accept the 
hand of the first young man who desired to pay taxes and to fulfil the duties of a 
loyal British subject … Mary was yet too soon for the time when parents begin to 
take their responsibilities seriously, and when the girl is sometimes as carefully 
prepared, as thoroughly equipped, as her brother for the fight of life. (14) 
Left alone by her parents, Mary becomes a “strange, indolent child” (17) whose intellectual 
curiosity drives her to explore the outdoors rather than behave like a conventional little girl.  
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     The school-age Mary, whose mother has died, is subject to benevolent neglect by her father 
and subsequently becomes bookish: “She had only to pick out her volume. It was a revelation in 
the possibilities of life” (21).  The narrator notes that Mary led “an odd life” (25) much 
influenced by reading Rousseau; in early adolescence, serious and intense, Mary endured 
“[s]trange, anxious days, passed in the twilight of ignorance …” (25) Though she will later 
become a companion for her father, Mary is effectively self-raised after her mother dies. Dixon’s 
emphasis on Mary’s strangeness and the experimental nature of her childhood is insistent; the 
reader understands her as a solitary thinker who, left on her own, has chosen her own influences. 
Her ethical choices later in the novel will return her to this period in her life. 
     While Cholmondeley only sketches a description of Hester Gresley’s childhood, she foretells 
the intensity of the adult Hester’s commitment to her writing in the power and dominance of her 
imagination in childhood. Though her friend Rachel comes from the wealthier family, Hester is 
the leader who “told Rachel … what the London sparrows said to each other in the gutters, and 
how they considered the gravel path in the square was a deep river suitable to bathe in” (31). 
Hester concocts stories about princes rescuing princesses until she becomes bored, and then 
makes up stories about the trees leaving town each evening to visit their friends (31). When 
Hester enters society as a young woman, her aunt sees that she is “becoming a personage” about 
whom people wonder. She is expected to become someone singular (32).  
     The most extended account of the childhood of the exceptional artist figure is provided by 
Sarah Grand in The Beth Book (1897). Grand’s subtitle, Being a Study from the Life of Elizabeth 
Caldwell Maclure, a Woman of Genius, makes her intentions clear. Almost from birth, Beth 
Caldwell embodies difference and exceptionality. Discussing her infancy, the novel’s discursive 
narrator describes Beth as “a child of light” in nearly messianic terms, one who would be shaped 
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by “that light which illuminates the spirit” (34). While Beth has unusual facility with language 
and intense emotional responses to music and nature, she is a thinker whose “memory helped 
itself by the involuntary association of incongruous ideas” (41). She has visions; she is a 
rebellious child who spends “much of her time in school … in solitary confinement for breaches 
of the peace” (40). Early on, the narrator notes Beth’s certainty that she is called to something 
more that she cannot quite grasp, “something which eluded her—something from which she 
drifted further away as she grew older—some sort of vision which opened up fresh tracts to her” 
(52). Ultimately, the narrator comments that Beth is a visionary; when reliant on guiding visions, 
her character is integrated and strong. Her intellect, on the other hand, misleads her; she will, the 
narrator notes, spend her life vacillating between the two, making impulsive and unpredictable 
choices (52). However, the overriding characteristic that Beth possesses, like Hester, is her 
imaginative life, which compels her to make up poems and stories. As she grows older, she 
disappears from home and her abusive mother to wander alone, mentally composing stories and 
poems. Like Lyndall and Mary Erle, Beth has always shown signs of exceptional intelligence 
and independence. As a young girl, she endured beatings from her mother because of her 
precocity. Grand describes her protagonist as a child visionary who is singled out by others in the 
community as oddly compelling. As she tells her friend Sammy, “… things come into my mind, 
but I don’t think them, and I can’t say them. They don’t come in words. It’s more like seeing 
them, you know, but you don’t see them with your eyes, but with something inside yourself” 
(200). From her earliest years, she invents poems and stories that “just come to her” and that 
others often reject as her work. Writing is natural for her; as she tells her Aunt Victoria in an 
offhand manner, she plans to write books that at least “won’t be worse than anything in the 
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Bible” (213). As an adolescent, she learns to discriminate between good and bad writing; “by the 
effect of bad books upon her … she learned the value of good ones” (215).  
     The authors of these novels position their protagonists, then, as thinkers, nascent leaders or 
artists with rich inner lives. Already as children they have been shaped by tragedy in the loss of 
one or both parents. All of these characters childhoods that reinforce their difference or their 
solitude to a moment when they are called out of their ordinary world. For most, the move into 
the world is a next step that will call them to the quest to write. 
5.2 The Call to a Quest  
     For Levinas, the artist’s experience is characterized not only by solitude or exceptionality, but 
by exile. The nomadic existence of the artist sets her outside comfort and convention and casts 
her into the condition that will produce insight. Levinas describes this condition in “The Poet’s 
Vision” through the metaphor of light and darkness. The illumination that is the consequence of 
exile is delayed. The call to being—in this case, the call to write—is answered from an 
understanding of the “ebb and flow of Nothingness and Being” (128). To undergo homelessness 
and exile is to be subjected to suffering and self-examination that will be fruitful later. Levinas 
employs an elegant mythic reference for this period in the artist’s development when he declares 
that the “owl of Minerva does not spread its wings until dusk” (128).   
     The New Women writers whose work is examined here depict homeless or exiled tragic 
protagonists who desperately seek to create art from trauma. In some cases, these characters are 
jolted out of the ordinary world by financial crisis. Mary Erle, for example, must find a way to 
support herself and her brother after her father’s death. Hester Gresley is shaken into action by 
her friend Rachel’s abrupt descent into poverty after her parents’ deaths. Later, she is exiled from 
her once-comfortable life with her aunt in the city to dependent status in the stultifyingly 
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conventional home of her clergyman brother. These women both suffer a loss of status and a 
separation from their friends. 
     In contrast, both Lyndall and Beth choose to leave comfortable homes to assert their 
independence and to claim their autonomy. Lyndall has spoken throughout her childhood of her 
desire for more education and her certainty that acquiring an education will be the first step to 
the life she desires, the life of an artist. Beth leaves a home that has never truly been comfortable 
to seek freedom and autonomy through marriage to a man she wrongly believes will support her 
in her desire to educate herself. 
     For these hero-artists, this move into the unknown is also analogous to Campbell’s first stage 
of the mythical hero’s journey, which “signifies that destiny has summoned the hero and 
transferred his spiritual center of gravity from within the pale of his society to a zone unknown” 
(53). In each case, the artist-hero crosses a threshold into a different life, and through that new 
life, she identifies her quest to become an artist. That quest then impels her actions and 
characterizes her adult life. Dramatic, even theatrical accounts of their suffering form their 
stories, not descriptions of their art or their philosophies. Intensely alone in their drive to write, 
they exile themselves from others. Like classical tragic protagonists, they are flawed, rebellious, 
aspiring to be more than their society wishes them to be. Like other tragic protagonists, they are 
punished for their desires, but they also experience transformation. 
5.3 Obstacles, Trials and Tests 
     Levinas characterizes the role of the artist as struggling for that transcendent experience that 
will impel her vision. If literature is separate from the real world, its genesis must lie in an 
experience that is both “a fundamental experience, and an experience of the origin” (130). Thus, 
the protagonists here experience a series of misfortunes that shape their poetic vision. In the 
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typical hero story, the tests and trials he undergoes test his resolve, strength, and fitness for the 
role of champion. For the feminist artist-hero, the misfortunes she undergoes and the obstacles 
she faces all stem from her identity as a young woman. Artist-heroes face a lack of educational 
preparation, support for their work; their work is rejected or destroyed. While the obstacles they 
encounter initially stymie these protagonists, they will finally experience a transformative ethical 
encounter that will transform them and ready them to produce works that reach beyond the 
realistic novel to work that will engage readers beyond simple truths to an open-ended and just 
vision. 
     Dixon consistently depicts Mary Erle, for example, as someone with potential who is 
struggling to find a foothold despite her lack of preparation for “the fight of life” (14). Dixon 
depicts Mary’s encounter with the realities of publishing in Chapter X, “In Grub Street.” Like 
her paintings, Mary’s first attempts at writing are rejected. Although she simply tries to 
reproduce the kind of popular story she has read, formulaic and predictable, her editor finds these 
efforts barely acceptable. Both magazine editors Mary approaches accept her work only because 
of her father’s name and her social connections. Mary’s attempt to write an authentic text is 
brutally rejected by the Editor of Illustrations, who has requested that she try her hand at a novel. 
She tells Perry the editor has rejected her novel because the subject was “too sad—too painful” 
and would be rejected by British readers (149). She has instead been instructed to produce a 
novel that would conform to the popular and successful formula of “a ball in the first volume; a 
picnic and a parting in the second; and an elopement, which must, of course, be prevented at the 
last moment by the opportune death (in a hospital) of the wife, or the husband…in the last” 
(149). Her editor attempts to explain it to her: The British public does not want to read novels 
that are “too much like life;” instead, Mary should strive for a tone that is “breezy” (183). Mary, 
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exhausted by her efforts, does not feel like she can accomplish the required breeziness. Instead, 
she “can't help seeing things as they are, and the truth is so supremely attractive” (183). The 
editor also notes her need to include more love scenes, which the public likes and which 
“illustrate so well” (183). Finally, she needs to ensure a happy ending. No one wants to read the 
morbid novels of Russian and French writers; the British reading public wants to read “pretty 
stories” with “a wedding at the end” (183). While clearly this episode contains Dixon’s scornful 
assessment of the reading habits of the British reading public and the state of popular women’s 
fiction, it also depicts Mary’s struggle to engage with her emerging vision that her work can have 
a power of its own. She is accepted as a Grub Street hack but rejected when she attempts to lift 
her work to the level of serious social critique. Mary struggles to publish work with an authentic 
voice, but authentic work is necessarily strange and obscure; the editor, a powerful man who 
controls the commercial apparatus, sensibly rejects her odd and melancholy work in favor of 
making money. 
     Schreiner depicts Lyndall as an aspirational figure, striving for power and agency. In her 
conversations with Waldo after returning to the farm, Lyndall describes her efforts to write plays 
and argues that the education offered her as a young woman was an inadequate preparation for 
anything but wifehood. Having seized the opportunity to go to school, Lyndall is frustrated and 
disappointed by the trivial subjects taught to young women. She tells Waldo “… of all cursed 
places under the sun … a girls’ boarding-school is the worst. They are called finishing schools, 
and … [t]hey finish everything but imbecility and weakness, and that they cultivate” (96). 
Lyndall powerfully articulates the defeats she has suffered and the tragic waste of her potential. 
As she recounts to Waldo, she effectively educated herself and tried to write: “I bought books 
and newspapers, and at night I sat up. I read and epitomized what I read; and I found time to 
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write some plays and find out how hard it is to make your thoughts look anything but imbecile 
fools when you paint them with ink and paper” (96). Through Lyndall, Schreiner indicts the 
substandard education available to ambitious young women. Lyndall, the aspiring writer and 
actor, has been defeated by her own lack of preparation and knowledge. If Mary Erle is defeated 
by entrenched patriarchal structures, Lyndall is discouraged by a sense of her own inadequacy. 
Schreiner depicts Lyndall as a kind of wasted capital; the obstacles she faces are too much for 
one young woman to overcome. Throughout Lyndall’s development as a child and now as a 
young woman, Schreiner has positioned her as a strong and confident voice, someone with an 
authentic vision. Lyndall continues to try to articulate her vision; she is driven by a vision she 
cannot give form. Her tragedy is that she does not have the tools to articulate that vision. 
     Cholmondeley presents Hester Gresley with a series of tests and challenges that confirm her 
role as a woman of genius. Hester’s novel, An Idyll in East London, both establishes her 
brilliance and causes controversy because of its subject matter. Because most people do not 
understand that she has based the experiences described in the novel on those of her friend 
Rachel, Hester is thought by many to have invented the details in the novel, a critique of the lives 
that the poor are forced to live. As the narrator points out, the novel was met with “astonished 
indignation and admiration, and her acquaintances—not her friends—were still wondering how 
she came to know so much of a life of which they decided she could know nothing” (38). 
Hester’s early success hints that she already has access to her own voice and a complex interior 
life. 
     Hester’s exile to her brother’s house presents her with a number of obstacles to completing 
her second novel. In a conventional household, she is expected to take care of children and 
entertain visitors instead of spending hours in her room writing. When friends enquire about her 
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progress on the new book, Hester replies that she manages a few hours per day, but “of course—
it is very natural—they think that rather self-important and silly. I am thought very silly here, 
Rachel” (78). Driven to write, she destroys her health by rising early in the morning to work on 
her second novel. Describing Hester’s vision and her solitary struggle, Cholmondeley positions 
her as the idealist, the writer or artist who is isolated by her own need to communicate her vision, 
her transcendent experience, to readers. Homeless, exiled from those who care for her, isolated, 
she struggles to tell an authentic story. The obstacles she faces as a dependent woman are 
significant, but Hester’s genius sustains her:  
“I cannot reach up to it. I cannot get near it,” she said. “When I try to write it is 
like drawing an angel with spread wings with a bit of charcoal…I make 
everything commonplace and vulgar by putting it into words. I go alone into the 
woods and sit for hours quite still with the trees…And I come home, Rachel, and 
I try, sometimes I try for half the night, to find words to translate it into. But there 
are no words, or if there are I cannot find them ... “(80-81). 
This passage is perhaps the most direct articulation of the writer’s engagement with her authentic 
vision. Hester’s work is beyond her ability to put into words; she is compelled to try and to 
sublimate her needs and herself to the struggle to which she feels called. Intense and passionate 
about her need to write, Hester’s eyes show “an infinite patience … that patience of enthusiasm 
which will cast away its very soul and all its best years for the sake of an ideal” (53). 
Cholmondeley underscores Hester’s character as the inspired writer who, driven by her need to 
create, will deny herself any comfort or ease and overcome any challenge or obstacle.  
     Similarly, Grand depicts Beth as a writer who has understood her calling since childhood. She 
has left home and an abusive mother to find what she hopes will be the peace and stability she 
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needs to become a writer. A marriage that quickly becomes unhappy motivates her to study and 
write. While Grand never clarifies just what Beth is writing, she determines that she will 
continue to read and to eventually make a career of writing: “She meant to write and write and 
write until she acquired power of expression. About what she should have to express she never 
troubled herself. It was the need to express what was in her that had set her to work” (387-88). 
Beth, like Rachel, is depicted as a visionary hero who is compelled to communicate experiences 
that are elusive. She has left home to marry a man she barely knows because she craves freedom 
and opportunity to study and write. However, in the course of her marriage, she has discovered 
that her husband does not approve of her aspirations and wants her to be a more conventional 
wife. He is coarse and unrefined, and Beth finds his lovemaking monotonous. In addition, the 
lack of privacy in her marriage offends her (Grand 363). She finds herself losing her vitality, as 
she no longer takes the solitary walks that have sustained her and inspired her writing (372). The 
final trial for Beth that encourages her to leave her husband is her discovery that he is having an 
affair, although beyond being affronted, she does not particularly care that he is betraying her 
(424). Later trials will provide the impetus for her to leave home. Again, like Cholmondeley, 
Grand positions her character as one compelled to express herself and determined to overcome 
any trials and tests to achieve her goal. 
     The trials that these characters undergo, proceeding from gender limitations, defeat Mary and 
Lyndall. Neither character will initially achieve her goal to write authentic works. Hester and 
Beth, on the other hand, are emboldened by their suffering and confirmed in their quests to write 
important and authentic books. As Levinas argues, the artist closely tracks the tragic hero figure 
of ancient works. Whether they triumph over their challenges or not, they and their art will be 
transformed by their ordeals.  
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This aspect of the New Woman Kunstlerroman, the obstacles and challenges faced by artist 
protagonists, has been explored in depth by critics. Depictions of the feminist artist figure, 
especially their suffering and trials, serve as coded messages to aspiring woman readers about 
their own standing in an inhospitable culture. These critical readings of this stage of the journey 
of the artist-hero interrogate the writer’s intention to comment on the relationship between the 
heroic feminist artist and the power of the larger context for her work. Analyses of the role of 
these protagonists underscore Levinas’s contention that authentic work both transcends and 
interrogates the cultural context that produces it.  
     Ann Ardis, for example, in her 1990 study New Women, New Novels places her discussion of 
New Woman Kunstlerroman in the chapter entitled “Retreats.” She describes “the ‘boomerang’ 
plotting of novels that punish New Women for their political and artistic ambitions and the 
representation of honorable retreat in self-reflexive novels about the antagonism New Women 
encounter as they pursue their utopian visions” (165).  Additionally, in the section Chapter 5 
“Crossing the Line,” subtitled “Reconceiving Maternity,” Ardis discusses the ways in which 
Victorian women redefine maternity more broadly to provide an acceptable basis for their 
reformist efforts and their movement into the marketplace. She extends this discussion to 
examples of New Woman novels wherein protagonists articulate their creative production in 
maternal terms. Ardis notes that mid-Victorian women writers like Elizabeth Gaskell cast their 
writing as an extension of their domestic activity and therefore not a violation of the woman’s 
private sphere of influence. Late-century New Woman writers move a step further away from 
traditional visions of maternity in reimagining it in “nonbiological terms” (127). The most 
prominent example from the discussion is Hester Gresley in Mary Cholmondeley’s Red Pottage, 
who articulates her grief at the loss of her book in terms of motherhood, as if her book were her 
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child. As Ardis argues, Cholmondeley is doing something quite different here from the mid-
Victorian depiction of writing as acceptable and womanly; she instead conflates artistic 
production with biological reproduction, taking place in the same sphere (Ardis 129). 
     Lyn Pykett, in her 1999 essay, “Portraits of the Artist as a Young Woman: Representations of 
the Female Artist in the New Woman Fiction of the 1890s,” argues that this fiction is one 
example of the “self-reflexivity” of New Woman fiction, which “foregrounds the conditions of 
its own production” (136). Pykett convincingly argues that the figure of the New Woman artist 
or writer is used by these authors to explore four issues: the feminist artist as invader of 
masculine space, as a symbol of conflicted female interiority, as an investigator of the nature and 
function of art, and as an opportunity to discuss the role of politics or activism and art. However, 
by the end of her essay, she suggests that novelists imply a need for deeper Freudian analysis 
into the exploration of female desire, “oceanic longings for self-transcendence as well as the 
desire for self-expression; the desire to speak up and speak out; the desire for a form of creativity 
other than the biological one of maternity” (148). 
     Rita Kranidis also explores the feminist artist figure in Subversive Discourse: The Cultural 
Production of Late Victorian Feminist Novels (1995) as indicative of writers rejecting 
conventional, patriarchal definitions of art and style, particularly the pronouncements of the 
Aesthetes. Authors challenge aesthetic ideology by demonstrating the obstacles to women’s 
literary and artistic production, how they are shut out from the privileged world of art and the 
artist. However, Kranidis too notes the indeterminacy that characterizes the narratives:  
     The feminists’ struggle for social and literary self-determination produced texts that open 
themselves to socially and historically based readings, precisely because of their inculcated, 
apparent awareness of late Victorian ‘culture’s discursive agency.’ Feminists both used and 
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manipulated cultural and literary conventions to create texts that are, paradoxically, both open-
ended and self-referential. (105) 
5.4 Fragmentation and Transformation 
     In the novels studied here, the artist-heroes must make choices that force them to assert their 
own personal ethics in conflict with conventional definitions of morality. This moment both 
fractures and transforms their identities, as Levinas asserts: “Crucial to the notion of the 
musicality of the artwork is the ethical sensibility which animates it, which is contrasted with 
traditional morality …” (19). McDonald goes on to discuss the concept of the tragic in its 
presentation of the individual’s identity as “diasporic,” irremediably split (21). The individual 
must choose between the system of morality he or she has been taught that provides the rules for 
living a good life and the ethical choice that occurs in the immediate present. This fracturing of 
the self, which puts the very identity into question, can result in the subversion of moral and 
political authority and “an incitement to ethical transcendence without recourse to any settled 
sense of self” (26). This “nomadic” self, an indeterminate state, resides in a region that is  
“nonconceptual…antiepistemological…and nonmoral,” which is “trespassed, most often, in 
literature, by the genre of tragedy” (27). This fracture of the self, I suggest, moves the artist-hero 
permanently outside the comfort of the domestic sphere. Her decision to assert her own morality 
over the accepted code of morality places her firmly in the role of exile and affirms her authentic 
role as a writer whose fractured identity frees her from writing simple truths and prepares her to 
reach for art that engages with a world of her own imagining.  
     While the New Woman writers do not present classical tragic heroines in Lyndall, Mary, 
Beth, or Hester, these women all experience tragic loss of identity in facing the intersection 
Levinas describes. These texts then illuminate not only the potential of literature to examine the 
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formation of the ethical identity but the struggle of the woman artist specifically to produce work 
that engages the reader in the recognition of tragedy along with its attendant hope for an as-yet 
undetermined future. 
     Schreiner depicts Lyndall as transformed through failed maternity into a saintly figure who 
comes to understanding only as she lays dying. Believing that she is unprepared to accept the 
role of artist or writer, Lyndall surrenders to her lover, but she is unwilling to marry and accept 
the consequences of being a wife and mother. Schreiner locates the fragmentation of Lyndall’s 
identity in the trauma of this confrontation between the culture’s expectations and Lyndall’s 
determined resistance. In the aftermath of her decision, as Lyndall is dying, she still does not 
deviate from her determined belief in the power of the will and knowledge: “It is thinking and 
thinking of things that makes them real … when you draw your mind together, and resolve that a 
thing shall not be, it gives way before you; it is not” (154). However, near to death, Lyndall 
atones for a life spent in isolation; she has allowed no one to touch her emotionally except her 
dead child, and now she sees herself as “a poor, weak soul striving after good … in the end it 
learnt, through tears and much pain, that holiness is an infinite compassion for others; that 
greatness is to take the common things of life and walk truly among them; that … happiness is a 
great love and much serving” (154). Schreiner ultimately depicts Lyndall as a failed artist who 
was never able to articulate an elusive vision but has been transformed into a saint through 
tragedy. 
     Mary Erle faces her own ethical crisis when she chooses to obey her dead friend Alison’s 
exhortation: “Promise me that you will never, never do anything to hurt another woman … I 
don’t suppose for an instant you ever would. But here come times in our lives when we can do a 
great deal of good, or an incalculable amount of harm. If women only used their power in the 
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right way! If we were only united we could lead the world. But we’re not—we’re not …” (213). 
When Mary replies “… but we shall be by and by. All we modern women are going to help each 
other, not to hinder. And there’s a great deal to do—” (214), Cholmondeley prepares the reader 
for the later scene in which Mary refuses to run away with Vincent. Cholmondeley frames the 
debate, the fracturing moment for Mary, as her confrontation with the conventional belief that 
romantic love trumps any ethical misgivings Mary may have. However, Cholmondeley reverses 
this more predictable view when Mary, instead, asserts the primacy of her connection with 
another woman:  
“I can’t, I won’t, deliberately injure another woman. Think how she would suffer! 
Oh, the torture of women’s lives—the helplessness, the impotence, the emptiness! 
… All we modern women mean to help each other now. We have a bad enough 
time as it is, … surely we needn’t make it any worse by our own deliberate acts!” 
(255). 
For Hester, the confrontation is even more dramatic. Hester’s intense connection to her work 
reflects Levinas’ argument about the fragmentation of the self that the ethical artist encounters 
when her personal ethics come into conflict with an unethical moral code (McDonald 17). 
Confronted with her brother’s unethical act in destroying her manuscript, Hester instinctively 
pushes the knowledge away, inadvertently hurting a young child. The trauma of the loss of her 
novel pushes Hester into a breakdown wherein she conflates the loss of her novel with her own 
actions in hurting Regie. She is sure she has committed the murder of a child in the same way he 
has murdered her “child.” Her vision has been that transcendent vision of which Levinas 
speaks—she has sublimated herself in service to an art she feels compelled to create, and its loss 
empties her. As she explains to the Bishop, “I was impelled to do it by what you perhaps will call 
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a blind instinct, what I, poor simpleton and dupe, believed at the time to be nothing less than the 
will of God” (335). Hester’s ethical vision has come into conflict with facile and dishonest 
morality with its destructive power. Her vision has been pure and compelling, but her brother 
represents the damage that dishonest religious and patriarchal hegemonies have done to women 
of genius. Her great work irremediably lost, Hester too now exists in the entretemps, suspended 
in grief.  
     Grand depicts Beth, like both Mary and Hester, as the artist whose ethical decision causes her 
to reject the role of the artist. Grand’s rejection of the writing life, a solitary and suffering one for 
Beth, should be read as a rejection of writing as a vocation for the woman of genius that will 
make a difference in the lives of others. She has positioned Beth as a writer whose work has the 
potential to be great; Beth is the writer for whom women have been waiting, but it is clear that 
they are not yet ready for her. Like Mary Erle, Lyndall, and Hester Gresley, Beth represents the 
figure of the woman writer who feels compelled to write authentically but has not yet found her 
readers. 
     Ultimately, Grand has Beth articulate a philosophy of literature that mirrors Levinas’ 
description of art as reflecting authenticity. Rejecting art for art’s sake, she contends that “what 
we want from the written word that reaches us all is help and advice, comfort and 
encouragement” (476). However, later, after leaving her husband and exiling herself from her 
friends, she rejects “her pretty talent for writing, her love of turning phrases, her play on the 
music of words” (540) in favor of a calling to speak. She has come to believe that while she 
chose writing as a vocation because of egotism and ambition, oratory has chosen her, and she has 
no choice but to follow her own clear power. The novel ends, too, with her recognition of the 
man who fulfills the vision she had seen of the ideal man to whom she would devote herself. 
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5.5 Resolution 
     For Levinas, the artist-hero ends her quest as a new woman. She has been tested and has 
failed, overcome by her own lack of preparation, the power of conventional bias, or her own lack 
of conviction. She has struggled with a choice that threatens her own sense of personal ethics. 
Making the more difficult choice, she has triumphed ethically. Ultimately, the quest is the point. 
The artist-hero is not triumphant—she is authentic. She is transformed by the breaking down and 
reconstruction of a new identity. She represents the ethical struggle of the artist-hero who will 
lead others into a mythical, emancipatory future by writing a new world that moves her readers 
beyond observable truth and knowledge into imagination. In Levinasian terms, these protagonists 
represent a transitional generation of writers who exist in an entretemps that does not yet offer 
them a voice. In an especially prescient example, Schreiner employs a speech by Lyndall to 
affirm the power of authentic art to imbue the modern reader with a sense of continuity with the 
past as well as a connection to a utopian future: 
When my own life feels small, and I am oppressed with it, I like to crush together, 
and see it in a picture, in an instant, a multitude of disconnected unlike phases of 
human life—a medieval monk with his string of beads pacing the quiet orchard, 
and looking up from the grass at his feet to the heavy fruit-trees; little Malay boys 
playing naked on a shining sea-beach; a Hindoo philosopher alone under his 
Banyan tree thinking, thinking, thinking so that in the thought of God he may lose 
himself; a troop of Bacchanalians dressed in white, with crowns of vine-leaves, 
dancing along the Roman streets; a martyr on the night of his death, looking 
through a narrow window and feeling that he already has the wings that shall bear 
him up … a Kaffer witch doctor seeking for herbs by moonlight while from the 
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huts on the hillside come the sounds of dogs barking, and the voices of women 
and children…I like to see it all; I feel it run through me … (114). 
This remarkable speech affirms the artist’s ability to transcend boundaries of time and space to 
understand the implications of the connections between her own solitude and the other lives she 
can imagine. The artist conjures images from the interstices, the “gaps in time” that are 
unrepresentable in language (Mcdonald 18). Finally, the passage also affirms Levinas’ 
contention in Poetry and Resurrection, underscored in the novels examined here, that writers tell 
stories that carry traces of previous stories as a trace of “an immemorial or unrepresentable past, 
of a radical alterity and transcendence” (McDonald 33). 
 
6 CONCLUSION: INTERSECTIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
This study comprises the convergence of a group of late nineteenth century 
women novelists, a twentieth century philosopher, and a twenty-first century perspective. I 
became interested in the New Woman novels initially because they were so strange and 
unpredictable; they seemed not to conform to any predictable conventions. These novelists 
clearly were self-consciously responding to the fin de siècle conversation about women’s rights 
contextualized in debates about “wild women,” bicycling, chaperones, women’s suffrage, 
sensible clothing, venereal disease, and marriage reform. They seemed to be presenting their side 
of the overall debate in the polemical speeches and conversations they invented for their 
protagonists. They also embedded the narratives about their protagonists in novels that were 
daringly innovative and sometimes frankly just strange in their interpolations of allegory, myth, 
folktale, visions, and dreams. The novels were both scandalous and popular during the fin de 
siècle, often running through several printings. While the novels were, as Teresa Mangum notes, 
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generally considered “middlebrow” even before the term was invented, such a luminary as Mark 
Twain was a fan of Sarah Grand’s work. The New Woman novelists succeeded in recruiting 
many of their readers to the suffragist cause as well. After considerable success, however, they 
seemed just to disappear, never becoming part of the accepted canon. Only after they were 
“rediscovered” in the late 1970s by Gail Cunningham, Elaine Showalter, and most helpfully, 
Ann Ardis, in their assessments of Victorian women writers did they become the subject of 
scholarly study. After reading critical analyses by a range of critics including Ann Ardis, Ann 
Heilman, Talia Schaffer, Sally Ledger, Lyn Pykett, and Teresa Mangum, I noted the consensus 
that the New Woman writers had written problematical novels that engaged with the condition of 
late-Victorian women but also appeared to be responding to the state of the novel post-George 
Eliot. 
     I sought a theoretical structure that might integrate the common characteristics of the 
novels—generally realist narrative, polemical sections, and experimental interpolations-- and 
account for them holistically. When I encountered Rachel Hollander’s essay “Daniel Deronda 
and the Ethics of Alterity,” which appeared in a volume edited by Donald R. Wehrs and David P. 
Haney entitled Levinas and Nineteenth Century Literature: Ethics and Otherness from 
Romanticism through Realism (2009), her reading of the novel through the philosophy of 
Emmanuel Levinas successfully resolved the problem of the two distinct plot threads. She reads 
the two disparate plot threads as Eliot’s effort to engage with the transitional nature of the late-
Victorian period that rejects sympathy in favor of openness and indeterminacy and the more 
open-ended plot and ending for Gwendolen Harleth as responding to the problem of the alterity 
or unknowability of the other. Hollander’s assertion that the fin de siècle period was 
characterized by the work of writers attempting to respond to this need seemed promising. Wehrs 
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and Haney’s introduction to their collection posited that reading Victorian novels through 
Levinas illuminates the way those novels grapple with the limits of personal freedom.  
     Because I had read the section of Levinas’s study Totality and Infinity entitled “Ethics and the 
Face,” I began there. Because Levinas grounds ethics in relationships, in real, embodied life and 
experience, I saw a parallel between his description of the vulnerability of the face-to-face 
interaction and the relationships that the New Woman novelists describe. They move from 
writing essays to writing novels and short stories because fiction provides the framework for 
telling stories about the New Woman, who replaces the Angel in the House, in terms of lived 
experience. As they envision a more open system of ethics, they imagine that system in terms of 
relationship.  
     Most importantly, however, the face-to-face relationship for Levinas is based on the self’s call 
to responsibility for the other, the obligation for the other. For the readers of New Woman 
fiction, feminine altruism, always within the domestic sphere, is the fundamental demand of 
Victorian culture for women to be considered ethical. How can they invent a new ethics that 
allows them to move forward into a new century in a more equitable system? Here, Levinas 
offers a new way of thinking about altruism that will be shared and equitable.  
     Levinas discusses the ethics of alterity in terms of openness and indeterminacy; I 
saw in the novelists’ generic explorations their efforts to link theme and structure. Bakhtin’s 
discussion of folk laughter and the carnivalesque, which provides another avenue for subverting 
the hegemonic demands placed on women, illuminated some of the most striking innovations in 
the New Woman tradition. Their use of the rogue, the fool, and the clown as subversive and 
comic characters also denote openness and change. 
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     I encountered Levinas’s ideas about the said and the saying in Robert Eaglestone’s 1997 
study Ethical Criticism: Reading After Levinas, which reads the theorist’s discussion of ethics 
and discourse in Otherwise than Being. In Levinas’s definition of these two concepts about 
discourse, the face calls the subject into discourse and thus makes possible reasoned dialogue in 
the cause of justice. In my reading, the pairing of polemics and narrative innovations—dreams, 
visions, allegories, and poetical proems--in New Woman novels is illuminated and integrated 
when considered through the lens of Levinas’s concepts of the said and the saying. This reading 
resolves the inclusion of two such apparently disparate characteristics. The effect of language 
that concretizes and fixes ideas is the power of language that the New Women interrogate in their 
novels. They are not only indicting the power of the controlling narrative but resisting its power 
by creating, in dialogue with their readers, a feminist language of their own. 
     They engage with the transcendent power of the saying, the moment of connection and calling 
in the face-to-face encounter, a moment that is unsayable, but locating the power of connection 
between women and a vision for an expansive future in mythic visions, allegories, and dreams. 
Like the saying, these passages in the novels interrogate a future that is possible by appropriating 
the power of the mythic past.  
     Finally, to bring these ideas full circle, I employ Levinas’s theories about the entretemps from 
Reality and its Shadow and the description of the tragic writer/artist from “The Poet’s Vision” in 
the last chapter. The New Woman writers do not depict themselves in their novels about women 
writers. Instead, they depict tragic, exiled, visionary women who are called to write. These 
figures carry the burden of articulating a more open future, documenting in writing the next step 
for women. None of the kunstlerroman examined here ends happily; true to Levinas’s 
description, the artist-heroes depicted in these novels are tragic figures exiled from conventional 
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relationships and domestic settings. They are aspirational figures looking toward a more hopeful 
future but attempting to reconcile themselves and their desires to a still-oppressive present. 
     This study suggests some continued examinations, particularly, first, to anticipate objections 
from feminist critics. The criticism levelled at Levinas by Simone de Beauvoir and Luce Irigaray 
is for his sexist language, his relegation of women to secondary status, and his apparent 
masculine bias in his exploration of the erotic. I suggest here, however, that the theorist’s 
overarching theory of ethics formation and the limits of personal freedom should and can 
resonate for women. While Levinas’s ideas were born out of the devastation of the Holocaust 
and the continual cycle of anti-semitism, women continue to struggle with the consequences of 
centuries of struggle and oppression. The fundamental concepts of the face-to-face encounter, I 
argue, are gender-neutral. Levinas’s theories offer women access to indeterminacy and openness, 
the non-definition needed for a more global and non-gendered system of ethics. 
     The application of theories of ethics formation and the implications of Levinas’s theories 
might also be examined in contrast with Victorian novelists’ interrogation of sympathy. Early 
feminist novels, particularly works by Charlotte and Emily Bronte, offer potential texts to be 
examined in light of the ethics of alterity. Certainly, early feminist artist figures, particularly the 
protagonists of Browning’s “Aurora Leigh” or Bronte’s Jane Eyre, offer context for my study of 
later feminist artist figures. 
     Additionally, more work is called for in examining productive intersections in the work of 
Levinas and Bakhtin. Both consider the manner in which written language and narrative structure 
offer new ways of critiquing the dominant narrative. Additionally, both consider figures that 
exist in the margins and serve to illuminate the culture they critique through the flexible form of 
the novel.  
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     In writing about the consequences of written language and concretizing the transcendent, 
Levinas asserts that every book is already in conversation with other texts, those already written 
and those that have not yet been written. I hope this study begins a conversation with other 
studies yet to be written. 
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